B737-700 flight crew reported an engine overheat after starting up Engine #1 following two aborted start attempts on Engine #2 while on the ground. Although the QRH deemed firing both extinguishing bottles into the affected engine unnecessary; the flight crew's company procedures had it as a required step.
Synopsis
B737-700 flight crew reported an engine overheat after starting up Engine #1 following two aborted start attempts on Engine #2 while on the ground. Although the QRH deemed firing both extinguishing bottles into the affected engine unnecessary; the flight crew's company procedures had it as a required step.
Narrative
We operated this aircraft from ZZZ2 - ZZZ1 followed by ZZZ1 - ZZZ. We pushed from [Gate] XXX in ZZZ and disconnected. We then attempted to start the Number 2 Engine. The N2 peaked at 16% so the start was aborted. Fuel was never introduced. Ran aborted engine start QRC/QRH. We then attempted a second start on the #2 Engine this time with both my eyes and the FO (First Officer) watching closely and verifying switch positions. Again; the N2 peaked at 16% with slow acceleration. The manifold gauge showed sufficient air on both sides of the isolation valve. The packs were verified off. We terminated this start as well. Operations were notified that we would be returning to the gate. As an alternate to waiting for a tug we attempted to start the Number 1 Engine so that we could taxi back to the gate. Coincidentally; when the First Officer placed the start switch to 'ground' on the number one engine the 'ENGINE OVERHEAT' for the Number 2 Engine illuminated. I commanded the First Officer to abort the start - fuel had not been introduced. I asked for the QRH/QRC for engine overheat. Obviously the QRC assumes we are in flight. Regardless; it directed us to fire extinguishing agent followed by isolating bleed air. The overheat light extinguished after bleed air was removed.Considerable use of our company ADM (Aeronautical Decision Making) model directed our actions quickly back on track. Staying within the QRH firing both extinguishing bottles into the engine seemed unnecessary albeit a required step to comply with Company procedures. Company training allows deviation although emphasizes to accept no unnecessary risk. To not fire bottles increased risk. I thank our training for that.
Second reporter narrative
We operated this aircraft with no issues on our first two legs. We pushed off Gate XXX in ZZZ and disconnected from the ground crew as we started Engine #2. During this first attempt to start Engine #2; I noticed that the N2 never reached above 16%; so the start was aborted. Fuel was never introduced. We then proceeded to run the aborted engine start QRC/QRH. After the checklist was preformed; we decided to try another engine start on Engine #2. We verified switch position and bleeds were configured correctly and attempted the start. Yet again; a slow start and N2 did not rise above 16%. We proceeded to conduct the Aborted Engine Start again; leading us to run the aborted engine start QRC/QRH Checklist.We noted that the manifold gauge on the bleed air supply showed sufficient pressure. After we finished the QRC/QRH Checklist; we called Operations informing them we needed to return to the gate. While waiting; we discussed the possibility of starting our #1 Engine as an option to taxi to back to the gate. As we started Engine #1; we received an ENGINE OVERHEAT caution on the #2 Engine. The Captain told me to abort the #1 Engine start. Fuel had not been introduced. We then conducted the QRC/QRH Checklist for ENGINE OVERHEAT. Regarding the QRC; it assumes we were inflight thus taking us to the QRH items for shutting the engine down and using the fire extinguishing agent and closing the bleeds for the #2 Engine. The ENGINE OVERHEAT light was extinguished after the bleed air was removed. We worked well together to come back on track after falling behind. Using our aeronautical decision-making method we continued to work through the situation presented to us. Remaining and complying within the QRH firing both extinguishing bottles into the #2 Engine seemed unnecessary. However; it was a required step to comply with Company procedures. Training allows deviation in such an event; but we are also emphasizing to accept no unnecessary risk while operating the aircraft.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.