B737 flight crew reported a blown tire on takeoff as well as a hydraulic systems failure that required a return to the departure airport.
Synopsis
B737 flight crew reported a blown tire on takeoff as well as a hydraulic systems failure that required a return to the departure airport.
Narrative
At VR a tire failed and subsequent hydraulic problems occurred.On rotation during the takeoff roll from XXL we experienced a shimmy that worsened once airborne and figured we blew a tire. We elected not to raise the gear as the aircraft was performing well and didn't want to make the situation worse by bringing loose tread into the wheel well. At about 800 ft the FA's called the flightdeck and I answered briefly to say that we blew a tire/everything was going to be ok and that we'd call them back. The F/O (First Officer) notified the Tower that we had indications of a blown tire on takeoff and requested a straight out departure. Initially; I called for flaps up after accelerating at about 1500 ft AGL. Once the flaps were up the takeoff configuration horn alerted so we brought the flaps back to 1. During initial radar vectors; we advised ATC and stated that we'd need to return to ZZZ but needed time to coordinate and run checklists. The only other indication that we had of gear problems was the ANTI SKID INOP light was illuminated. I handed the control of the aircraft and the radios to the F/O so that I could make a PA to the Passengers; coordinate with ops; the FA's and reference the AOM/QRH. I made a quick PA and called the FAs; which was when I was told that a ceiling panel had come loose and injured 2 of our Passengers but that they were stable. We let ATC know we had injuries and provided the info that we had. At this point I referenced the AOM for landing gear tire failure on takeoff. I read the high points of that section to the F/O; so that we were on the same page; while waiting for ops to set up a patch with Dispatch. I was also busy coordinating with our F/As; Jumpseater (Company Captain) on how best to stow the loose ceiling panel such that I wouldn't impede egress. Subsequent to that; the Master Caution illuminated for the #1 ENG HYD LOW PRESS. The F/O pointed out that the pressure was good but that the QTY was low and decreasing. Initially we elected to run the LOSS of SYSTEM A Checklist; figuring it was only a matter of time but decided to back out of that checklist since we still had good steady pressure even after the quantity read 0. We ran the #1 ENG HYD LOW PRESS checklist which directed us to turn off the pump. Once that was complete; we ran the Descent and Approach Checklists and asked for vectors to final. On about an eight-mile final; the Master Caution illuminated again; and we realized we were losing System A. We went around and asked for delay vectors again; while we ran the LOSS of SYSTEM A Checklist. Once that was complete; including performance data; we were vectored for landing. The landing was normal other than only getting one reverser and the shimmy from the blown tire. Directional control seemed normal; and braking was good; albeit slightly less than normal; which I expected. I had the F/O keep an eye on the accumulator pressure just in case. I also directed the F/O to start the APU. After slowing to about 30 knots and testing the tiller we told Tower we would exit the runway. I let the aircraft coast down the runway to exit. Upon slowing through approximately 20 knots; the aircraft started veering left and I couldn't maintain directional control. I stopped the aircraft as best I could with the nose ultimately 90 degrees to the left of centerline; but on the paved surface. B System Hydraulics registered 0 quantity. I then made a PA to the PAX to remain seated. Once the APU was on the busses; I shut down the engines and we started communications with CFR. They said there were no indications of fire; so we elected to keep the Passengers onboard the aircraft. The main thing we should have done differently is to have stopped straight ahead on the runway as expeditiously as we could have. I'm guessing the extra seconds we spent coasting down the runway was the time it took for the B System to lose quantity and pressure as well as the right brake to fail.
Second reporter narrative
During rotation; left main tire blowout; causing partial loss of hydraulics.During rotation we felt what we believed was nose-wheel shimmy. The shimmy and vibration got quickly worse after liftoff; and we realized we had a blown tire. The Captain stated we had a blown tire and to leave the landing gear extended. We notified ATC that we possibly had a blown tire and would return to ZZZ. We retracted the flaps and got the takeoff config warning horn; so we extended the flaps to 1 to prevent the takeoff config warning horn from sounding; and we maintained about 190 knots. ATC climbed us to 6000 ft. We started to get vectored back to ZZZ. The Captain gave me the aircraft and radios; while he coordinated with the Flight Attendants and Dispatch. The FAs reported some Passengers had been injured by an overhead panel that had fallen down from the vibration. I ran the numbers and setup the FMC and radios for our return to ZZZ. The landing data stated would be landing about 14;000 pounds overweight; but due to the injured passengers we opted to land ASAP in the interest of passenger safety. We reviewed the AOM tire failure on takeoff" items. During our delay vectors we got a 'hydraulic system A engine low pressure' caution light. We noticed that the system A quantity was about 30 and decreasing rapidly; we began to run the 'loss of system A' QRH; but decided since we still had hydraulic A pressure; we should just run the 'low pressure engine A' QRH. We turned off the Engine A hydraulic switch per QRH.I made a PA announcement to the passengers explaining we were doing a precautionary landing due to what we believed was a blown tire. We told ATC we were ready to land. On final at approximately 2000 ft we received 'low pressure electric A' light. We told ATC we needed to go around and run some checklists as we had just lost one of our hydraulic systems. We ran the performance data for "loss of system A" and ran the QRH for "loss of system A". We vectored around again. We turned on the "system A flight control standby rudder" and "alternate nose wheel steering". Upon landing; we maintained centerline and appeared to have directional control. There were heavy vibrations during the entire landing. Landing was normal until approximately 20 knots going straight down the runway; the aircraft started to turn to the left; the Captain stated the brakes and nose wheel steering were becoming ineffective; and the aircraft slowly came to a stop facing 90 degrees left; still on the runway pavement. The Captain called the FAs and made a PA to remain seated. We started the APU and shut the engines down. We stowed the speedbrakes and extended the flaps to 40 to be ready for an evacuation if we needed to do so. Fire trucks approached the aircraft; they reported some smoke from the right main tires; and one of our right main tires was blown. They said they didn't see any need for an evacuation. Fire Department said the brake temps were approximately 390 degrees; and they would chock the tires. Fire dept chocked the tires and asked us to release the brakes. Approximately 15 minutes after stopping; airstairs were brought to the aircraft; and the EMTs came onboard through the forward entry door to evaluate the injured Passengers. After maybe another 15 minutes; three buses arrived; and we deplaned everyone into the buses."
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.