Air Carrier B767-300 flight crew reported engine failure after takeoff. Returned to departure airport and landed uneventfully.
Synopsis
Air Carrier B767-300 flight crew reported engine failure after takeoff. Returned to departure airport and landed uneventfully.
Narrative
Catastrophic engine failure and fire.On initial startup of left engine had L ENG FUEL VAL with no Fuel Flow. Ran QRC and QRH and once the FUEL CONTROL SWTCH was in CUTOFF the EICAS message went away. Ramp Tower wanted us tugged back into the gate for traffic concerns. When we got into the gate a Maintenance person connected to the aircraft and asked what had happened. I stated we had the EICAS message and no fuel flow. I asked if he could look to see if there was any fuel or fuel smell in the left engine. He said no. We discussed as a crew that the FUEL CONTROL SWITCH may have not been seated; so we asked Maintenance to stay on the headset to attempt a start in the chocks. The start was normal and we pushed and ground operation were normal through takeoff. It was Runway XXR; Flaps 5 D-TO1 41C with a N1 102.5. We discussed the NADP (Noise Abatement Departure Procedure) 2 heavyweight takeoff and the Vcl being 236 KCAS. Takeoff was normal and just as I was getting ready to call Flaps Up After Takeoff Checklist there was an extremely loud bang from the left side; followed shortly of EICAS Fire warning and a bunch of cautions; fire lights in both the left fuel control switch and the left engine fire handle as well as the warning lights and the fire bell. There was left yaw and significant loss of thrust. It occurred at approximately 2;500 feet MSL and 235 KCAS approaching the ZZZZZ fix. I don't remember if I had or had not called Flaps Up. Definitely a significant startle for me and the FO (First Officer). I split the cockpit duties immediately and I have the radios and the airplane and the FO run the Engine Fire checklist. I notified ATC and continued hand flying. The FO ran the QRC for ENGINE FIRE to its completion and then stepped to the ENGINE FIRE QRH. All the fire indications remained - when the FO preceded through the checklist to step X it seemed like it had been at least 1 1/2 minutes to 2 minutes from the last step of the QRC of rotating the fire switch. Fire indication remained; so the FO continue and rotated the fire switch IAW (In Accordance With) the QRH. The fire indications didn't go out; so I told the FO we're are landing ASAP (As Soon As Possible) Runway XXC and we'd be over max landing weight. The FO said that was a good plan and agreed. Since it was VMC and I was maintaining aircraft control and the FO was running the checklist I just kept hand flying with one attempt to engage the autopilot; but the MCP was not setup correctly; so I disconnected the autopilot and hand flew the rest of the flight. At some point the fire indications went out. I believed we had a good plan to get the get on the ground safely in a very expeditious manner; so we decided it would be best to continue with landing ASAP and not burn down gas to be at or below max landing weight. I deviated from my initial request of 4000 ft. MSL which in my mind I thought we had requested 3000 ft. MSL. We made a base turn to the east at approximately 12 miles from the field with the FO still running checklist. We got a visual on the runway and turned to final about 12 miles with an initial overshoot of XXC. We had asked the jumpseater (767 Captain) to come up to the observers seat and back us up. He ran the landing distance numbers. It was a Flaps 20 manual landing maximum autobrakes max selected Runway XXC. Landing weight 345;000 pounds. The approach and landing were uneventful. Cleared the runway at Taxiway 1 met by CFR (Crash Rescue Fire Equipment). They conveyed there was a lot of damage to the left engine but there were no indications of an active fire. We thought it best to shutdown there and be towed in. We were towed back to the gate.Some type of engine improvement. Having this event occur in the configuration; altitude; and airspeed made this not be the standard V1 cut we're used to in training. With my splitting the duties before the autopilot was engaged caused me to not be able to use automation more effectively. The Fire was my main concern and flying the jet to a safe landing. The radio communication with hot mic actually was a distraction for me; because I had ATC and my FO at the same volume. I would discontinue hot mic in this situation. The QRC should add a step before going in to the QRH if fire continues after 30 rotate fire switch to other stop; then go to checklist."
Second reporter narrative
I was a jump seater on this flight. I'm a 767 Captain. During departure climb out at approximately 2000 feet MSL the crew received a fire warning and fire bell for the left engine. The crew complied with QRH procedures and returned to ZZZ. I assisted with the process whenever the crew asked for support.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.