AN LGT FREIGHTER CREW MISSED THEIR XING RESTRICTION LETTING DOWN INTO MEM.

Date: 1992-05 · Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng

Anomalies: deviation-altitude-crossing-restriction-not-met|deviation-altitude-undershoot|deviation-speed-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance

Synopsis

AN LGT FREIGHTER CREW MISSED THEIR XING RESTRICTION LETTING DOWN INTO MEM.

Narrative

ZME GAVE US A DSCNT CLRNC FROM FL350; PLT'S DISCRETION TO FL240. I WOULD NORMALLY BEGIN THE DSCNT APPROX 90 MI FROM MEM; PLANNING TO CROSS MIDDY INTXN (046 RADIAL FROM MEM; 30 DME) AT 10000 FT AND 250 KIAS AS SHOWN ON THE MIDDY ARR TO MEM. SOMETIME BTWN 90 AND 110 MI FROM MEM; ZME GAVE US THE CLRNC TO CROSS MIDDY AT 10000 FT AND 250 KTS. WHEN THE FO STILL HAD NOT BEGUN THE DSCNT 80 MI OUT; I STARTED TO SAY SOMETHING TO HIM ABOUT STARTING DOWN. CONCURRENTLY; HE BEGAN HIS DSCNT. ALTHOUGH I FELT THAT WE WERE RUNNING BEHIND ON THE DSCNT; THE FO WAS OBVIOUSLY WORKING AT IT; SO I SAID NOTHING; BUT KEPT TRACK OF HOW WE WERE DOING. I STILL FELT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE XING RESTRICTION; BUT THAT IT WOULD BE CLOSE. THE FO WAS A LITTLE SLOW IN DECIDING TO USE THE SPD BRAKES; NOT EXTENDING THEM UNTIL WE WERE PASSING FL200 ABOUT 20 MI FROM MIDDY. WHILE I DID ASK MEM APCH IF THEY REALLY NEEDED THE SPD REDUCTION AT MIDDY; I NEVER TOLD THEM THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE RESTRICTION. THE RESPONSE FROM MEM APCH WAS THAT WE WERE 200 KTS FASTER THAN TFC WE WERE FOLLOWING; SO THAT THE SPD REDUCTION WAS NECESSARY. WE WERE NOT LEVEL AT 10000 AND SLOWED TO 250 KIAS UNTIL WE WERE ABOUT 5 MI PAST MIDDY.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.