Tower CIC; the CIC in TRACON and the tower Local Controller reported an air carrier was cleared for takeoff with another aircraft on short final. The Local Controller was unsure how to resolve the conflict so the Tower CIC took over their position.
Synopsis
Tower CIC; the CIC in TRACON and the tower Local Controller reported an air carrier was cleared for takeoff with another aircraft on short final. The Local Controller was unsure how to resolve the conflict so the Tower CIC took over their position.
Narrative
Aircraft Y was holding short of RWY 22 with a XB:01Z departure time. Aircraft X was in the VFR traffic pattern and Aircraft Z was IFR; short final for RWY 22. At or around XA:58Z; Aircraft X completed their first touch and go and was in the upwind. Once Aircraft X was wheels up; the local controller began to clear Aircraft Y for an immediate take off with Aircraft Z on a 1-2 mile final but didn't tell Aircraft Y about the traffic on short final. After the local controller cleared Aircraft Y; Aircraft X was told to start their crosswind when they were about 100 ft in the air and only about 4000 ft down the runway. I was CIC (Controller in charge) at the time and told the local controller to tell Aircraft Z about Aircraft Y departing in front of them. The local controller THEN told Aircraft Z about the traffic departing and to maintain visual separation from the traffic to which Aircraft Z said they had the departing traffic in sight and would maintain visual separation. At that point; Aircraft Z was on about a 1 mile final. By the time Aircraft Y was departure roll; Aircraft Z was 1/2 mile final. The local controller then told Aircraft Z to make a right 360 on final due to not having runway or wake turbulence separation. Myself and a CPC in the tower told the local controller they couldn't do that since by then Aircraft Z was already over the threshold. Aircraft Z was about 2000 ft down the runway when he asked the local controller if the controller wanted them to make the right 360 at that time. The local controller asked me and the CPC if they could do that and we both said no again. At first the local controller keyed up and told them yes; to make the 360 but then corrected and told them no. At that time; I took the position from the local controller; Aircraft X advised that they were going to be a full stop; Aircraft Y had been switched to departure during the relief brief; and after I had to position I switch Aircraft Y to departure. As the CIC; I should have stopped the local controller from clearing Aircraft Y in front of Aircraft Z and reminded the local controller that they were short final and there wouldn't be runway or wake turbulence separation. Aircraft Y still had a 4 minute window to depart. If the local controller would have waited just 2 minutes; none of this would have happened.
Second reporter narrative
I was the WCIC (Watch controller in charge) when the incident occurred. Just prior to the incident was also working Radar F combined with the WCIC position. Another controller relieved me on Radar F and I moved to the Radar F associate position for the overlap (still on as WCIC). During the overlap I did some landline coordination for the oncoming Radar F controller with ZDC about a jump zone west of the airport and the GSO controller about an arrival into SOP. I moved the oncoming controller to Radar F on ART and completed the overlap. During that time I did not witness the event via radar though it appears to have happened during the overlap. Immediately after the overlap I was relieved by an oncoming WCIC and completed the briefing with them. I was still unaware an incident had occurred. During the incident there was GC (Ground Controller) training in progress. LC (Local Control) and TCIC (Tower Controller in Charge) were also staffed.15 minutes or so later; while on break; the previous LC arrived in the breakroom and told me to call the tower. During the call the GC advised me that the previous LC had cleared Aircraft Y for immediate take off with Aircraft Z somewhere between 1 and 1/2 mile final. When the GC and TCIC realized the problem they advised the LC to break out the aircraft on final (the tower controllers should be filing reports that reference this incident with a more complete description. I believe the aircraft on final acknowledged but from my understanding crossed the threshold prior to initiating the maneuver. Somewhere less that 4000 ft. runway separation was indicated. I'm not sure what recommendation to make here. The actions by the LC indicate they had either forgotten about the aircraft on final or were too fixated on a ZJX release time. Maybe both. The TCIC has no override capability; nor should they need it; and after receiving a clearance for immediate take off Aircraft Y could have easily crossed the hold short line before the process could be stopped. The LC was newly certified and I'm sure inexperience played a factor.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.