Cirrus Vision jet single pilot reported executing an emergency descent after losing cabin pressure; and was disappointed that they did not receive more help from ATC.
Synopsis
Cirrus Vision jet single pilot reported executing an emergency descent after losing cabin pressure; and was disappointed that they did not receive more help from ATC.
Narrative
Emergency decompression event. The controller(s) could have offered more assistance. When an aircraft asks to level off early in a climb; clearly begins to slow; asks to divert to an airport nearly below and begins a rapid descent at 5500FPM from the flight levels; it should get special attention. Add the obvious comms struggle (muted/muffled) due to an oxygen mask and non-standard/stressed responses from the pilot; it should be obvious everything is not okay. At some point in the rapid descent; [priority was requested]; this seemed to have been met with the prioritization of a robotic 'souls/fuel' inquiry; rather than a 'how can I help' sentiment.Emergency descents are max workload; thankfully conditions were VMC. The high-enroute Controller knew the intention was to divert to ZZZ. An initial heading/vector would have been very helpful while aircraft maximum speed and maximum descent rate were being managed. A complete re-programming of the FMS and Autopilot were also required. Two low altitude alerts were issued while autopilot-assisted level flight was being re-established. There was a lot going on in the aircraft; making sure passengers were okay and surveying the overall situation. Was then handed off to Center. Once established direct to the airport; the controller inquired about an approach request. There had been no time to obtain weather; so current weather was requested verbally. No info was provided so scrambling to load the frequency and listen to the ATIS simply added unnecessary workload. Something like 'ZZZ is reporting XXXX; perhaps the visual to their longest Runway XX.' Or 'Can I provide a safe delay vector that keeps you close by?' Perhaps it's the training; but the controller seemed to lack a human element. There seemed to be more concern about whether we were cancelling IFR in the air or on the ground vs. if we were all okay. There was no inquiry about emergency services (none were required). And perhaps some training/awareness of Part 91 single pilot operations would help. For emergencies where there is just one pilot; workload is at its highest. Pilot mistakes are very possible; the Controller can play a significant role in their prevention.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.