A321 flight crew reported a hard landing after a bounce and pitch warning while landing in gusty wind conditions. The crew received a ACARS report of a hard landing exceedance from maintenance and submitted a log writeup.
Synopsis
A321 flight crew reported a hard landing after a bounce and pitch warning while landing in gusty wind conditions. The crew received a ACARS report of a hard landing exceedance from maintenance and submitted a log writeup.
Narrative
Landing at ZZZ at approximately XA:20 hours; our aircraft lost airspeed and needed to recover for landing very close to the ground. The Captain was pilot flying the visual approach to Runway 0XL; Auto-pilot and auto thrust were disengaged. I called the Captain stable at 1000 ft. and 500 ft. respectively. At around 200 ft. AFL; it was apparent the winds were stronger than anticipated and causing low level turbulence/ wind shear. I noticed the aircraft losing airspeed around 100 ft. RA; the Captain did his best to recover but resulted in a bounced landing. The last winds I heard from the Tower providing a wind check were 300 degrees 22 gusting 27. A hard; bounced landing occurred. Maintenance Control stated the hard landing occurred after the initial bounce. However; at the point at which I might have called a go around; I felt the landing was safer and that a go around would have resulted in a tail strike. I'm not sure exactly how close we were to the ground when the approach became completely unstable and would like to find out that information. Winds were a factor; ZZZ ATIS did not report low level wind shear but we experienced it during the approach. The Captain elected not to use automation; I believe having the thrust managed and airspeed managed could have helped the gusty wind conditions by decreasing the Captains workload during the approach. Inadequate recency of experience manually managing the thrust levers; in my opinion; was the primary factor.[I suggest] having more recency and experience flying the airbus with no automation in gusty conditions or a furthered risk analysis on use of less automation.
Second reporter narrative
The ATIS winds were 310/14G21. I chose to hand fly the thrust levers on the ILS XL and selected an approach speed of 143 (Vls+8). I also noted that we were close to max landing weight and selected flaps full; since the runway was short enough to require a landing assessment. The winds were moving the aircraft around quite a bit; but I was stable at 1000 ft. and at 500 ft. Crossing the threshold; I encountered a loss of headwind and a sink. I goosed the power to arrest the sink rate. On touchdown; the aircraft bounced. I felt like I held the attitude; but we received a pitch warning. We touched down again; rolled out; and exited the runway. After shutdown; the ACARS printer produced a lengthy printout. I wasn't sure what it meant; but the FO (First Officer) thought I should check for a tailstrike. I went outside and found no evidence of a tailstrike but decided to call Maintenance Control. Maintenance Control informed me that the aircraft registered an exceedance on the second touchdown and asked me to write up a hard landing in the AML (Aircraft Maintenance Log).The winds were a factor; and the gusts may have exceeded what the ATIS reported. Although I have a lot of experience hand flying the thrust levers; I don't have much recency doing so and am still getting reacquainted with the A320. Ultimately; since I recognized the loss of airspeed and the sink rate; I should have chosen to execute a go around.I am comfortable hand flying the thrust levers and have done so in training and on the line. However; I should also trust the systems and safeguards that the A320 provides; such as the autothrust and ground speed mini. I could have chosen to keep the autothrust engaged and used managed speed. I could also have kept the Autopilot engaged for longer. Given the conditions; a flaps 3 approach would probably have been advisable. And I needed to go around. I feel I am a competent; professional pilot. In many years of flying; I have never had a bounced landing. I have never had a hard landing. I certainly have never had both in one approach. I am neither cocky; nor a showboat. I don't believe I harbor hazardous attitudes. However; this event does humble me and forces me to re-examine my go around decision process. One change I will make now is to more fully brief parameters for a go around and to encourage FOs to call a go-around if they see these limits. I will also lean towards flap 3 approaches in gusty winds; landing performance permitting.
More incidents for this aircraft family →
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.