Air carrier Ramp Lead personnel reported the lack of adequate ramp load staffing and poor ramp communication contributed to an inaccurate departure Weight & Balance data. Additionally; a missing DG parcel location in the cargo compartment was not resolved.
Synopsis
Air carrier Ramp Lead personnel reported the lack of adequate ramp load staffing and poor ramp communication contributed to an inaccurate departure Weight & Balance data. Additionally; a missing DG parcel location in the cargo compartment was not resolved.
Narrative
I was assigned inbound flight ZZZ with a quick turn flight ZZZ1. I arrived at Gate A directly after departing another aircraft on Gate B. I had minimal time to meet my crew and perform a safety briefing involving the type of aircraft; load; etc. I noted that the ramp crew had designated job duties prior to my arriving at Gate A. One of my crew departed the Gate to run the city bags. I sent another crew member to obtain our outbound ZZZ1 bags (note 151 bags). One crewmember and I were left at the gate. NOTE: since I walked up to the gate minutes prior to the aircraft arriving; I had no planning time for the outbound load; nor did I have time to obtain a second power stow to assist the crew in loading the aircraft. I only had a power stow and a belt loader to load approximately 5600 pounds of mail/ freight and 151 bags. My crewmember arrived back with the outbound bags and began assisting me loading the mail into Pit 4. I contacted my supervisor to assist me with manpower and equipment to assist with this load. At some point the Manager arrived on my gate. He directed me to begin loading the front cargo pit with the 151 bags. The Manager and Supervisor then directed another lead to continue loading the rear of the aircraft. At this time I informed the Manager that the second cart of mail must be loaded into Pit #4 and cannot be split from the remainder of the mail from that cart that I had already loaded into Pit #4. During this time; I was unable to keep up with what the Manager/ supervisor was directing my crew to load in the rear of the aircraft. 1. I knew there was a dangerous good at the gate. I found a box that had no obvious dangerous good markings; however it scanned as 'cargo not manifested.' I made the decision to place that box aside and revisit it at the end of my load. 2. The Manager continued to direct my crew as pit #3 bulked out and directed a number of my crew to load items into the rear of the aircraft. 3. At this time I realized that I had no idea what was on the aircraft and what was held off. 4. This flight was weight restricted (165 bags weight restriction) and given that my scanner and the other lead's scanner do not update in real time; I realized that I had no idea how close I was to the 165 bag limit; or if I was infact over the limit. 4. I considered calling a safety stop; so I could catch myself up with what had been loaded and held off the aircraft; but the manager's presence and the fact that he was directing my crew to perform tasks unknown to me; I carried on with what I could accomplish. 5. The Manager chose to question my technical competence as a Lead as I attempted to close out the flight and noted that there were at least 9 Missing Scan/ Verify Pit(s) red error verifications to reconcile. 6. At this time I realized that there were either 9 or 11 carts on my gate; and the Manager had directed my crew to move them out of the Safety Zone at the gate. I informed the Manager that I needed to take the time to personally verify each cart number and whether there were or were not contents; as that was the only way I would have an idea if the cart items were loaded into the rear of the aircraft at the Manager's direction. The Manager appeared upset that I was taking this time consuming step to physically verify what was actually on the aircraft or held off the aircraft. The Manager then informed me that the 'Mail team' had removed an unknown number of carts from my gate; and he could not verify if all three of those carts had been loaded onto the aircraft or not. I asked the Manager if he could call the mail team and verify the cart numbers the removed from Gate A without my knowledge. The Manager seemed highly upset with me for making this request. At this time; I informed the Manager that I personally did not know what HAD and HAD NOT been loaded onto the aircraft due to his directing my crew without my knowledge. I then asked the Manager if the dangerous good had been loaded onto the aircraft. The Manager informed me that the dangerous good had been held off the aircraft and was sitting in a random cart on my gate. I then informed the Manager that I would need to contact Load Planning to assist me in removing the dangerous good from the final DSTG (Departure Staging Guide) report; as I could not do so through my scanner device. The Manager stated that instead of me taking the time to go to the kiosk and logging onto a computer to get into a software; that he would personally call Load Planning. Additionally; I stated to the Manager that I did not know if the third cart of mail was physically on the aircraft or if it had been held off and was still showing loaded on the DSTG report. The Manager stated that he would take care of the final DSTG with Load Planning. I was then told to close out the loading form; at which time I noted that I could not verify what exactly had been loaded onto the aircraft and what had been held off due to the Manager's directing my crew without my knowledge. 7. I would like to note that I was greatly concerned for the safety of the aircraft and passengers and crew; given that the Manager chose to direct my crew to perform load tasks (unknown to me) at the rear of the aircraft. However; given this Manager's frustrations; I did not feel comfortable until I could personally and physically verify what had been loaded/ held off this aircraft. I was not sure about how close the aircraft was to its baggage weight restriction. I was not 100% sure about the status of the dangerous good being held off. I was not 100% sure how much mail/ freight had been loaded into the rear of the aircraft. I noted in my loading form that the Manager had approved this outbound ZZZ1 Load. Later; I learned that this Manager had been on the ZZZ1 departure at the gate at least one other time in the previous week. I am concerned for the safety of my ramp crew; given that this Manager had knowledge that the quick turn to ZZZ1 had issues earlier in the week; yet the Manager chose not to solve these problems. I am concerned for the safety and well being of my fellow ramp crew and leads; given that this Manager chose to not address obvious staffing/ equipment/ safety issues on this flight. This Manager essentially chose to place my ramp crew; as well as the passengers and crew of the aircraft in danger by allowing this incident to repeat itself multiple times over the span of a week. My goal is to ensure that no other lead is set up for failure on this flight due to staffing/ lack of proper equipment; and/or a Manager on site at the gate choosing to perform lead duties (yet not informing the lead of his decisions); and pressuring the lead to close out the flight so the aircraft could depart.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.