A Ground Control trainee and their Instructor reported a taxiing aircraft had to stop suddenly to avoid another aircraft taxiing through an intersection.

Date: 2024-03 · Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model · Phase: taxi

Anomalies: conflict-ground-conflict|critical|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|flight-deck-cabin-aircraft-event-illness-injury|ground-incursion-taxiway

Synopsis

A Ground Control trainee and their Instructor reported a taxiing aircraft had to stop suddenly to avoid another aircraft taxiing through an intersection.

Narrative

I was a CPC-IT on Ground Control on west flow. After taking the position with my trainer; Aircraft X was issued [Runway] XXR at [Taxiway] 1 via [Taxiways] 2; 3 prior to me taking the position and had stopped on 2 for traffic on [Taxiway] 4. Shortly after Aircraft X reported that the severity of braking for traffic caused the injury of a flight attendant. I; along with my trainer; promptly relayed the information to the OS/CIC (Controller in Charge). Initially; the pilot's intentions were to return to the gate; however; the pilot later decided to continue taxi for departure; and departed without further incident. During and after this situation; there was debate as to whether or not the traffic on [Taxiway] 4 had the right of way due to them not being established in the 'core'. I am unaware as to whether or not a MOR was filed.On east flow; there is clear guidance on 'right-of-way' traffic regarding to traffic both established in the core and established on an adjacent taxiway. On west flow; however; no such guidance exists. Mitigation of an event like this may warrant more clarity on the taxi flow plans; especially now due the construction projects in that area. This can be accomplished by adding 'join behind' annotations on the west flow charts or; rather; removing the annotations from the east flow charts in order to return to the default aircraft established on a taxiway have right-of-way.

Second reporter narrative

My trainee wasn't on time so I took Ground Control myself to relieve the other controller in a timely fashion. I taxied several airplanes and then the trainee finally showed up. While I was giving him an abbreviated briefing since I retained the position the whole time I looked up and saw Aircraft X south on [Taxiway] 1 stopped at [Taxiway] 2 while a fast taxiing Aircraft Y went in front. The trainee then said 'sorry they were supposed to give way; continue' Not correct; we/I missed the call. A couple transmissions later Aircraft X keyed up and said that when they stopped hard for the Aircraft Y a flight attendant got knocked over and was injured and they would need to return to the gate. I quickly overkeyed the trainee and told Aircraft X to go right on [Taxiway] 3 so that we could get them back quickly as opposed to them continuing in the line of departures and getting stuck. The trainee worked a couple of more planes before Aircraft X keyed up and said the flight attendant was actually ok and they were able to continue the flight. The trainee then resequenced them. Just before frequency change Aircraft X keyed up again (Captain I think; different voice) and asked if the Aircraft Y was supposed to have given way. I keyed up and said I am the trainer and no; that was our missed traffic call and my responsibility and I understand your frustration. I then shipped them to Tower. Immediately define who has right of way at that intersection. It should be Ground Control giving [Taxiway] 2 short of [Taxiway] 1 on initial contact and then evaluating as they get closer. The aircraft that use this route land [Runway] XXR and come all the way down [Taxiway] 4 to [Taxiway] 2 and tend be moving fast after a long taxi and being on a two mile straightaway. I think this event proves that this is a conflict point that needs to be addressed definitively. As it is right now the Aircraft Y was on [Taxiway] 2 was established and I owned the call and I accept responsibility for this event.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.