B737-800 First Officer reported a high speed abort was executed due to a miscommunication of multiple parts of the ground operation regarding a DG document.
Synopsis
B737-800 First Officer reported a high speed abort was executed due to a miscommunication of multiple parts of the ground operation regarding a DG document.
Narrative
After waiting for a half hour for a correct load close out reflecting the dangerous goods we had on board; and had received and acknowledged a Notice to Captain (NOTOC) for; we finally received it. We informed Tower that we were ready and were cleared for takeoff. On the roll and above 80 kts; we received the following transmission from Tower; 'Aircraft X; cancel takeoff clearance' in an unsure tone. The unusual nature of that direction led me to question and replay it in my head before acting on it. My Captain said something similar later as we debriefed; but he still began the abort very quickly and we reached about 100 kts before slowing. Exited the runway and returned to the gate for a maintenance inspection and brake cooling period. Our Dispatcher not knowing that we had received our closeout despite the fact that I believe he has access to all of our ACARS messages. Even if that's not the case; to cause a high speed abort for a paperwork issue seems to me to be misplaced priorities leading to an erosion of safety. This could have been handled very easily and much more safely in the air. Additionally; given the dynamic nature of a takeoff roll; a more assertive abort call from the Tower Controller would likely have saved us some time and thus a few knots of speed. A few seconds later; it might have been quite critical. Better communication between different parts of our operation would have prevented the abort; and a more assertive abort call from Tower would have made the abort safer.
Second reporter narrative
The Captain initially contacted me stating that the restricted article was not declared in the initial load closeout for this flight. The aircraft was holding short of the runway when he contacted me. I immediately contacted the load agent who stated that he was waiting for the Crew Chief to call him and give him the details so he can correct the load closeout to send out a revision. I then contacted ZZZ OPS and was told that the manager was trying to get in touch with the crew chief. I also notified the unit coordinator and a sector manager about the ongoing issue. Approximately 10 minutes were spent trying to coordinate this issue while I continually refreshed the weight and balance input to see if a load closeout revision was sent out but I did not see one. Simultaneously; I noticed that the aircraft was getting on the runway and I subsequently called the ATC Tower to cancel the takeoff clearance. The crew aborted the takeoff and later confirmed that they were approximately 100 knots when they aborted the takeoff. Aircraft went back to the gate to get inspected by the local maintenance. [Caused by] the incorrect load closeout that was sent out with no restricted articles (R/A) listed and difficulty to get in touch with the crew chief who worked the flight to notify him of the error. An automated and immediate forwarding of load closeouts to the screen printer of every flight assigned to a dispatch desk; including R/A information of flights would be very helpful.
More incidents for this aircraft family →
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.