Fractional Captain reported there were no NOTAMs regarding LVM runway conditions where it had snowed heavily. Due to safety concerns with LVN runway and ramp conditions; Captain flew to a different airport.

Narrative

I am submitting this report for informational purposes because I believe some lessons can be derived that can improve safety for not only Company but also aviation in general. Day 0 was the day before the beginning of my work week. At XO:00; I received my next day brief; which was to ferry from ZZZ to LVM Livingston; Montana; departing XB:00 and landing LVM at XD:00; to pick up a passenger and take him to ZZZ1. Taking in consideration my previous experience with LVM and what I knew to be the current and future weather that day in LVM; I knew I would not be able to land in LVM the next day. The evening of Day 0; it had been snowing in LVM for about 12 - 18 hours nonstop and was forecast to be snowing all night. I checked the NOTAMs for LVM and it caught my attention that there were no runway conditions reported for LVM. From previous experience flying into LVM; I knew the services were limited and I suspected that the runway at LVM had not been plowed; and would not be plowed in the morning. I called the FBO the evening of Day 0 and spoke with the person on duty. They told me that the runway had not been plowed since it had started snowing; that it wouldn't be plowed in time for our arrival the next day; and probably would not be plowed for some time as the city does a quick going over; when they get around to it." They also added that the runway had been wet with puddles and standing water prior to the freezing air arriving; so that the runway had flash frozen and was ice; that was then covered with snow. They told me straight out; "Do not come here; go to ZZZ2." ZZZ2 is a full service airport that is about an hour drive away from Livingston. After speaking with the LVM FBO; I knew I should let Company know what was going on and try to get them to switch the trip from LVM to ZZZ2. I spoke with Operations; Scheduling; and the Chief Pilot in three separate phone calls relaying the data that I had collected. All three departments declined to make any decisions that evening and punted the decision the next morning. I then called the FBO in LVM back and asked them if they would mind heading out to the airport at XB:30 on Day 1 to give me a runway condition report; to which they agreed to do. The next morning we showed at XA:00 to prep for our ferry to LVM. I checked the weather; including the observations over the previous night; which showed snow with low visibility all night. Additionally; the airport NOTAMs for LVM did not show any runway condition NOTAMs. The airport appeared open and normal operations; and the snow was forecast to end later that morning. For someone with no experience with LVM and no data beyond current and forecast weather; and current NOTAMS; it would seem that LVM would be a go for launch. However; it was not. I made a call to the Dispatcher who was working us that morning and relayed what I knew about LVM from the night before. She listened to what I had to say; but was reluctant to change the destination to ZZZ2 based on what I had relayed. She told me that looking at the data she had; the airport looked okay; other than it snowing all night. She wanted to wait until we got a runway condition report from the FBO that morning before changing the flight. At XB:30; I called the FBO to get the report. They told me the runway was snow over ice and that they had lost control of a vehicle while driving down the runway. That was enough for me; I knew I would not go to LVM that morning regardless of what Company or the owner wanted to do. I called the Dispatcher; relayed what I heard; and she told me she wanted to hear it herself. She called me back and told me that the FBO said it was snow over ice and that he had lost control of his truck. She said we will send you to ZZZ2. We ended up flying to ZZZ2 to pick up the passenger and landed in low visibility and snow. The owner had told us the drive from LVM was harrowing and the road conditions terrible. He also relayed that he had also called the FBO and the FBO had told him not to come to LVM; all the while he had been pressuring Operations to get us to pick him up in LVM.On the flight to ZZZ1 from ZZZ2; my second in command; who was a brand new; recently upgraded Captain; told me he was glad I had previous experience with LVM and that I had done all that extra work on the phones the night prior and that morning. He told me; initially he thought it was odd that I was making all these calls; but now looking back he realized that I was doing the prep work required of a diligent Captain. He told me; that if he had been the Captain that morning; he probably would have looked at the NOTAMs and saw no runway condition reports and launched from LVM. He said; "Hopefully; someone would have been there on the UNICOM to tell us that the runway was contaminated with snow over ice; otherwise we probably would have discovered it on approach; or perhaps even touchdown!" He seemed to be a bit alarmed by the whole situation; but it seemed to be a good learning experience for him as a new Captain. We completed our duty day safely and I didn't really think about this experience for several months; until a few months later. I saw that Aircraft Y ran off the runway in Livingston Montana in wintery conditions. I couldn't help but think that perhaps that crew had run into a similar situation as we had; but had pressed on in their mission believing that the runway conditions were normal. I checked the NOTAMs for LVM for that day and saw no runway condition reports. It makes me wonder if I had relayed my experiences earlier; perhaps I could have helped prevent the Aircraft Y incident? I would like to know what the requirements for an Airport Manager or Operator is to report runway conditions? It seems to me; that I've had similar experiences at other Montana uncontrolled fields. Specific examples of similar airports are Anaconda 3U3; Deer Lodge 38S; Ennis Keks; Dillon DLN.It seems surprising to me that whole days can pass at LVM of snow and winter weather and no runway condition NOTAMs are issued. I would like to know what the regulatory requirements are for an Airport Manager / Operator to issue runway condition NOTAMs. I wonder if even the minimal issuing of runway condition NOTAMs at LVM; or even a "runway condition not reported" note on the Jepp chart would have saved Aircraft Y? I would like to suggest more intensive training for new hire pilots; recent upgrades; dispatchers and schedulers here at Company regarding the lack of runway condition NOTAMs at some of these airports. I am scared that the influx of inexperience at Company might result in a similar accident as to Aircraft Y. As relayed by my second in command; he didn't know what he didn't know; and probably would have only looked at weather and NOTAMs. I would suggest that the Company emphasize getting on-the-ground runway reports; rather than just rely on issued NOTAMs. And this emphasis can't be through comply messages or newsletters; it has to be in ground school and IOE and mentoring. I also feel that the company culture that I experienced; of being skeptical of the info that I was trying to relay; as being a safety issue. I know Operations; Management; and even the Dispatcher were under pressure from a difficult owner to pick him up at LVM; but their unwillingness to listen to me; and also their unwillingness to make a decision until the last minute removes important barriers that block unsafe operations from proceeding - thinking of Swiss cheese model here. Waiting until the last minute only increases the urgency of the decision making and increases pressure on those decision makers. The Company should be striving to reduce pressure rather than increasing it."