Air carrier flight crew reported a NMAC during initial approach to BUR in night visual conditions. The crew maneuvered in response to the TCAS RA commands; then returned to their clearance and continued the approach.
Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported a NMAC during initial approach to BUR in night visual conditions. The crew maneuvered in response to the TCAS RA commands; then returned to their clearance and continued the approach.
Narrative
At an altitude of 6;000 ft. during the RNAV visual 33 near GZILA fix; I observed an aircraft at our 10 o'clock 5-10 miles SE of our position. LNAV; VNAV; autothrottle and autopilot were all engaged. The traffic appeared to be stationary; and I alerted the FO who was PF to the traffic and the potential for a TCAS RA maneuver. The FO placed his hands on the control column and thrust levers to be ready for response if needed. Based on the aircraft not appearing to move; I became increasingly concerned as it was apparent we were merging; and the threat of a collision was looking more likely. SoCal Approach frequency 134.2 was task saturated and did not mention any potential traffic conflicts for our approach and I was unable to query due to frequency congestion.Approximately ten seconds after we initially began monitoring the traffic; we received an TCAS alert followed by an immediate CLIMB" RA with both PFD and aural warnings. I recall seeing 00 on the ND altitude display with the TCAS alert; prior to the RA. The FO immediately disengaged the autopilot/autothrottle and began a climb following the RA command bars on the PFD. The initial pitch guidance and or the FO's pitch application with the control column seemed modest considering my synopsis attempting to maintain visual on the approaching aircraft; which was clearly flying from our left to right westbound. I returned my focus inside to the instruments and thrust settings. The thrust levers were at a low power setting due to our approach. I commanded the FO increase thrust to expedite our climb; I lost visual of the other aircraft as our nose continued to rise. At that time SoCal Approach directed an immediate climb with a frantic sense of urgency. I calmly responded that we were taking "EVASIVE ACTION" and simultaneously the TCAS RA audio directed us to "INCREASE CLIMB" which I believe could be heard on the ATC frequency at the time I was keying the mic. We climbed to 8;000 ft. before we received the TCAS "CLEAR OF CONFLICT" aural alert. I estimate we were within 800 ft. or less of a potential collision during the closest point of conflict. SoCal issued descent clearance to 5;000 ft. and subsequently cleared us for the RNAV visual 33. The aircraft in question was Aircraft Y that had departed Van Nuys and was heading west. After the resolution; Aircraft Y broadcast what their prior ATC instructions were on SoCal frequency; which I cannot recall. We had to work quickly in order to configure the aircraft appropriately in order to meet stable approach criteria. Winds were gusty on the field with windshear advisories present. Airspeed began to drop during the final turn on approach and I informed the FO of the loss; and the appropriate prompt response was applied with additional thrust. The autothrottle was still disengaged following the RA and the FO re-engaged it. A normal landing occurred the remainder of the flight was uneventful. I contacted Dispatch at the termination of the flight to report the TCAS RA in accordance with flight manual policy. I noted the time of the incident at (time and date).Suggestions: The Review Team will have more accurate information with access to the ATC tapes and other tools to better recreate this situation than my memory can describe with this transcript. In my near XX years of 121 airline experience; I can say unequivocally that this was the most dangerous moment I have ever faced; and we are lucky to have avoided a potentially devastating accident with a total hull loss. While we were vigilant and took corrective action; prior to this event we had encountered moderate turbulence and broke sterile cockpit with unnecessary conversation. Fortunately; we had ceased conversation as we began entering the terminal area and were sterile the remainder of the flight. Had we been distracted and not looking outside the cockpit; we may have been unable to avoid this conflict; in the future I will stress the importance of remaining sterile duringcritical phase of flight. I believe our previous training had helped us respond in an appropriate manner; but I will concede that our response could possibly have been improved. Startle effect (despite our advanced preparation and readiness) is an ongoing threat no matter how many times you train it. I would strongly suggest the Review Team consider including a scenario like this with training going forward. In my previous SIM experiences; an RA event is usually obvious and artificial compared to this real world event. Perhaps we can consider exposing Crews to an RA during approach when they are more unsuspecting; task saturated and or distracted to see if appropriate response is initiated in a timely manner? Last; I would like to bring attention to the Review Team the importance of the TCAS equipment and the real likelihood that it possibly saved the lives of all XXX souls on this flight. MEL 34-XX-XX permits the TCAS being deferred as long as "Enroute or approach procedures do not require its use." Although infrequent; I have operated flights with TCAS under this MEL authorization and I believe it gives too much risk/burden on the Captain's judgement to accept the aircraft. I would wish to propose the Review Team use this situation as an example to prohibit our flights from operating without operable TCAS equipment. I believe we can apply company guidance here and make risk decisions at the right level to eliminate the risk of having the choice to operate an aircraft with inoperable TCAS in busy controlled airspace. The risk does not outweigh the reward and is unnecessary."
Second reporter narrative
We were cleared to descend to 5;000 ft. on the RNAV Visual Runway 33 into BUR. A bit past GZILA waypoint; descending through 6;000 ft.; we noticed another aircraft; opposite direction. It was an Aircraft Y climbing out of VNY. ATC was busy talking to another aircraft behind us on the same RNAV Visual. We got the TCAS RA; and it directed us to climb (also got an 'Increase Vertical Speed'). We climbed from around 6;000 ft. up to around 8;000 ft. before we leveled off and were able to tell ATC that we were responding to an RA and were returning to our original clearance of 5;000 ft. ATC then cleared us for the approach; and we landed on Runway 33 without further incident.Suggestions: I'm not sure what happened with ATC in this situation. Aircraft Y stated what their clearance was on the radio after we told ATC that we were responding to an RA. I believe that it was a heading and a climb to a certain altitude; but I was busy hand flying and getting back down to our assigned altitude; so it was mostly heard in the background. It seems that ATC was busy talking to the traffic behind us and did not notice the conflict that was about to take place. I am not sure what systems they have to alert them of this situation; but they were obviously unaware of the conflict; and we couldn't query them in time to avoid the RA because ATC was giving a clearance to other traffic. It seems that this should have never been allowed to happen; but again; I don't know what the situation is like for ATC Controllers.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.