Air carrier Captain reported being pressured to depart with incomplete DG documents and an incomplete General Declaration. After extensive delays the Captain elected to call in fatigue.

Narrative

The following summation is being composed to document and satisfy FOM and regulatory requirements for reporting on events covered under the different reporting programs. It should be looked at holistically to understand all aspects that came into my consideration. The bottom line is as the Captain for the flight; I felt an excessive attitude existed from outside the cockpit to create a situation that put safety; fatigue; legality; and company policy as afterthoughts. The sole focus was on 'meeting the schedule' and efforts were extensively made to encourage the crew to fly into ZZZZ without proper documentation of general declarations or Dangerous Goods. My unwillingness to accept those pressures eventually resulted in too much time passing and a decision to call in fatigued was warranted. The details are what follow along with citations relating to my understanding of company policy and regulations.Aircraft X was originally scheduled to depart at XA15 with a block time of 11:23. As the Captain; I had set my body clock/sleep schedule on the previous two nights to be wide awake and alert for the flight. Given the recent incidents that have been communicated to us via the company about errors in ZZZZ operations (flt level issues; communications; emergency procedures) and the dire consequences to all of Company operations if it happens again; this sleep model is key to getting the flight right. I consider through my training at Company that the Threat and Error Management (TEM) process relies heavily on this level of alertness by the crew and especially that of the Captain.Aircraft X blocked out just before scheduled time and after engine start we experienced a flight control binding issue with both forward and aft yoke inputs on both yokes and reported this to Maintenance and Dispatch. ZZZ Maintenance requested we block in and that occurred after notifying Dispatch; it was approximately XA23 local. Maintenance informed us they needed to do a more exhaustive search after the initial survey of the aircraft controls resulted in no solutions and I made the decision to go back inside given the environmental temps and possible delay. Once inside; I notified ops of our location and throughout the Maintenance process communicated with Dispatch. At approximately XC22 local ZZZ ops told me that they were being asked if it was possible to trans-load and get done before XC22 for 'crew duty day'. ZZZ ops declined that request. Approximately at XD00 local I was informed that the flight was canceled and shortly after that I spoke with the Dispatch rep. I indicated to Dispatch that the proposed departure time was not considering our sleep cycles and that I would be unable to immediately go back to sleep given when I had slept in preparation for the all night flight. Dispatch connected me to the Duty Officer and he was made aware of my concern. He indicated he understood and got the flight pushed an additional 2 hours and told me to call him back if I couldn't sleep. Again I said I thought this was not the best course of action based on myself and the conversations I had been having with the crew. The Director of Operations (DO) said that was as late as they could leave and be able to keep the schedule moving. At this point; crew scheduling informed us it would take an extra 45 mins to get my relief pilot to a hotel and again; no consideration of his rest was included. As predicted; I was unable to sleep a great deal but after some sleep I felt that I would be able to operate safely and within my personal limitations if we were able to make the scheduled take-off time. On the way to the airport; I asked Dispatch for permission for an early departure since the plane was loaded from the night before; this request was approved for up to 30 minutes early. Additionally; I asked Dispatch to clarify that our Company call sign had been changed to Company Y. It was confirmed that ATC and ZZZZ was expecting us as Company Y.At approximately XE50 ZZZ my crew and I were ready to go and were waiting on W&B; DG; and documents. Upon query of the ZZZ ramp; we were informed that more cargo was going to be loaded at the direction of Dispatch in the belly compartment and there would be a delay. This seemed odd since the DO had stated the previous night that the flight could not be delayed any more than the time he approved. Around XF15 ZZZ I noticed the main cargo door being opened and a loader and crew arriving. The belly door was then closed. I called Dispatch to ask what the plan was and was told by the Dispatcher he knew nothing about this loading evolution. Shortly after that the DO called and asked what was happening. After a period of time; the DO called back and said they should be ready by XI00 ZZZ with the additional cargo. At approximately XI05-10 I was presented with the General Declarations (Gen Decs) and the DG paperwork for review. I immediately noticed the Gen Decs had the old flight number Company X versus the ZZZZ approved new callsign of Company Y. I was told by the ramp agent initially that they could not fix the paperwork for the Gen Decs because everyone had left for the day and upon my explanation that I needed the correct documentation he acquiesced. The ramp agent said that the customs office was closed and he would have to go to the airport terminal to fix this and it would take 15 min. I elected to move forward and get the paperwork corrected and in hand so that process began. The DO and I spoke about that time and he had heard about the Gen Dec issue. He offered for me to go ahead and take-off without the paperwork and that I could get it emailed to the ramp and us upon arrival. I was uncomfortable with this idea because I have never been trained or heard of leaving without applicable documentation and paperwork and from my knowledge of the FOM it seemed incorrect. The DO said he understood. About this time I had also reviewed the DG paperwork and told the ramp and the DO that the flight number was incorrect on that paperwork as well and would need to be amended prior to departure. With all of this going on; I received a significant amount of pushback and resistance to making the corrections to the DG documentation. Excuses I heard from various personnel related to 1) shift change; 2) we do this all the time; 3) the software cannot produce a flight number with a letter in it; 4) 'we've called ZZZZ;....and no one can say if we need the correct flight number or not'; 5) 'I spoke to the lead Company rep in ZZZZ and he said we should be fine.'Upon hearing these and with the pressure mounting to move the aircraft; I conversed with the crew again to clarify their positions regarding my interpretation of the FOM related to DG documentation. Then I reached out to an MD11 Line Check Airman who has approximately XX+ years here and after briefing him on the situation; he confirmed I should not accept these excuses and to insist on the correct documentation and paperwork before leaving. I made attempts to back up his input by reaching out to 2 Captains in MD11 standards and was unsuccessful at that time in contacting them. I felt I needed input from Flight Standards and since the aircraft fleet X deals with the same issues and knowing the current representative was a former MD11 Captain; I reached out to aircraft fleet X Captain. After speaking with him; I was further impressed that flying without the correct documentation or letting the paperwork be emailed to the destination instead of fixing the problem before push should be avoided. Additionally; signing a DG document with known errors was fraudulent behavior and should be avoided.About XJ30 ZZZ time I received a phone call from MD 11 fleet contact who is also Flight Standards and apprised him of the situation. He called me back after speaking with the DO and praised the paperwork catch of the Gen Dec error. He followed that up with reassurance that we do this DG drill all the time of flying without the correct callsign into ZZZZ because we are stuck with a software that cannot produce letters in callsigns on our DG paperwork. I then asked him for the reference (waiver) in the FOM that authorized me to disregard the policy and regulations I had been trained on pertaining to this. He told me there was no such part of the FOM. I explained this was a difficult situation given his position in standards and asked the rhetorical question of would he want me to not follow the FOM on other areas. He indicated he understood the difficulty in my position. I have a great deal of respect for [the] Captain and this seemed uncharacteristic of him given previous interactions with him. Regardless; I did not nor do I now feel it is ethical or legal to fly with the paperwork I was being given.At approximately XJ40 ZZZ; the ramp agent again wanted to know if we were going to take the flight or not. I asked if he had an any way to get us the required DG paperwork and he cleanly said he could not. At that point I made the decision that given the information I had and the appearance that no solution seemed imminent; I needed to evaluate myself and my crews' rest situation since we had been denied adequate rest the night before and now we had delayed significant time from when we originally determined we were fit now and throughout the flight. Human Factors encompasses all aspects of human performance and its influence on a process or outcome (event). It is not singularly isolated to the cockpit. As defined by the FAA; it is a multidisciplinary effort to generate and compile information about human capabilities and limitations. This is applied to equipment; systems; facilities; procedures; jobs; environments; training; staffing; and personnel management. This influence is often made directly via behaviors (whether intentional or unintentional) but can also involve human psychosomatic responses. Using the broadest explanation; it is easy to translate that regardless of whether a human influence was intentional orunintentional; both instantaneous and final results may be determined to be either desiredor undesired.Upon reflection on this portion of the FOM; consultation of the crew and my experience in decades of flying and simply knowing my physiological body clock; I determined 2 things: 1) there was no solution to the paperwork issue and 2) because of that failure to generate the correct paperwork I would continue to move towards a rest state that would not be conducive to my responsibilities as a Captain or crew member at Company. Per our policy regarding fatigue; I informed the DO of this fatigue situation when it became first apparent that I would be fatigued upon arrival in ZZZZ. Had the paperwork been completed correctly and in a timely manner I do not believe the flight would have been canceled by the fatigue call. Additionally; the denial of the crews' declared physiological limitations driven by sleep cycle preparation was largely ignored and discounted after the first maintenance issue. Had this recognized limitation been accommodated for and the later departure occurred; I feel the flight would have been able to occur.I welcome any feedback as to what I should do differently in the future.