B737 flight crew reported the aircraft's main gear rolled into the grass and got stuck after the Captain started the pushback.
Synopsis
B737 flight crew reported the aircraft's main gear rolled into the grass and got stuck after the Captain started the pushback.
Narrative
I arrived on time; XA:45; to the aircraft for preflight duties. My technique when accomplishing checklist callouts is to physically point at the item and verify it visually while responding aloud. I briefed the FAs (Flight Attendant) prior to boarding. The 2 male FAs were working up front and the 2 female FAs were working in the back. The preflight procedures were uneventful and we pushed on time. The aircraft weighed approximately 155;500 lb. The push crew pushed us straight towards the grass which meant that the aircraft was perpendicular to the grass area and Taxiway 1. All communications with the ground team were normal. We were cleared to start engines during the pushback and I directed the FO (First Officer) to start the #2 engine and then provide air as initially briefed. I elected to single-engine taxi because we had a long taxi to Runway XXR. When the push was completed; I set the parking brake and communicated it as stated in our procedures. The ground crew acknowledged. The FO also pointed at the brake pressure gauge and gave me a thumbs up confirming that the brakes were set both verbally and visually. This was the time I realized that each time the brakes were part of a checklist item and response; the FO would point and confirm with a thumbs up that they indeed were set. In accordance with our procedures; the ground crew reported that they were now ready for disconnect. I cleared them to disconnect. After pulling away I received the salute and called for the After Start Checklist. The checklist was completed with no discrepancies. I then directed the FO to request our taxi clearance from Ramp Control.We received our clearance for a left turn and taxi to Spot X. I confirmed the clearance and cleared the left side of the aircraft. The FO cleared the right side of the aircraft and responded as such. I could not tell how far back I was to the grass and where my main gear were in relation to it either. From the flight deck viewpoint; there was not a perceptible slope that gave me the inclination that upon releasing the brakes that the aircraft would roll backwards and that a larger than normal power input would be required to arrest the backwards roll and climb uphill. It was now approximately XC:00. I released the brakes and visually confirmed that the brake handle moved to the retracted position and that the red brake light extinguished. I then moved the #2 engine thrust lever forward 1 to 1.5 knob widths to increase power for taxi. I then continued to raise my visual scan to the engine stack to see that the engine was responding to my input and increasing in thrust as noted by the arc on the N1 gauge. I continued my visual scan upwards to outside the front windscreen and was startled to see us moving backwards instead of forwards. My scan process verifying my inputs and that the aircraft is responding is approximately 2 seconds in time. Now realizing that we were actually moving backwards and not forwards I instinctively applied the brakes again and we came to a quick stop. I did not feel the nose gear come off the ground in any way. The stop was quick but not aggressive. It felt like we settled onto a drainage grate which were lining the edge of the paved taxiway. I reset the parking brake; visually and verbally confirming while pointing at the gauge as well. The FO did the same. We both agreed that something didn't feel right and we should get assistance.I asked the FO to contact Operations and request the push crew to return to the aircraft and see if it was possible to pull us forward. I informed the passengers that we would be delayed a bit and would update them when I had more information. We also let Ramp know that we were going to stay there for a bit. Ground personnel began arriving by golf carts; tugs; and on foot. An individual got on headset and established communications with the flight deck. I asked what the situation was and he said they would coordinate to have us pulled forward and then we could be on our way. I asked if our gear were on the pavement and he responded yes." When the ground crew were ready they began hooking up a tug and trying to pull us forward. After a few attempts without success; I again asked that our gear are on the pavement. He again responded "yes". I specifically asked if our gear was in the grass and he said "no." I confirmed again that the gear were not in the grass; not on the black asphalt; but were on the concrete. He responded that it was on the pavement but kind of in a hole depression. I felt confident that we were on the pavement and not in the grass so we would just need a larger tug to pull us forward and uphill. More and more people and equipment were continually arriving. I kept updating the passengers. We started Long Tarmac Delay notifications and the FAs provided water as well. [A team] arrived with bigger tugs. This is when I was informed by a different person that our main gear was actually in the grass right at the point where the asphalt ends. This was at approximately XD:00. At the request of the team; we shut down the #2 engine and supplied electrical power and air via the APU. I called the Chief Pilot at XD:15 to inform him of the situation. It was coordinated through Operations for offloading the passengers onto buses because the aircraft was too heavy to pull forward. We coordinated with the cabin crew and informed them of the deplaning process when the buses arrived. Air stairs were also coordinated and provided.When the air stairs were in place; [the] Team Supervisor boarded and better explained the outside situation and plan. A maintenance person came in and pulled CVR (Cockpit Voice Recorder) circuit breakers and when queried; he responded that this was normal procedure. A Customer Service Supervisor came on as well and explained passenger deplaning. Once everything was in place; the deplaning began from the rear forward onto a bus to shuttle them back to the terminal. This took several trips to get all of the passengers with their luggage to the terminal. During this process; FA 1 came to the flight deck and reported that she fell down when I stopped the aircraft and her knee was sore. She also reported that FA 2 had also fallen down and her back was sore. Both FAs were accomplishing pre-departure checks and were working in the rear aircraft positions. The FO and I asked if they needed or would like medical attention since we had the Fire Department and paramedics outside. They declined to have medical support meet them. During the deplaning process; I had the FO monitor the progress and be the flight deck representative. I placed a follow-up call to the Chief Pilot for further information. He made appropriate contact with necessary individuals and informed me that if we are willing and able to proceed; we can choose to continue with a few scheduling changes. Both the FO and I individually accepted to continue. The passengers were safely deplaned and taken to the terminal with no known injuries. I was the last one off the aircraft and no damage was reported on the aircraft at that time.Having received authorization to proceed to ZZZ; we departed at approximately XF:40 and landed at approximately XH:50.The FO was superb for this entire situation. I couldn't have had a better person to assist me with all of this. He was the best support I could wish for which allowed me to concentrate on Captain duties and caring for the passengers and crew."
Second reporter narrative
Taxi incident. I was the FO (First Officer) and pilot monitoring on Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ1 on Day 0. I am a new hire FO still on probation with only 88 hours on the 737. This trip would have finished my consolidation period. Station report time was XT:47. I met [the] Captain at Gate XX; and he briefed the flight attendants. We then boarded the aircraft and proceeded to complete our preflight checks. Events leading up to pushback were uneventful with all checklist items complete. I requested push via ACARS at XB:45 - on time. Ramp instructed us to push back straight onto Taxiway 1. Captain released the brakes at XB:46 and we observed a quiet flight deck. I received final weights after brake release. Our gate fuel was 19.4. Once we were clear of the gate; I started the #2 engine. We planned/briefed a single-engine taxi. After the aircraft was pushed straight back; I saw and confirmed the parking brake set and we finished the after start" checklist. I set flaps 5 and loaded the final weights. We verified the takeoff data was valid and accepted. While I was heads down completing these actions; the Captain received a final salute from the push crew.At this point as far as I could tell we were in a good position on the taxiway; straight in line with Gate XX and on Taxiway 1. Once all checklist items were complete; the Captain called for taxi. After reading back the clearance with Ramp; I confirmed the instructions with the Captain; and then saw/heard him release the brakes. I observed him pushing up the throttle on number 2 engine and then looked right out the #2 window in order to clear the turn and said "clear right." I then felt the aircraft stop suddenly as Captain applied the brakes. It felt like we had rolled over something; and I felt the jet settle. I immediately said out loud; "That didn't feel right." Captain then said; "I felt the jet moving backwards and stopped." He then questioned our positioning on the taxiway and said that he was going to hold position until we figure out where we are at. He then instructed me to call Ramp and let them know we were holding position. The time was approximately XC:00. After informing Ramp; Captain then called Operations and requested that the push team come back to the aircraft and plug in so we could talk with them. Operations said they would give them a call and then we waited for them to arrive. I watched them walk over from Gate XX. It took about 10 minutes for them to plug in and talk with us since the Team Lead needed to get a headset. The Captain then had a conversation with the Push Team Lead on the ground and asked him specifically where the aircraft was positioned on the taxiway. The Captain and I could not see where our main gear was from the flight deck. The Tow Lead told us that the aircraft main gear was on the concrete. Captain then specifically asked him again if we were on the concrete or on the pavement. The Push Team Lead again confirmed that we were on the concrete. This news was a relief to both of us as we had feared that we were in the grass. Captain then said to the push crew that we rolled back when we tried to taxi and felt like we were too far back and needed to be positioned more forward on the taxiway so that we could resume our taxi. The Tow Team Lead said that they would get the tow bar hooked up and move us forward. We kept the parking brake engaged as they hooked up the tug and awaited the tow team's instructions. I kept Ramp informed that we would be delayed unit we could get repositioned.While the tug team was getting hooked up; the Captain and I discussed the current situation and any reporting that might be needed. We both acknowledged the significance of what would need to happen if we did go in fact go into the grass; but at this point I felt relieved that all we needed was a tow and could continue the flight. After a few minuets; the situation began to change when we noticed that the tug couldn't pull us forward. The tow team then saidthat they needed to get a bigger tug and would be right back. We then saw a new bigger tug come over and hook up - a wide body tug. That tug was also unsuccessful in moving us forward. I could feel resistance; almost like a chock was in place when the tow team tried to pull us forward. I then began to realize that our situation was not what we had been told. After a third attempt by the largest tug available - an orange aircraft tow vehicle - we realized that it could not move us forward. As this was happening we started to observe more and more vehicles show up to the aircraft. Airline Operations; Safety; and Maintenance vehicles started to gather around the aircraft. Lots of people were inspecting the aircraft. I knew at that time that we were in a bigger situation then we first realized. It wasn't until the third aircraft tow vehicle arrived and started to coordinate with us that we were informed by the tow team that our main gear was in fact in the grass. This news angered both of us; since the original tow team had specifically lied to us and told us something different. If given the correct information upfront I believe we would have taken a different course of action and handled the situation differently. At this point the flight was now delayed by 45 minutes. The Captain made regular announcements to the passengers to let them know our situation and that we were doing everything we could to fix the problem. The Maintenance Supervisor got on the interphone and asked us to shut down the number 2 engine. It was positioned over tarmac. We shut it down uneventfully and made sure we were on APU power and that the air conditioning was set to deliver air to the passengers. We were also told by the flight attendants that it was getting hot in the back. The Captain switched the right pack to high and I read the hot weather supplement to the Captain out of the FM (Flight Manual) to make sure we were delivering maximum cooling. Our concern was always on the safe care of the passengers.We started coordinating with maintenance personnel and additional Ground individuals who had arrived at the aircraft. It was then advised to us that despite all efforts; they could not get the aircraft out of the grass. We then discussed a plan of deplaning the passengers to reduce weight. The Captain started to put that plan in place and requested busses come over to the aircraft help take the passengers back to the gate. Customer service representatives started to arrive at the aircraft. We kept Operations informed and waited for regular updates on the status. The Captain made regular announcements on the PA to let the passengers know what the plan was for deplaning the aircraft and their safe conduct back to the gate. I opened my flight deck window to give maintenance personnel the gear pins. Once air stairs were brought over; the main cabin door was opened to allow customer service representatives to get on the airplane to help the flight attendants coordinate the deplaning. We also had a Maintenance Technician come into the flight deck area. All he said to us was that we wanted to pull some CBs (Circuit Breaker). We found out later that he pulled the cockpit voice recorder CBs and made a comment that it was standard procedure. This news created some stress for me; and I expressed a desire to the Captain that I wanted to get ALPA involved in this situation. Once the busses arrived about an hour and forty minutes after our initial pushback; passengers started to deplane. It took about 45 minutes to get everyone off the plane with about 4 trips of the busses back and forth. After everyone was off the plane; the Captain and I ran the parking checklist and made sure that everything was shut down according to the checklist. We left the APU running to provide electrical power to the aircraft. After gathering our things I deplaned; followed by the Captain. It was XE:22 local time when we exited the aircraft. We were then given a ride back to Gate XY and went back inside the terminal. Captain discussed the situation with the Chief Pilot and we were instructed to continue our pairing. I declared that I was still "fit to fly" as well as the Captain. We then proceeded to Gate XZ and started prep for the continued flight to ZZZ1. We departed ZZZ around XF:30 local and flew an uneventful flight. We terminated a little after XI:00 in ZZZ1 and entered crew rest. Over all; I felt like Captain did everything in his power to safely conduct this flight. His handling of the situation was always according to SOP and above bar. He remained calm and professional throughout this situation despite the high stress. He has my full support and confidence. I would not have done anything differently and did my best to support his efforts in this situation. My overall assessment of this situation is that we got pushed back too far. The #2 engine did not have enough thrust to move the aircraft forward and it rolled backwards. Captain stopped the aircraft when he observed the roll back but couldn't prevent the main gear from contacting the grass."
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.