B737 flight crew reported a rejected take off at 110 knots for violent lateral nose wheel vibrations. The flight crew returned to the gate and turned the aircraft over to maintenance.
Synopsis
B737 flight crew reported a rejected take off at 110 knots for violent lateral nose wheel vibrations. The flight crew returned to the gate and turned the aircraft over to maintenance.
Narrative
Very violent lateral nose wheel vibrations (to include rudder and control column shaking) began on the takeoff roll at the exact time the First Officer called 100 knots. The aircraft also exhibited a slight veer to the left at the same time. I felt this was an aircraft controllability issue (potential nose wheel gear or tire failure or separation) and therefore I made the decision to reject the takeoff. The RTO maneuver was initiated at 110 knots (VI-115 KTS) in accordance with company SOPs. The RTO QRC and RTO non-normal and brake cooling for 737-700 were completed. Due to the light weight of the aircraft; brake temperatures did not reach the caution or warning zones. As part of my RTO Briefings; I brief the First Officers to also request ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) if the RTO is performed in the High speed regime. The First Officer and I quickly discussed staying on the runway or exiting. The taxiways were wide enough that we felt ARFF would have adequate maneuvering capabilities around the aircraft and therefore elected to clear the runway so that the runway was still usable after the runway FOD check was completed.ARFF response was within 3 minutes. Communication was established with ARFF and ATC quickly and an assessment for fire or damage was completed. I requested that the aircraft be chocked so the parking brake would not have to be set. ARFF performed temp checks of the main gears. Left main temperature was 502 and right main temperature was 400. ARFF set up a fan to cool the gear while we coordinated with company and airport operations. We decided to have the aircraft towed to the gate and the tow-in checklist was referenced.After all procedures were completed I briefed the passengers and the First Officer and I had a debrief with the inflight crew to discuss the event. All crew members felt communication was clear and concise and everyone remained calm.Once able; I called and debriefed the Chief Pilot on duty; and the HF checklist was conducted on me and my First Officer. I then called dispatch to conference with Maintenance Control to give a verbal debrief of the event. I also met with the ARFF crew to discuss and complement them on their response actions.The next day the nose wheel tires were changed and I was told by Maintenance Control there was evidence of tire imbalance. We ferried the aircraft the next day to ZZZ1 and on taxi in the nose gear began to randomly vibrate at normal taxi speeds. Entry was made for nose gear vibration and I verbally briefed the outgoing flight crew and the mechanics. Maintenance elected to take the aircraft out of service for additional inspections and an additional tire replacement. I met with the maintenance manager later to ask for an update. I was told that when they removed the replacement tires and there was evidence of flat spots and they were going to begin inspections of the entire nose wheel gear and components.
Second reporter narrative
We were cleared for take-off to fly tower assigned heading (Departure Runway- XXR). I was the PM (pilot monitoring) and Captain was the pilot flying. After the take-off thrust was set; I called 100 knots; when extreme vibration started from the nose wheel of the airplane. The Captain decided to reject the takeoff before V1 was called out. The rejection was done at approximately 110 IAS and the Captain followed the RTO procedures specified in the FM. I verified the procedure and made the required calls of 80 Knots and informed ATC and made the PA; 'Remain Seated; Remain Seated'.We discussed and decided to vacate the runway (from Taxi-way 1); and advised tower to roll out the fire trucks; since we rejected above 100 knots. We held short of Taxi-way 2 on 3. The Captain tried to set the parking brakes; however he was not able to do so. Also; at the time the parking brake indicator light went out (INOP). The Captain called for the RTO QRC; which was completed and after discussing the situation with the FA in the cabin; the decision was made not to evacuate. The Fire Rescue team (4-trucks) responded and were next to us within 3 minutes. I continued on the checklist and calculated the brake-cooling time; which was approximately 45-50 minutes for our weight and speed. We were out of the caution and warning zone. Communication was established with the ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) team and Captain advised them to put chocks on the nose wheel (since we could not set the parking brake). The ARFF team advised us that they did not see any visual damage to the landing gear or the tires. There was also no indication of fire or smoke. We started the APU and decided to the shut down both engines for the safety of ARFF and ground personnel.We decided the aircraft was in good condition; however as a precaution; we requested airport operations and company operations to have our aircraft towed to the gate. The captain made a PA and was advised by the FA that everyone was calm. He also advised them that we will be heading to the gate. While the tow truck was being organized; the tower switched us to ground frequency and we were in contact with ARFF; ground and airport Ops. We followed the supplementary procedure to be towed to the gate. Once at the gate; we performed the parking checklist and the passengers were deplaned using the jet bridge. We made the required reports (verbal/ACARS) to Chief Pilot; dispatch; maintenance and put in two ELB reports - i) For the RTO due to Extreme Nosewheel Vibration and ii) Parking Brake Light in-op.The ARFF team came to meet us at the flight deck and gave us the information about gear temperature (500+ for left gear and 450+for right). They also mentioned that they used fans to cool down the gear system. We were advised by Maintenance Control that they will have Maintenance check the nose wheel assembly and have both the wheels replaced. However; due to lack resources at an out-station; the wheels could not be replaced and the flight was canceled.Next; day we were scheduled to operate the ferry flight to take the airplane back to ZZZ1. The Captain was informed that the vibration may have been caused due to wheel being out of balance. The wheels were replaced and we departed ZZZ. However; upon landing and taxing in at ZZZ1; we felt vibrations in nose-wheel again and we made an ELB write up again. We also briefed the next crew on the situation and the aircraft was taken out of service and additional inspection. The Captain was advised by the Maintenance manager/supervisor in ZZZ1 that the replacement tire had flat spots and will inspect the nose wheel assembly and the gear system too.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.