B737-700 flight crew reported miscommunication occurred between the flight crew and ground crew regarding the aircraft's inoperative APU and the need for external ground power on arrival. The ground crew seemed unprepared for the arrival despite being provided advance notice of the process and what was needed. Personnel also approached the aircraft while one of the engines were still running.
Synopsis
B737-700 flight crew reported miscommunication occurred between the flight crew and ground crew regarding the aircraft's inoperative APU and the need for external ground power on arrival. The ground crew seemed unprepared for the arrival despite being provided advance notice of the process and what was needed. Personnel also approached the aircraft while one of the engines were still running.
Narrative
We were swapped into an aircraft with an inoperative APU with MEL applied; presumably because it was originally scheduled ZZZ1-XXX-XXX; whereas we were flying ZZZ1-ZZZ-ZZZ1; so inoperative APU aircraft would finish in a maintenance base. When departing from ZZZ1 I did a face-to-face briefing with the entire ground crew about the sequence of events; what would happen when; what COMMs to expect etc.; but that was still pretty screwed up. First; the huffer was too far from the aircraft and it took them about five minutes to move it to where it needed to be. The supervisor running the huffer; engine start air cart; thought we had already started and secured air when we were about ten seconds into the start; thankfully before we had introduced fuel or even gotten much rotation. After some more discussion; I reiterated that we would tell him when to kill the air as I had briefed him ten minutes prior and after that it went okay. This was all despite the face-to-face brief. I don't think anyone besides myself and the FO (First Officer) had done an air start before; not even the supervisor. At the arriving station there is no chance to do a face-to-face brief for the pull in and get power to the aircraft part of an inoperative APU; thus why that ended up even more screwed up than the departing with an inoperative APU. We ACARS'd Dispatch when we were about halfway to ZZZ to have them remind ZZZ that we had an inoperative APU; since the gate ACARS report showed inoperative electric and air at the gate. We also called ZZZ Operations on radio when 70 miles out although COMMs were difficult because we were already low; then called on ground. Each time we were assured that ZZZ was aware and were ready for the inoperative APU. Instead; we arrived and pulled into the gate; and I gave the brakes set signal. I did not give the engine cut signal. Marshaller gave the engine cut signal anyway - I'm sure expectation bias/habit/etc. I quickly opened my window and pointed at the #1 Engine and indicated it was still running and gave the ground power signal; reminding them that we needed electric. He realized his error and then pointed at #1 and spun wand showing it was still running. Someone entered the safety zone on the #1 side; out towards the wingtip and was walking slowly towards the back of the aircraft/running engine. Engine was at idle and still running.Jetbridge Operator; myself and Marshaller with the wands saw them and motioned them back; at which point the jetbridge interfered with my view. I think they moved back out of the zone but couldn't see it. Electric was finally connected; and I secured the engine. We did everything we possibly could to make sure ZZZ was ready and aware of our needs but still it was screwed up and someone could have been seriously hurt. Also; while #1 was running someone opened the aft cargo bin. It's like ZZZ had no idea we needed electric despite the inoperative APU being on the release; us asking Dispatch to tell them; calling inflight; and calling again on the ground and giving the proper signals from the cockpit. It was maddening and unsafe.I know that the Company is getting serious about MAXes and their cooldown times; but this APU inoperative situation is as bad or worse. Maintenance has gotten much better about keeping them working; but sometimes they will be inoperative and when they are it is a real problem. Everyone on the Ramp is new and no one seems to know how to manage the situation.I think that Company needs to adopt a policy of using ground power carts for all APU inoperative situations. This would prevent the wait for the jetway to pull up to hook up electricity. The jetway; by necessity; blocks the Captain's view of the engine that IS STILL RUNNING. So; a standard procedure to have a ground power cart and use that as a first choice for all inoperative APU aircraft would shorten the time necessary to get power on the aircraft and preserve the Captain's view of the #1; running engine until the Captain can secure it. Ground Operations REALLY needs to work on their training and have experienced supervisors available and in place for situations like this.
Second reporter narrative
Operations with APU inoperative are rarely smooth and have a higher probability for error and safety issues dealing with ramp personnel. Prior to departure the Captain was able to brief ground personnel and then able to communicate through headset during the push to coach the process. However; Operations during arrival at the gate with engines running do not allow communication or coaching from flight deck to Ground aside from hand signals.Enroute; we messaged Dispatch to ensure ZZZ1 Operations knew we had an APU inoperative. Gate XX gate message said no services; so we wanted to ensure that wasn't the case. On descent in range; we contacted Operations on radio and told them the same information. Upon arrival radio contact on the ground; we informed Operations that the APU was inoperative and we'd require ground air and power to be hooked up before we could shut down an engine. Upon arrival to Gate XX; we taxied in. The Captain shut down Number 2 as we pulled into the gate; parked; and set the parking brake. He gave the brakes symbol. The Marshaller then gave the cut symbol. The Captain did what he could to shake his head no and open his window to yell that #1 was still running. He then noticed a Ground Operations person walking toward behind the #1 Engine but couldn't totally tell because the jetbridge blocks his view behind the aircraft as it moves forward. The Marshaller then signaled his Ground person that the engine was still spinning. It was hard to tell what was happening and the Captain was ready to shut down the #1 Engine without power connected. The anti-collision light was still running the entire time.While this was happening; ground operations personnel approached the right side of the aircraft and opened the rear cargo door; drove up the baggage loader and started working on the FO (First Officer) side of the aircraft; all while the engine was running and the anti-collision light was flashing. Eventually; power was connected; and we were able to shut down #1. Additionally; ground cooling air was also unavailable and malfunctioned at Gate XX with no APU available.Ground crew were unaware and unfamiliar with no APU operations. They dangerously approached a running engine and entered the Safety Zone while engines were running. When APU is inoperative; suggest a ground power cart is available to plug into the aircraft before jetbridge power is available to expeditiously shut down the engine. Ensure Ground Operations ramp agents are aware they should not approach the aircraft until the all clear is given. They need to be patient and wait. I don't know a better way to communicate with ramp agents while approaching the gate with engines running.
More incidents for this aircraft family →
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.