A321 pilot reported engine component malfunction inflight. Flight continued to destination airport.

Date: 2024-05 · Aircraft: A321 · Phase: climb

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-maintenance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

A321 pilot reported engine component malfunction inflight. Flight continued to destination airport.

Narrative

In climb passing approximately 20;000 ft. from ZZZ; crew received an ECAM Caution: ENG 2; FADEC OVHT. The ECAM action items direct the crew to check the engine parameters; and IF ABN ENG OPERATION; THR LEVER 2; IDLE; ENG MASTER 2; OFF."All engine parameters were normal; so after completing ECAM and QRH follow-ups; and discussion with crew (my FO; and Airbus 320 FO jump seater; who was a former mechanic) we called Dispatch via crew phone. Via phone patch with Maintenance; he advised me that this message was a "crew advisory only" and told us to continue to ZZZ1 to complete the flight; even after I expressed reservations to his recommendation because this message was not transitory in nature. (After the ECAM was cleared; it could still be recalled; meaning it was not transitory in nature and still active.) Furthermore; I told Maintenance that I didn't feel it was prudent to continue on a 2-hour flight with this active message that ultimately would direct us to shut down the engine if engine parameters became abnormal. He again directed us to continue even though ZZZ was only approximately 30 minutes behind us and ZZZ2 was even closer; if needed. Based on Maintenance and Dispatch agreement that they wanted me to continue; I elected to continue to ZZZ1 as directed. After checking the Logbook in the days since; Maintenance found a "CLANP FAILED AND INSULATION DAMACE ON A/I DUCT" in #2 engine; meaning that the Full Authority Digital Electronic Control (FADEC) was being exposed to extreme hot air from the ruptured ducting. Another words; Maintenance directed us to continue to ZZZ1 exposing the aircraft and crew to unnecessary risk with a serious risk of engine failure. Even more outrageous is the aircraft was placed on MON for "NUMBER 1 ENGINE HAS METAL DEBRIS IN DUCT" 21 days before my Engine 2 FADEC ECAM and has 16 entries since then. This aircraft still is not fixed. It is flying in its current state as I write this report. One reason listed for it not being fixed on Day 0 was "INSUFFICIENT MANPOWER". In conclusion; our #1 engine was actively on a MON for metal fragments found (and allowed to continue to fly) while Maintenance directed the crew to continue a flight while the #2 engine FADEC was actively overheating; creating an erosion of safety that ABSOLUTELY increased the risk for a dual engine failure. (Example; if the #2 engine shut down; the #1 engine would be subject to increased load and with an active mechanical discrepancy MON for metal debris; increases the risk of #1 failure as well.) Company needs to get serious about the safety culture that is being ignored by the maintenance department and other departments within Company in order to insure a "completion factor" for personal; professional; and financial incentives to be met; among other reasons. I believe the erosion of this safety culture is going to eventually lead to a major accident with devastating consequences. I have filed previous reports regarding this matter but the reply I always get is that the report is being "forwarded to the appropriate department." I have seen no change and since my last reports. The disregard for safety has gotten worse. Fix our broken safety culture within our maintenance department."

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.