EC130 Helicopter pilot reported on approach at night using NVG the helipad was occupied resulted in taking evasive action to avoid overflying aircraft and a critical ground conflict event. Pilot reported that dispatch failed to notify that helipad was occupied.

Narrative

Having been advised by a dispatcher that a ground helipad was clear another helicopter; I flew to the location under NVGs (Night Vision Goggles); at night; in VMC conditions. Arriving at the location; I immediately initiated an approach without confirming landing zone vacancy. At approximately 400 ft from the helipad at just below 500 AGL; I was able to clearly see that the previously reported aircraft was shut down and still occupying the only helipad; having developed a mechanical fault during start and aborting departure. I initiated an immediate climb and evasive maneuvering to avoid overflying the disabled aircraft on the ground at low altitude. I believe this incident to be a near-miss. I then flew to an alternate landing area without incident.There were several contributing factors at play. Firstly; is that this incident occurred at night while using NVGs. Because the area surrounding the helipad is replete with several sources of ground lights (parking lot light poles; building lights; ground traffic; etc.); under NVGs the viewing picture of the LZ from a distance is 'bleached'/'washed-out'. Clear definition of the helipad is not possible from certain angles at night until in closer proximity. Secondly; while a pre-landing orbit would have revealed the presence of the other aircraft; given the proximity of that landing zone to an airport with a sometimes high density of student pilot training aircraft as well as tall radio towers with structural guy-wires; superfluous orbits are not in common practice there. Thirdly; the same dispatcher who informed me that the other helicopter had departed should have told me that the pad was still occupied. However radio interference in that area prevented such a relay of information until I had already initiated an evasive go-around procedure. Fourthly; there was another helicopter in the vicinity that I was deconflicting with over the radio while in proximity to the LZ but the separation between myself and that aircraft made it only a minor distraction to the whole event at best.Simply put however; the primary reason that I did not see the other aircraft until I was well-established on a final approach was because I had become complacent in what I had assumed would be a 'routine landing'. I followed along all checklist items and company procedures just as I had when I landed into that same LZ just 28 minutes prior; allowing my assumption of the situation to overlay itself on the reality and cause me to miss warning cues: cues like 'if another aircraft just departed; why then don't I hear him on the CTAF frequencies or see him on TCAS'? Instead I simply initiated an approach until my error was apparent on short-final. Complacency combined with minor distractions caused me to make a completely preventable mistake that I would personally categorize as a near-miss. A re-focusing on situational awareness; vigilance; and verification of second-hand information will correct this error-chain and I shall make it a top priority.