ACR LTT FAILED TO FOLLOW GND CTL INSTRUCTIONS AND TAXIED ONTO AN ACTIVE RWY CAUSING A HVT TO GAR. GND CTL AND TWR PREVENTED A SERIOUS CONDITION TO WORSEN.

Date: 1992-04 · Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Anomalies: deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|ground-incursion-runway

Synopsis

ACR LTT FAILED TO FOLLOW GND CTL INSTRUCTIONS AND TAXIED ONTO AN ACTIVE RWY CAUSING A HVT TO GAR. GND CTL AND TWR PREVENTED A SERIOUS CONDITION TO WORSEN.

Narrative

TAXI CLRNC WAS: RWY 25R VIA K; INTXN 30; TAXIWAY J. I TAXIED E ON K; AND TURNED R AT INTXN 30. I WAS INTENDING TO TURN L ON J; AND CONTINUE E TO THE END OF THE RWY. THE L TURN SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE FIRST OPENING OR CLRWAY TO MY L AS I TURNED R ON INTXN 30. AS I JUST STARTED TO MAKE THE L TURN ON WHAT I THOUGHT WAS TAXIWAY J; I REALIZED THAT I HAD INSTEAD; MISSED J AND ENTERED RWY 25R; THE ACTIVE RWY. I WAS STILL ON S GND CTL; SO I HEARD THE GND CTLR SAY 'MDT YOU'RE ON THE RWY.' I THINK I SAID 'I REALIZE THAT NOW!' AND THE CTLR SAID TO MAKE THE L TURN AT INTXN 26. AT THIS TIME; A HVT FLT; WHO APPEARED TO BE A MI OR SO OUT; STARTED A MISSED APCH. THE CTLR HAD ME COPY DOWN A TELEPHONE NUMBER; AND WANTED A CALL AT NEXT LNDG. I RECALL SEEING A LOT OF RED DAY-GLO BARRIERS AT THE CORNER OF TAXIWAY K AND INTXN 30; AND EITHER MISSED SEEING THE PROPER TURN ONTO J; OR THOUGHT WE WERE STILL USING RWY 25R AS A TAXIWAY; AS WE HAD FOR THE PAST FEW WKS; DURING THE TAXIWAY REPAIR PROGRAM. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 206535: CLRNC WAS RECEIVED WITH THE REPLY 'EXPEDITE.' THE CAPT REACTED WITH A TAXI SPD THAT WAS ABOVE NORMAL IN MY OPINION. MY JOB IS TO EXECUTE THE 'BEFORE TKOF' CHKS WHICH BRINGS MY EYES INTO THE COCKPIT FOR THE COMPUTATION OF TKOF DATA AND VARIOUS OTHER DUTIES. THE CAPT'S PRIMARY JOB IS TO TAXI THE ACFT. WHILE TAXIING OUT WITH MY HEAD 'DOWN;' THE CAPT MADE A VERBAL SOUND OF DISTRESS. I LOOKED UP; NOTICED WE WERE ON RWY 25R (EBOUND) AND I SAW A HVT IN THE GAR MODE. WE TAXIED CLR AND WE WERE ASKED TO CONTACT A TELEPHONE NUMBER. CAUSATIVE FACTORS: 1) UNNECESSARY RUSHING OUT OF GATE. 2) EXCESSIVE TAXI SPD. 3) COCKPIT CHKS THAT REQUIRE 1 CREW MEMBER TO DIVERT ATTN INSIDE COCKPIT. 4) AS A FO; I FAILED TO MONITOR THE CAPT'S TAXI PROGRESS; AND TO ALERT HIM OF THE HIGH TAXI SPD.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.