B737 MAX 8 flight crew reported they failed to make a crossing restriction on arrival into ATL after encountering wake turbulence from the preceding aircraft.
Synopsis
B737 MAX 8 flight crew reported they failed to make a crossing restriction on arrival into ATL after encountering wake turbulence from the preceding aircraft.
Narrative
We were flying the GLAVN 1 Arrival landing west at ATL. Center cleared us to cross GLAVN at 14;000 ft and we were sequenced behind another airliner approximately 5-7 NM in front of us. While passing through 16;000 ft; we encountered wake turbulence and the aircraft rolled left/right and shook with moderate force. I came out of VNAV Descent (we were on the path) and shallowed out our descent with V/S to get above the preceding aircraft's wake. I verbalized my intentions with the PM; but then contacted the cabin crew to let them know the source of our turbulence and inquire about any injuries. While communicating with the cabin crew; we continued to get higher and higher on the path descent. After terminating my call to the cabin crew; the PM informed me we were high. ATL Center switched us to ATL Approach. I resumed descending in LVL CHG with speedbrakes and asked the PM to inform Approach Control that we encountered wake and were going to be high at GLAVN. The PM checked in with Approach Control and advised them of our situation; but Approach did not acknowledge the altitude situation at GLAVN. We were informed to plan Runway 27L and then had to go about programming the FMC and briefing 27L; as we were expecting 26R. We crossed GLAVN around 14;700 ft instead of 14;000 ft. Approach did not inform us of a deviation. We were not given relief. The timing of the switch from Center to Approach complicated the request for relief. While I feel that I was communicating well with the PM; and that we had a shared mental model; we both were distracted after the wake event. My initial reaction was to get out of the wake; however I then allowed myself to be distracted with concerns of the cabin crew; versus effectively flying the aircraft and maintaining our assigned clearance. I should've directed the PM to contact Center immediately to request altitude relief or a vector. By the time he brought it to my attention; we were 2;000 ft high on the path and were not going to make the restriction. The handoff to Approach Control complicated the issue at that point.
Second reporter narrative
We were on the GLAVN1 Arrival and given the crossing restriction at GLAVN of 14;000 ft (landing west at ATL). We were in VNAV PATH with everything normal when passing through 17;000 ft we encountered moderate turbulence; which both the Captain and I agreed was caused by wake turbulence from preceding aircraft on the arrival. The Captain (PF); instructed the Flight Attendants to take their jumpseats; and he lessened the descent rate to stay above the wake; yet he was aware of the upcoming restriction at GLAVN. During this time; as PM; we had two changes with Approach frequency that were in quick succession. The first assigned us the 27L transition on the arrival. We were then handed off to the next Approach frequency. I alerted the Captain that on check-in I would inform Approach we would be high at GLAVN due to wake turbulence.On check-in with the Controller; I advised we were descending through our altitude (about 17;000 ft) to cross GLAVN at 14;000 ft but that we would be high because we encountered wake turbulence. On check in we were just outside three miles from GLAVN. The Controller did not mention anything with regard to the statement that we would be high and did not seem concerned. As we continued our descent there was no longer the threat of wake turbulence; we crossed GLAVN about 1;000 ft high and the Controller did not query. The descent and approach continued uneventfully. It would have been helpful for ATC to acknowledge our report of wake turbulence or acknowledge when I stated we would be high at the crossing restriction.
NASA callback
Reporter stated the wake encounter was a significant distractor.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.