A New York ARTCC Controller reported their frequency 125.32 is routinely mistaken for Boston ARTCC 135.32. Both sectors work N90 departure traffic resulting in separation errors and confusion when aircraft are issued or read back the wrong similar sounding frequency.
Synopsis
A New York ARTCC Controller reported their frequency 125.32 is routinely mistaken for Boston ARTCC 135.32. Both sectors work N90 departure traffic resulting in separation errors and confusion when aircraft are issued or read back the wrong similar sounding frequency.
Narrative
Systemic similar frequency issue that has occurred countless times and been reported through faa system previously. ZNY (New York ARTCC) area B sector 56 (Kennedy) has a similar frequency of 125.32 as a sector in ZBW (Boston ARTCC) area B sector 38 (Athens) of 135.32. Both of these sectors work departures off of N90 (New York TRACON) and multiple times per day aircraft are incorrectly switched to the ZNY area B sector 56 controller. This is an extremely dangerous situation that results in frequency congestion and aircraft incorrectly taking climb clearances for other aircraft with similar sounding call signs. This has resulted in significant losses of separation and wake turbulence events. This is a systemic issue that has been pushed up the chain of command by controllers and operation supervisors at ZNY ARTCC but has not been addressed for numerous years. The necessary action to mitigate this systemic safety issue would be to have one of the ATC sectors frequencies changed. This is a human factors issue and all attempts to mitigate this situation by air traffic controllers have not been successful over an extended period of time. Additional information that supports the need for a frequency change is that the ZNY area B sector R56 (Kennedy) is the busiest sector at ZNY ARTCC and is often combined with an additional sector of R42 (east Texas) due to ongoing staffing shortages of ATC personnel at the ZNY ARTCC. These staffing shortfalls negatively affect the safety of the NAS and have no near term solutions. Please push for this change as it is a known and on going systemic issue that is outside of the controller work force's control and a factor that contributes to a reduction in the safety of the National Airspace System.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.