Air carrier flight crew reported a flight entertainment monitor began to emit smoke during cruise then eventually stopped. Flight crew completed a diversion and safe landing.
Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported a flight entertainment monitor began to emit smoke during cruise then eventually stopped. Flight crew completed a diversion and safe landing.
Narrative
Flight ZZZ-ZZZZ; Day 0; Approx XA00z; FL370; 100nm north of and enroute to ZZZ [VOR]. CA (Captain) answered cabin call; FAs (Flight Attendants) notified him an IFE (In-flight Entertainment) screen smoking. Multiple pax smelled smoke; FAs retrieved fire extinguisher. CA relayed FA's message to me and CA selected IFE/PASS seats power switch off and we ran smoke; fire; fume memory items (mask not necessary and the cabin and crew communications were established). CA assigned PF (Pilot Flying) duties and ATC to me; he continued to talk to FAs about status of smoke while calling via SATCOM to dispatch and asking for a maintenance control patch. I called up and began accomplishing the smoke; fire; fumes Electronic checklist. Shortly after CA selected the IFE/PASS seats power off; the FAs reported to him that the smoke had stopped and dissipated from cabin. They did not need to use the extinguisher and they moved the passenger from the seat. We had accomplished the smoke; fire; fumes electronic checklist up to the step of Turing off the APU bleed when the call with Dispatch and maintenance control connected. CA relayed actions to stop smoke and fumes with maintenance control; and queried about turning equipment back on/ leaving equipment on that did not cause smoke as the smoke clearly came from the IFE screen; was now powered off; and was no longer smoking (gasper fan; recirc fans; APU bleed were items electronic checklist called to be turned off). Maintenance Control noted that as IFE/PASS seats power switch remained off; CA discretion / okay to turn items not related to smoke back on - also a step in checklist provided that option ('Restore unpowered items at the Captain's discretion')- we completed electronic checklist. After accomplishing the electronic checklist; I listened to the SATCOM call with low volume to build situational awareness from dispatch while focusing on flying the aircraft and listening to ATC. I did not hear any of the FA to captain communication and relied on the CA to relay relevant info from the FAs. After the electronic checklist was complete; and while CA was talking to dispatch and maintenance control; I also sent for METAR and TAF weather at ZZZ1 [airport] via ACARS and checked the weather when the reports returned to the aircraft ACARs COMM. While working the satcom call and getting updates from the FAs via the handset; the CA asked my thoughts on continuing / diverting. I recommended we consult with dispatch and strongly consider a divert to ZZZ1 [airport] and relayed the weather I just checked at ZZZ1 [airport]. He agreed and said let's not go past ZZZ [VOR] (about 80 miles to the south of our position at that time). As CA resumed talking to dispatch about diverting to ZZZ1 [airport] via SATCOM; I turned SATCOM volume down and remained focused on flying and ATC communication. While CA was talking to dispatch; I called ZZZ1 Center ATC and advised them that we were working an issue in the cabin and would likely not proceed past ZZZ [VOR]. ATC asked if we were diverting and I replied that we were still gathering info and making the decision but that we were looking at ZZZ1 [airport] for a divert option. ATC asked nature of the issue and I explained we had a flight entertainment monitor that was smoking but all indications were that the smoke source had stopped; we removed electric power to the screen; and smoke had dissipated. As CA made decision to divert to ZZZ1 [airport] with dispatch I coordinated with ATC for diversion and flew the aircraft (left turn back to heading and then direct to ZZZZZ on ZZZZZ1 STAR). I entered ZZZ1 [airport] into the RTE page as the destination. ATC Asked if we were [requesting priority handling] and I started to tell them 'yes' when the CA (internally to our flight deck and not on ATC) stopped me from finishing 'yes' and advised me NOT to. CA had better situational awareness of the smoke status in the cabin as he spoke directly to FAs and I only heardwhat he relayed. He assured me the smoke stopped and dissipated. So I confirmed with ATC that we were not [requesting priority handling] and that the smoke stopped and had dissipated; but we desired a diversion to ZZZ1 [airport]. CA Notified FAs and made PA to pax about the situation and the diversion to ZZZ1 [airport]. CA continued to advise FAs to remain in communication and report any changes to the status of the smoke and temperature of the IFE screen.On the arrival while CA was making calls to FAs and pax PA; I asked ATC for a heads up on a expected runway and approach as the ATIS listed multiple approach and runway options (XXL; XXR; XY). ATC stated they would relay my request. After not getting an answer after several more minutes I requested the RNAV Y XXR. ATC then replied we could expect the ILS XY. I loaded the ILS XY approach. I was trying to prevent having to go heads down at a lower altitude so that I could remain more focused on backing up the CA with the flight path. CA took ATC/PM (pilot monitoring) role back; briefed arrival and approach; ran descent checklist; and was asked by ATC for SOB (souls on board) and fuel remaining. CA then took control of aircraft back and I resumed PM duties. We discussed and agreed that the diversion QRC could wait until after we landed and parked. CA Flew arrival; approach; and Landed at ZZZ1 [airport] uneventfully. ATC approach and tower both asked if we were [requesting priority handling] and both times I replied that we were NOT (in accordance with CA direction). Despite these replies; the fire trucks were waiting near runway XY and after we cleared the runway the fire crash rescue reported to ATC they would still follow us to the gate. After initial call from FAs; there was no recurrence of smoke; and while monitor initially was hot it was later described as warm. CA relayed this info but I never heard any of the reports directly from the FAs as I acted as PF and handled ATC and the QRH. The CA did a great job of keeping me informed of the cabin status and words from maintenance control and dispatch. I also felt very much included in the process and could not have asked for better CRM with a CA.ATC (ZZZ1 center; approach; tower) were very helpful and professional. Completed smoke event paperwork with maintenance after parking. Debriefed flight with CA. Flight felt very much like a training scenario - glad to have had the training we do for this type of event. In hindsight; during preflight prep; CA and I discussed that ZZZ2 [airport] was a dispatch alternate; ZZZ2 [airport] forecast weather was not the best (storms; wind and rain) but would work - and that ZZZ1 [airport] was a more practical flight divert versus the dispatch flight planning alternate. I would have preferred to [request priority handling] in this scenario but I did not feel that it was unsafe not to do so and I did not feel that it was worth the time in pushing back on the CA's call to NOT [request priority handling]. It would have added talk - discussion time without much added value. If at any time the smoke returned I would have pushed to [request priority handling]. The timing / location of the event made for a very busy arrival; but manageable with the CAs assignment of duties and very efficient for getting on the ground relatively quickly after the initial event.
Second reporter narrative
We were 20 mins north of ZZZ [VOR] @ FL 350. ZZZ1 [airport] was approximately 200 nm east with bad weather en route and in their local area. After ZZZ [VOR] we were planned to transition to be overwater for the next 90 minutes. We received a cabin call from a FA (flight attendant) who stated there was 'smoke in the cabin. We are getting the fire extinguisher. We will get back to you.' FAs established a point of contact with the flight deck; designated a FA to handle the smoke issue; and provided us with updates as able - later reported as coming from a video monitor. I was PF (pilot flying); transferred the aircraft and radios to the FO (First Officer) as I coordinated with the FAs and tried to filter the incoming details. As the situation developed; we concurrently ran the smoke; fumes; or fire checklist and contacted Dispatch/maintenance control. FAs did a nice job following their procedures: they kept in good contact; eventually reseated pax (passengers); and recruited [a] pilot to monitor the problematic seat and entertainment equipment. As time progressed I felt the situation in the cabin was safe and under control. Initially we set ZZZ [VOR] as a limit/ decision point to resolve the cabin issue as I did not want to be troubleshooting a checklist with unclear resolution and dealing with international ATC communications; potential overwater divert procedures; route reversal in international airspace; lack of overwater alternates; and intermittent SATCOM communications. Filtering information from the cabin took some effort as the FA tasked with communicating with the flightdeck was not initially involved with the smoke; she was presenting second or third hand information so understandably she lacked a lot of details (I felt she did a good job; she let me know what she did and did not know; she was consistently easy to reach; and she followed through on getting answers to my questions.) As I later gained access to first hand info from those on the scene; I reevaluated the situation. This was the most difficult part of the scenario - integrating details from 2 or 3 different cabin perspectives from FAs that had varying degrees of involvement at different times; and the information was presented to me out of sequence (again understandable given the situation). It was definitely not a linear flow; nor could that be expected. It now appeared that the smoke was more extensive than a wisp or two and that more equipment was involved than the originally reported video monitor. FAs reported that non-colocated entertainment equipment beneath the seat was very hot. The equipment later cooled to just 'warm'. Still felt the situation was stable in the back; checklists had fixed the problems. Since we were approaching ZZZ [VOR] at this point; I decided diverting to ZZZ1 [airport] was the safest option. Thanks to Dispatch/maintenance control for the help. FO did an excellent job with managing ATC comm and workload management. At each change of the route/ altitude; as I cleaned up details in the back and coordinated the divert; he made sure I was aware of the changes so I could back him up to prevent pilot induced errors. Strong descent; ATC; workload; and CRM management skills on his part. Workload was high as the divert progressed; we transitioned from irregular workflows back to normal workflows with FO still flying as I cleaned up details for the divert and arrival. I transitioned back to PF (pilot flying). We discussed the divert guide and tasks; but did not have time to reference it until after landing due to arrival severe weather and turbulence. All divert items were accomplished. No [priority handling requested]. Fire extinguisher was not used. No ATC or SOP violations occurred that I am aware of.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.