EMB-145 Check Airman and trainee First Officer reported an airspeed deterioration and a stall warning from the aircraft during approach. The new First Officer was pilot flying and thought the configuration of the aircraft was ready for landing. The aircraft experienced the warning and the Captain completed the landing.
Synopsis
EMB-145 Check Airman and trainee First Officer reported an airspeed deterioration and a stall warning from the aircraft during approach. The new First Officer was pilot flying and thought the configuration of the aircraft was ready for landing. The aircraft experienced the warning and the Captain completed the landing.
Narrative
This was a training flight. The trainee was pilot flying (PF). I was pilot monitoring (PM). During the approach phase (landing XXC at ZZZ) we were cleared for the visual approach. About 3 miles from the FAF the aircraft was configured for flaps 22. We were level at 1;500 ft. and at 150 KTS. I noticed the speed came down to 140 KTS; which was too slow and I called 'check speed'. The pilot flying responded by reducing the thrust. I immediately intervened by adding thrust but at that time we hit some turbulence; I noticed the speed at 135 KTS and then the stick shaker activated. The Autopilot disconnected. I immediately called 'STALL -My aircraft' and took the controls. I set max thrust; reduced the angle of attack and the airspeed quickly recovered. Altitude loss was minimal. We continued the climbout; reconfigured and completed all checklists we spoke to the passengers and flight attendant and returned to land without any further issues.During the debrief; the PF mentioned that he thought that we were already fully configured flaps 45 and that was why he was slowing to final approach speed. We were actually configured for flaps 22 at the time of the stick shaker. The main contributing factors causing the event were an incorrect input of reducing thrust when the call of 'check speed' was made as well as lack of awareness of current aircraft configuration. I believe the stall escape maneuver was flown correctly.
Second reporter narrative
Training flight IOE. After completing the approach brief and designating expected configuration points for the ILS XXC; (penultimate fix: gear down flap 22) (intercept the glide slope: flap 45) As pilot flying; I was vectored off of the arrival for a visual approach for Runway XXC into ZZZ. Being dropped in between the final approach fix and the penultimate fix; we were cleared for the visual approach. During this point at flaps 9 and gear down (to slow) I used heading mode and aligned with the runway awaiting the localized to capture. At approximately 2 mile from the final approach fix the LOC captured and I called for flaps 22 and began slowing waiting on the glide slope to capture. As we were approaching the final approach fix; and GS did not capture (we were below the capture altitude 2 miles out from the FAF). Saturated and being a visual approach I called and rolled in vertical speed and began a descent; still monitoring the glide slope; thinking that it was not going to capture. At this time (slowing to flap 45 speed but already descending). The Captain (pilot monitoring (PM) called 'STALL check speed' at approximately 145 kts. I did a quick scan from outside to the airspeed; glide slope (still not captured) localized and descent rate. Believing that I was fast on the approach; I slightly reduced the power to approach speed (thinking that we had already called for flap 45 and landing check). As the speed reduced auto a pilot kicked off as we got the shaker. Immediately; the Captain called 'my airplane and we executed a missed approach procedure from which the Captain landed and we debriefed.On this approach I allowed a series of quick and frequent changes to the briefed plan in an unfamiliar; high workload environment to affect my situational awareness and interpretation of the aircraft configuration. I understand that these adjustments to the 'expected plan' are a normal and frequent occurrence; and as such constant diligence to situational awareness and cross check are paramount to the safe operation of our aircraft. In this situation it may have been best to ask for an extended vector when I noticed that I was being brought so close to the final approach fix; and I should have visually and verbally verified flap 45 before reducing speed to approach speed upon the ' Stall check speed' call. This will now be an integral part of my scan; and I realize it is already in a check list I had believed we ran.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.