An EMB-145 air carrier crew reported an engine vibration malfunction which resulted in a shutdown of the engine. The crew proceeded to the destination airport and landed safely.
Synopsis
An EMB-145 air carrier crew reported an engine vibration malfunction which resulted in a shutdown of the engine. The crew proceeded to the destination airport and landed safely.
Narrative
After 80 knots call out; Captain pointed out ENG 1 engine vibration is on yellow. We continued take off since we didn't see any power loss indication; but all other engine indication was indicating normal range. After takeoff; Captain asked me to start the timer; and Captain asked me to run QRH. We ran Abnormal Vibration QRH. When Captain slowly reduced the left thrust lever (directed by QRH); vibration initially seemed going down; but it stayed in yellow indication while waiting to come down. Time had past for awhile since we ran the QRH. We decided to re-run the same QRH; and it directed us to Affected Engine Failure/Shutdown Procedure QRH. Captain asked me if I feel comfortable take control the aircraft (PF); and I told my Captain I'm confident and can take the control. We exchanged our controls; and ran the Affected Engine Failure/Shutdown Procedure QRH. We decided to level off at 17;500ft. Even with #1 Engine had shutted down; #1 HP VIB still showed outside of normal range (yellow). We decided not to restart the engine at this time. Captain [requested priority handling] with ATC and ATC cleared us direct to ZZZ [airport]. We got Runway XX assigned for ZZZ; and we ran descent check; approach check; landing checklist adequately on time; and we got about 9NM final for runway XX. When intercepting the localizer for final; it seemed we are overshooting it; so I decided to disengage the autopilot and handflown the Runway XX visual approach into the runway. After aircraft touched down on the runway; Captain mentioned do not use the thrust reversers; and we came to stop with brakes. No assistance was required; and we taxied with our own engine into the gate. Suggestions: First of all; for Engine vibration we had no master caution/ Master warning even it reached outside of the normal range. I believe it can be easily missed to catch that indication during critical phase of flight.I believe handling procedure went smooth; some improvements I think are if I took the radio calls from captain; that could gave my captain more room and communicating with Cabin as well. Also; we shutted down engine directed by QRH; but before doing that; utilizing Flight Attendent to check if she hear anything or feel anything on the back could be an another option to double check.
Second reporter narrative
During the takeoff roll I (CA) noticed the ENGINE #1 High Pressure Vibration indication (HP VIB) went into the amber range. I was pilot flying at this time; and although I did not verbalize the indication in the amber range; I pointed at the EICAS; and opted to continue the takeoff roll; considering all other engine indications remained in the green range; and no thrust was lost. The decision to continue the takeoff roll was also back by the Engine Vibration: HP Spool limitation according go the manufacturer (limited to 5 minutes during takeoff and go around phases). Once airborne; and landing gear was retracted; I asked the First Officer (who was Pilot Monitoring at the time) to start a timer. I continued to climb and to monitor the engine indications. At approximately 5500 feet; I asked the First Officer to complete the Engine Abnormal Vibration QRH. Thrust was slowly reduced on engine #1; and the vibration indications started to slowly improve; however they remained in the amber range (past the 5 minutes limitations established by the manufacturer). We incorrectly stopped the QRH for a moment; however as engine vibrations remained in the amber range; we decided to go back into the QRH; which led us to the Affected Engine Failure/Shutdown Procedure QRH. At this time; I asked the First Officer if he was comfortable; and asked him to take the flight controls and assume Pilot Flying duties; while I (CA) then became Pilot Monitoring; which he agreed to. We successfully exchanged flight controls and duties; and I then proceeded with a precautionary engine shut down (ENGINE #1). At that point; I opted to stop our climb at 17;500 feet; [requested priority handling]; and proceed to ZZZ; as I knew the airport would be much better equipped to support us with any needs. The First Officer agreed with that decision. I notified the company of the events via ACARS; and informed the Flight Attendant of the events following our special procedures. The Flight Attendant is highly experienced and was able to prepare the cabin and report back to me efficiently and promptly. Considering this was a precautionary engine shut down; once ENGINE #1 was secured; all other engine indications remained within normal parameters. Evaluating all these facts; myself (CA) and the Flight Attendant agreed to NOT notify the passengers at that time; as it was reasonable to assume the situation would NOT further escalate (no evacuation needed; nor any bracing procedures). We did have a commuting Flight Attendant on board with us (outside company); and she was informed of the situation should her assistance be needed at any point and time; which she agreed to. Myself (CA); and the First Officer both agreed a new engine start attempt would not be considered in this case. The QRH eventually led us to the Approach and Landing Procedure QRH. We went through all the steps on the procedure with no issues. Approach had given us an intercept heading to join a 9 NM final for RWY XX. We were cleared for a visual approach. Weather was VFR; and there was a slight right crosswind at the time (my last recollection was winds 130 at 9 KT). The aircraft was already below its maximum landing weight; although fuel was slightly misbalanced (the RIGHT fuel tank had approximately 400 lbs of more fuel compared to the LEFT fuel tank the last time I checked it). As we were given the intercept heading and visual clearance; I switched MFD pages to monitor TCAS. As we received clearance for the visual; we both had our navigation sources to NAV/ green needles. As the localizer captured; the auto pilot slightly overshoot the final approach course; at which point the First Officer opted to disengage the auto pilot; and hand fly the approach. The First Officer skillfully handled the aircraft; and executed a stable; and safe landing. No thrust reversers were used after touchdown. No bracing instructions were commanded. We exited the runway and taxied into the gate under own power. Once at the gate; with both engines shut down; and passengers off the airplane. The HP VIB indication remained in the amber range event after engine shut down. I did not observe any external damage to the engine during the post flight walk around. Suggestions: Should an instance like this; or similar to this happen again in the future; I would be more deliberate about verbalizing the abnormal indications; instead of simply pointing at them (as I did during the initial takeoff roll). Overall; it was clear that my crew members were highly skilled; and able to effectively contribute to the successful outcome of this flight.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.