MIL HELI IN PATTERN OVER ARPT JUDGED TOO CLOSE TO ARRIVING FGT BY FGT RPTR.

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I WAS THE FLT LEAD OF A FLT OF 2 FGT APCHING MCAS EL TORO FROM THE S FOR THE OVERHEAD BREAK TO RWY 34. AT 5 NM FROM THE NZJ TACAN; WE DSNDED OUT OF 4000 FOR 2000 ACCORDING TO THE LCL COURSE RULES. THE TWR HAD CALLED OUT TFC FOR OUR FLT DURING THIS TIME. A HELI WAS XMITTING MCAS EL TORO 'N OF THE FIELD AT 2400 ON THE WINDOW RTE.' I DID NOT IMMEDIATELY PICK UP THE HELI AND I INSTRUCTED TWR THAT I WAS LOOKING FOR THE TFC. THE TWR RESPONDED THAT THE HELI HAD A VISUAL ON OUR FLT AND WOULD MAINTAIN SEPARATION. I SIGHTED THE TFC ON THE DSCNT. BY THE TIME WE HAD APCHED THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE FIELD; WE WERE DIRECTED BY THE TWR TO BREAK AT THE NUMBERS. OUR ALT WAS APPROX 2100 WHEN I BROKE AT THE NUMBERS. THE TFC THAT THE TWR CALLED OUT AT N OF THE FIELD APPEARED CLOSER THAN WHAT WAS RPTED. THE HELI LOOKED TO BE AT THE UPWIND NUMBERS; AND JUST SLIGHTLY HIGHER THAN OUR ALT. MY WINGMAN WAS BRIEFED PRIOR TO THE FLT TO BREAK 2 SECONDS AFTER ME. BUT WHEN HE TRANSITIONED FROM FLYING FORMATION TO LOOKING STRAIGHT AHEAD AND DELAYING 2 SECONDS; HE HAD TOLD ME THAT HE BROKE IMMEDIATELY AFTER ME TO AVOID HITTING THE HELI. THERE WERE 3 LESSONS LEARNED FROM THIS: THE DSCNT PROFILE FOR VFR TFC INTO MCAS EL TORO IS TOO STEEP. AT 5 NM FROM THE NZJ TACAN; YOU ARE APPROX 4 NM FROM THE APCH END OF RWY 34. THIS REQUIRES LOSING 2000 FT IN ABOUT 40 SECONDS; CAUSING ACFT TO BE EITHER HIGH AT THE APCH END OF RWY 34; OR CAUSING THE ACFT'S DSCNT RATE AT LOW ALT TO BE EXCESSIVE (UP TO 4000 FPM BELOW 4000 MSL/3600 AGL). TO ASSUME THAT A 100 KT HELI WILL MAINTAIN SAFE SEPARATION FROM A FLT OF 2 FGTS DOING 350 KTS IS WISHFUL THINKING. THE FGT WOULD BE ABLE TO MANEUVER MORE EASILY TO AVOID HITTING THE HELI THAN IF THE SITUATION WERE REVERSED. THE 'WINDOW RTE' SHOULD BE ELIMINATED. IT PUTS HELI TFC DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO VFR BREAK TFC AT MCAS EL TORO.