A319 flight crew reported loss of auto flight systems in cruise. Flight crew diverted and landed uneventfully.
Synopsis
A319 flight crew reported loss of auto flight systems in cruise. Flight crew diverted and landed uneventfully.
Narrative
As I was receiving my Line Check to complete IOE and operating flight XXXX ZZZ-ZZZ1; my LCP (Line Check Pilot) decided to [request priority handling] and divert to ZZZ2 in response to a non-normal situation that developed while in cruise at FL370. As we were about 90NM west of ZZZ2 and about 2:40 into the flight we received an ECAM ANTI ICE STBY PITOT FAULT". At the time I was the PF (Pilot flying) and following SOP the CA (Captain) remained the PM to resolve the ECAM. With ECAM complete and screens normal the flight continued normally; and I needed a bio break; so I went to the LAV. As I was about to reenter the flight deck; I could hear several chimes. Once I was back in my seat the CA informed me of the situation and I let the Purser know she could go back in the cabin. The CA was hand flying the plane as we lost all automation. He elected to remain PF and I stayed the PM. Using proper CRM and SOP I followed the ECAM prompt. The CA also had a deadheading CA join us in the flight deck who helped us trying to find more information in the QRH as well as augment our resources and CRM capabilities to handle the non-normal situation.Once the ECAM were complete and screens were normal I went to find the "L/G SHOCK ABSORBER FAULT" non-normal in the FM (Flight Manual) and the condition paragraph confirmed loss of AP (Autopilot); A/THR and FAC consistent with the complete loss of automation. After the CA [requested priority handling] and as directed; I followed our SOP descent procedure to set up for ILS XXL in ZZZ2 since we wanted to use the longest runway available. By the time we turned around to ZZZ2 we were about 120 NM West and established on vectors and descent for the approach and upon the CA's request I also made a brief announcement to the passenger that following degraded instrumentation and navigation capabilities we were diverting to ZZZ2 for precaution and safety; and we would be on the ground in about 20 minutes. Once the descent procedure was complete and I did the arrival briefing for the CA; we were vectored for the approach and the CA flew in IMC from FL200 to 2;300 ft AGL with raw data only. As we went VMC about 3NM prior to ZZZZZ on ILS XXL we called the runway in sight and approach control cleared us for the visual XXL. The CA met all our stabilized approach criteria the descent; approach and landing were accomplished uneventfully and safely. Once we parked at the gate; we were met by the maintenance crew; and we individually and collectively gave them a narration of the incident. Then the ZZZ Assistant Chief met us and once the CA and I were able to debrief we received a fitness for duty assessment questionnaire to determine we were no longer fit for duty. The CA and I had a complete and extensive debrief afterwards and the CA was extremely thorough to explain that the IOE and Line Check couldn't be completed which I already knew since the CA briefed situations that would require to discontinue the Line Check. The CA made further arrangements so I can be quickly rescheduled to complete IOE."
Second reporter narrative
While operating Flight XXXX ZZZ-ZZZ1; and conducting a Line Check for new hire and IOE pilot; we received two ECAM faults while at cruise flight at FL370. The first fault occurred approximately 2 hours and 40 minutes into the flight. The first fault was an ANTI ICE STBY PITOT FAULT. I had First Officer continue to fly the aircraft while I ran the ECAM and referenced the QRH procedure. This particular fault had NO to do items associated with it and advised us that the standby pitot heat had failed. Once the ECAM was complete and screens normal we continued normal flight as all other systems were operational and the aircraft was capable of normal flight in RVSM airspace. We decided as a crew to set up a lavatory break and started that process per SOP. While FO (First Officer) was out of the cockpit and in the lav; we then received a L/G SHOCK ABSORBER FAULT at FL370. I announced ECAM and 2 seconds later the Autopilot; Flight directors; and Autothrust all disconnected simultaneously. There were many audible alarms and chimes going off when the Purser who was upfront with me per the SOP said What's going on?" to which I responded we just lost everything instrumentation wise. I immediately took over manual control of the aircraft and began flying the aircraft on raw data instrumentation. FO then returned to the cockpit and I advised him of the non normal status of the aircraft. I elected to continue flying the aircraft and had FO become the PM and state to run the ECAM non normal procedures. I realized we had no autopilots; and lost LNAV navigation; and told FO we needed to advise ATC. The Purser advised me before she left the cockpit that we had A crew DH (Dead Head) in the back and I advised her to have the Captain of that crew come up to the cockpit to help us with the non normal situation. CA (Captain) then came up and sat on the jumpseat to help us with the non normal situation. Even though he was a different aircraft type pilot; using CRM principles and training; I elected to give Captain A my QRH to see if he could also help us diagnose and maybe get some instrumentation back on the PFD (Primary Flight Display) and MFD (Multi-function Flight Display). I then [requested priority handling] and advised ATC when had lost all automation and were flying raw data. At this point we were about 90miles just west of ZZZ2 and I elected to divert there due to it having long sufficient runways and a major hub for Company. I had FO then get ATIS; landing data and advise dispatch and maintenance via ACARS of our status and intentions on diverting to ZZZ2. ATC then gave us radar vectors direct to ZZZ2 and set us up to land via the ILS XXL in ZZZ2. In the descent I called the Purser and gave her the official briefing per SOP. Per the QRH procedure and notes; I advised her based upon the aircraft status that an evacuation would not be probable. The whole descent and final approach into ZZZ2 was in IMC and flown via raw data. We joined the ILS XXL approach and broke out of IMC at approximately 2300 ft AGL. We were then cleared for the visual to XXL and landed safely and uneventfully. We taxiied to the gate did the parking checklist and did a quick debrief of the situation. We were met by maintenance personnel and advised them of the faults we received and loss of all automation. I then verbally debriefed the flight with the Chief Pilot; and also verbally debriefed with ZZZ2 Assistant Chief Pilot xxxx. xxxx then ran myself and FO through human factors checklist to determine our risk level for continuing our trip. It was then agreed upon by all parties that we were not fit for duty to continue due to the stress incurred during the incident. Afterwards myself and FO had a thorough debrief of the situation. I advised him that unfortunately we could not complete his IOE and Line Check due to having to [request priority handling]. I advised him I would reach out to the fleet training managers and advise them of the situation so they could put together a plan to get FO finished up with IOE."
More incidents for this aircraft family →
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.