Light aircraft pilot reported an NMAC in the pattern at non-towered airport O69.
Synopsis
Light aircraft pilot reported an NMAC in the pattern at non-towered airport O69.
Narrative
I was entering a crowded pattern from the north at about 100 kts. I was trying to sequence my arrival with departing aircraft on upwind; crosswind and downwind in the pattern. With radio calls; traffic advisory imagery; and looking out the window; I was trying to distinguish which planes were calling their positions and intentions and distinguish them from ground clutter. I was slowing down and descending into the pattern at the same time. After locating the planes on upwind and crosswind; I realized I was overtaking a 172; on downwind in front of me; too quickly. My throttle was already reduced for this phase of flight; and I saw that that my airspeed was not dropping sufficiently fast to maintain good separation from that plane. I turned hard to the left; as the pattern was right traffic; so as to either exit the pattern; or create enough space so I could re-enter it sufficiently behind the 172. At this point I was called by that plane for being too close. After making sure the area was clear; I continued my approach and did a touch and go landing. Human Performance Considerations:I was in good condition to fly. I was out practicing for the day. The weather was clear and there was no reason for me to overtake the preceding plane except that I had become distracted trying to detect the other planes that I was concerned could be turning into me from their crosswind legs. It took me too long to do that; and during that time I was not gauging the rate of my overtaking on the 172 well. At the point that I did see where we were relative to each other; I needed to alter my course aggressively so as not to get any closer.I feel that this was a time; rate; distance problem that developed because I did not properly prioritize the obstacle in front of me (the 172) over the planes that were eventually behind me. While I suppose this sort of problem could occur at any point; I felt that my ability to correctly shift focus/attention was not as sharp as it would have been had I been flying more frequently. As an observation; if I did not have the traffic advisory system in the plane; I would have been concentrating more on looking outside. However; I still don't think I would have physically seen the two planes on upwind and crosswind until I could separate them from ground clutter (I could see them on the traffic system; but at close quarters; that is not always a very true gauge of relative locations). Due to their useful and standard radio calls I knew where to look for them; but they were difficult to see. Conceivably I might have spent even more time looking for them; which would have possibly meant I would have noticed the speed of my approach to the plane in front of me even later.In summary; I can't fault either standard practices; the equipment or the conditions. I think I simply got behind the plane and that caused me to misjudge our closing speeds. I think my reaction to turn to the left was the correct solution to exiting a deteriorating situation. It would have been better not to need the aggressive turn to maintain separation.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.