A319 pilots reported multiple instrument malfunctions during descent. EICAS indicated airspeed; vertical speed; altimeter; angle of attack and pitot-static system malfunctions. After one missed approach a landing was accomplished.
Synopsis
A319 pilots reported multiple instrument malfunctions during descent. EICAS indicated airspeed; vertical speed; altimeter; angle of attack and pitot-static system malfunctions. After one missed approach a landing was accomplished.
Narrative
While descending on the arrival the warning alarms and the ECAM pops up indicating Captain pitot fail. The Captain (CA) Pilot flying (PF) called their aircraft and radios. The First Officer (FO) (PM) followed the ECAM and checklist. After about 30 seconds another warning alarm sounds. The second time the ECAM displayed pitot fail AOA fail. Simultaneously the airspeed tape and altitude tape showed erroneous information and the standby attitude indicator read zero. The CA turned off the auto pilot and auto throttles and maintained a constant decent. The FO had [requested priority handling] and requested speed and altitude calls from ATC to crosscheck desired performance. Cautions and warnings continued to sound every few minutes with ECAM. This created a very distracting and loud cockpit. As we descended below 14000 ft. it seemed that the instruments became more reliable. The crew continually crosschecked with ATC for confirmation. At about this time the Flight Attendant called the cockpit to inform the crew about an unresponsive passenger. While on vectors ATC reported extreme precipitation on final; they then said the heavy precipitation was gone. While getting on the LOC course the aircraft was still high and was directed by ATC to level off at 3000; and that we would be executing a missed approach. The crew received vectors and landed the aircraft on Runway XXC. Once on the ground the crew taxied to the gate/jet bridge. EMTs came on board and the previously unresponsive passenger awake and responsive once on the ground. Cause: IMC weather conditions; multiple alternates with similar weather as ZZZ icing conditions; multiple systems failures; backup systems failures. Suggestion: I see no actions that could have prevented it. There were a few actions that were omitted due to the extreme situation. Although the crew alerted ATC of the situation the crew forgot to squawk 7700. The crew followed all checklist and procedures and prioritized well.
Second reporter narrative
While descending as Pilot flying (PF) into ZZZ; about 25000 ft; IMC; anti-ice on; the aircraft had a master caution alert indicating a Captain pitot heat fail ECAM. I confirmed my aircraft" and asked the First Officer (FO) to run the ECAM which they did. Within 30 seconds or so; we received many follow on master caution and master warning alerts for a couple of minutes. As soon as we would silence the bells; new ones would alert. ECAM was indicating all pitot heaters had failed and we received AOA failure alerts as well. This resulted in the failure of all airspeed indicators; they went to 0. Altimeters and VSI were fluctuating and appeared to be unreliable. We made a [request for priority handling]; altitude and descent rate from ATC. I disconnected the auto pilot and auto thrust; then set pitch and power to continue the gentle descent that we had set previously. We were able to confirm with ATC as we continued the descent that the altimeters seemed to start working reliably again. Our intent was to get into warmer air to get airspeed and VSI back. We knew the temperature at ZZZ was 15C or so. We requested and were granted vectors to ILS XXC for approach. Weather was 1100 overcast and 3 miles visibility with showers in the vicinity. Weather at ZZZ1 and ZZZ2 were no better with gustier winds. We continued running the ECAMs; trying to make sense of it all. FO was also continuously backing me up on instruments. Upon finishing the checklists; we were in alternate law and finally got airspeed and VSI back. Then we got a call from #1 Flight Attendant (FA) that they had a medical emergency in the back; an unresponsive passenger. I replied we had an [priority] up front as well; they would have to handle it; landing in 10 minutes. We notified ATC of the additional issue and requested medical attention at the gate. We got the aircraft slowed and took vectors to base leg. ATC then reported moderate to extreme precipitation; ahead and just right of course. I was trying to corroborate that on the radar while FO requested vectors around it. After a long pause ATC replied the radar return was now gone; and turned us to intercept final. While handling all that and finishing configuration I overshot the localizer and started back to the right to intercept. ATC gave us a go around from about 2900 ft. which we completed. Second ILS and landing went fine. After landing; we taxied to the gate and it took another 5 or so minutes to get the jet bridge working. Once connected; EMT's boarded and medical assistance was rendered to the passenger. They were conscious before landing according to the FA's and feeling better as they deplaned. We were IMC from the start of the problem until we broke out at 1100 ft. on final. We were in light rime icing until about 15000 ft. (estimated); then we regained airspeed and VSI indications; one instrument at a time. I maintained aircraft control by constantly cross referencing all of the instruments to check for reliability; taking input on checklist items when able; and ignoring all other distractions. It was a full time job. I made gentle changes to pitch; roll; and power until we were able to jointly agree; with ATC providing ground speed and altitude calls that we were getting the performance from the jet we wanted. Once we got lower; we started trusting the instruments again as they seemed to be working normally. FO's backup on this was very helpful. They did a fantastic job helping with instrument scan and providing verbal updates; getting us through the ECAMS; and assisting with comms. For a XX hour; new hire FO; they were impressive. The Flight Attendants also deserve recognition for handling the medical situation in the back. The #1 FA heard all of the warning and caution alerts so they knew something was wrong up front. They remained calm and they carried on admirably with what little information they had. The FO and I had 100% of our attention on flying the jet and landing safely. Cause: Multiple cascading failures contributed to a confusing and difficult situation. Suggestion: I recommend all pilots ensure they are comfortable completely hand flying an instrument approach. I flew jets for XX years and we hand flew all the time. That came in handy today; even XX years later."
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.