Piper Arrow flight crew reported being notified by the Chief Flight Instructor that the aircraft flown on the previous day that vertical stabilizer cable was extremely loose.
Synopsis
Piper Arrow flight crew reported being notified by the Chief Flight Instructor that the aircraft flown on the previous day that vertical stabilizer cable was extremely loose.
Narrative
On Day 0; my CFI at Company; Person A; and I were assigned Aircraft X to fly the Commercial Pilot Single Engine Certification Course FAR Part 141 training program. We went out to the plane to preflight it; Person A came out a few minutes after I had started untying the plane and we conducted the preflight together. At one point I came back in to grab a seat cushion for a better view from inside the plane as Person A suggested it might help my sight picture. I had started flying the Arrow the previous week. It was my first time flying this airplane and I noted that the seatbelts were an older style as well as some of the switches inside the aircraft. There was nothing noteworthy about the preflight; I did not skip any steps and completed the preflight inspection per training regulations.We started the lesson with a soft field takeoff followed by a northeast departure to avoid the rough air that was inland. There was a direct crosswind from the left; approximately 8 kts. We flew out over the ocean until reaching an altitude of 4;500 feet. I performed the slow flight maneuver; went right into a power-off stall; and recovered from that maneuver retracting my flaps and landing gear. I then performed one power on stall with a 20-degree bank to the right.After this maneuver I performed a chandelle to the left twice; one to the right; and then two lazy 8s in each direction before Person A demonstrated one and then I attempted one in each direction again.Person A then took the controls while I got the ATIS for ZZZ and started descending from approximately 6;500 feet. I then took over controls; called up ZZZ Tower and we were told to fly to the VOR for XXR. Originally; we asked for a full stop; however; when we landed Person A asked for one more taxi back to XXR to practice the soft field take-off again and we were then approved for a short approach to practice a power-off 180 landing. Both landings were on the centerline; not sideloaded. During the power off 180; I maintained a glide speed of 79 kts. until short final where I then slowed to approximately 72 kts. before landing on the 1000-foot markings. No slipping was done to descend to the runway. We parked Aircraft X at its usual parking spot and secured it as per company policy. At this point; the sun was setting. Nothing abnormal stuck out to me during post-flight; and the plane was secured by both Person A and I. On Day 1; I was called to the flightline where I met with Chief Flight Instructor. He showed me Aircraft X and pulled on the vertical stabilizer several times to show me how loose it was. He demonstrated this several times to show me that it was barely attached. During my training; I have not been instructed to pull on the vertical stabilizer in the manner demonstrated by the chief flight instructor. My training has instructed me to inspect the control surface for signs of obvious damage visually; ensure that all identifiable rivets are present; no working rivets; and that there are not any dents or cracks on the rudder. It also advises to check to ensure it is free of ice; snow; frost and other extraneous substances; check rudder hinge points and the last line states do not push or pull on the rudder. This is described on page XX in the Flight Crew Techniques manual for the Piper Arrow III. As a result; nothing abnormal was detected during the pre-flight; and the flight was conducted without incident. Subsequently; the chief flight instructor on behalf of Company has amended its pre-flight procedures for all students and instructors to include an inspection as demonstrated by him during our discussion. This will be performed by all future company pilots but was not previously covered during a pre-flight inspection.
Second reporter narrative
Person B and I briefed the lesson beforehand; looking over the maneuvers she wanted to practice in preparation for the Commercial Single Engine Airplane check ride. The aircraft takeoff weight was calculated at roughly 2565 pounds; and a maneuvering speed of 114 kts. With the build up of clouds forming over the western practice areas; roughly 15nm to the West of the field; we had concluded on departing the airspace to the northeast; and upon intercepting the ocean shoreline; would track northbound to set up for the maneuvers.Person B began the preflight of the Aircraft X while I was applying sunscreen inside; and I joined her soon afterwards. The aircraft was already topped off with 72 gallons of fuel; and with only 1.5 hours required for the lesson; there was plenty of fuel needed to complete the lesson within reserves. Both Person B and I did the preflight together; and as this lesson is in preparation for the check ride; Person B wanted to discuss the landing gear system and discuss the J-hooks and over center joins as we completed the gear inspections. I checked the flight control surfaces; and did not identify anything out of the ordinary with the ailerons or flaps. When inspecting the rudder and vertical stabilizer; there was nothing to suggest the rivets had been broken; loose; or missing entirely. Person B and I continued the preflight with the stabilator and static ports; and concluded the aircraft was airworthy. After starting the engine and taxiing out of the ramp area; neither Person B nor myself felt anything different about the rudder in terms of steering. The Piper Arrow alone has heavy rudder pedals from the increased weight on the nose gear; and we felt the resistance the same as all our other flights. The runup did not have any problems with magnetos or prop controls; and our takeoff brief focused on the soft field takeoff and emergency procedures. With the winds on the METAR reporting 070@11 kts.; and a departure from Runway XXR; we experienced a left crosswind of 8.4 knots. As the takeoff was performed; Person B did not add enough right rudder input to counteract the left turning tendencies; and we deviated from centerline to a point where the centerline was directly under the right main tire. I verbally corrected Person B; who promptly added the additional corrections for both rudder and aileron; and maintained centerline for the rest of the climb out. Once reaching the altitude required to proceed on course; we made a left turn to the northeast; and continued the climb to reach the ocean shoreline. Upon doing so; we tracked the shoreline Northbound and climbed to an initial altitude of 4;500 feet. The first maneuver we performed at this altitude was slow flight; and the setup was held within commercial ACS requirements. As Person B was getting stabilized in slow flight; I had to verbally correct her on additional right rudder to maintain coordination; and Person B added the correction immediately without problems afterwards. Person B had to add power a few times to remain at altitude; but once corrected; I asked her to perform a left turn in slow flight to track the shoreline Southbound now. The turn was very well executed without any issues with coordination; and our next maneuver to perform was the power-off stall to a full stall recovery. Instead of asking Person B to recover from slow flight and then set up again into the stall; I asked her to transition immediately to a power-off stall. Person B added power; lowered the nose to intercept the required speed of 72 kts.; and began to perform the simulated descent before the flare was conducted. I teach my students to perform this flare to no more than 10 degrees above the horizon to prevent a too low nose down recovery attitude as the full stall is produced; and Person B held the nose to around 7 degrees during this maneuver. As the nose dropped during the stall; Person B added full power and the necessary rudder input to maintain coordination and heading within ACS. She dropped the flaps immediately from 40 degrees to 25 degrees and began to bring the nose up to increase speed and climb performance to get a positive rate indication. With the positive rate indication and airspeed above 72 kts.; Person B dropped the flaps to 10 degrees and waited for 78 kts. with the positive rate; bringing the gear up once indicated. With the positive rate and climb speed accelerating towards 90 knots; Person B dropped the flaps to 0 degrees and continued to climb at 90 kts.; transitioning to straight and level at 4;500 feet; and reconfiguring the aircraft into cruise.The next maneuver Person B performed was the power-on stall; and I instructed her to bank the aircraft 20 degrees to the right while in the nose up attitude to practice coordination and recovery in a turning stall. Person B made a turn to the north and reconfigured the aircraft for the maneuver. Person B brought the gear down and set up for a speed of 71 kts. before applying full power and bringing the nose up to an attitude of 22 degrees above the horizon; while also maintaining a 20 degree banked right turn. I did not have to make any verbal corrections for coordination; and we brought the aircraft to the buffet before recovering from the maneuver. We waited for the positive rate indication before bringing the gear up; and leveled off at 4;700 feet to prepare for the next maneuver; chandelles. I instructed Person B to make a left turn and track Southbound before starting the maneuver. The first attempt at the chandelle; Person B banked the aircraft to 35 degrees to the left; and I had to verbally correct her to maintain 30 degrees of bank; as per company maneuver profile in the Flight Crew Techniques Manual. Person B maintained coordination throughout the maneuver; but did not perform the maneuver within ACS due to bringing the nose up too slow to intercept the 90 degree point in the maneuver. I chalk this mistake up to the fact that the maneuver was performed facing into the ocean; and there were no visual reference points to aid in Person B's situational awareness during the maneuver. That being identified; I asked Person B to perform the maneuver again in a left turn; and because of our Northbound heading at this point; Person B could identify outside reference points from inland to perform the maneuver to standards; which she did. Now on a Southbound heading; Person B performed the maneuver to the right; using the same outside references as before; maintaining coordination throughout. Upon completion of the chandelles; we maintained 6;300 feet and reconfigured the aircraft for the next maneuver; lazy eights.Person B struggled with the lazy eights on the first attempt; having a tendency to hold the nose up longer than she should through the 90 degree point; resulting in the first lazy eight turn to the left being 200 feet higher than initial altitude. We remained at this altitude and performed the maneuver to the right; where Person B allowed the nose attitude to come down sooner; descending to the initial altitude better on the second half of the maneuver. Person B requested I perform a lazy eight so she could have a good example of how to properly execute the maneuver. I took the controls; and started the maneuver at 6;500 feet. As I began the lazy eight to the left first; there was nothing out of the ordinary to suggest anything wrong with the rudder. I maintained coordination through both the first and second turn of the maneuver; and the resistance that I felt from the rudder pedals was the same as any other lazy eight I perform for my students in the commercial stage of training. After my example of the lazy eight; Person B took back the flight controls and repeated the maneuver; with this final attempt being within ACS for both the left and right turns. Person B maintained coordination throughout both turns as well; and did not exceed the 110 kt. maximum ACS speed for the maneuver. After completion of the lazy eight; it was time to make a left turn heading Southbound to get all information needed to return to ZZZ and perform a few landings. Person B requested I take the controls while she listened to the ATIS for ZZZ; and during this time I reduced the power to 15'Hg; the reason being the Arrow's gear warning horn will sound when the manifold pressure is reduced below 14'Hg and the gear is not down and locked. In this configuration I am able to lose the most amount of altitude in a clean configuration without gaining too much airspeed; while also not having to listen to the gear warning horn. Person B completed listening to the ATIS and performed the necessary checklists and landing briefing; and took back the flight controls before radioing ZZZ Tower our intentions. We planned to do a soft field landing to a full-stop back to company ramp; and upon radioing Tower of our position; the bridge; approximately 7 miles to the north of the field; Tower instructed us to fly straight to the ZZZ VOR and then make a straight-in approach for Runway XXR. We continued the descent towards the VOR; and the Tower eventually advised us of traffic to follow and to turn towards the numbers of XXR; clearing us to land XXR. Configuration changes were within aircraft limitations; and the crosswind component was the same from the takeoff done earlier in the lesson; from the left about 8 kts. We made our 300 foot stabilization call; checking mixture; prop; and three green indicated on the gear lights; and we continued the approach and landing as all required items were fulfilled for a stable approach. The landing was smooth with no side load. Person B maintained centerline and used minimal toe braking for the sake of the soft field landing requirements. We exited Runway XXR on Taxiway 1; holding short of Taxiway 2. Person B and I discussed performing another trip in the pattern because we had some time left on our block time with the aircraft; so we asked the Tower for a taxi back to Runway XXR for an additional trip in the pattern; full-stop; and requested a short approach to perform the power off 180. Tower gave us taxi instructions to Runway XXR via [Taxiway] 2 and across Runway XX. There was still no indication of rudder issues during the taxi; and the crosswind corrections that Person B used were as required to maintain centerline without feeling mushiness or needing excessive correction force. I asked Person B to perform another soft field takeoff to make sure her centerline tracking was better than the first takeoff of the lesson. On this attempt; Person B used the proper right rudder and aileron into the wind to maintain centerline for the takeoff; and we climbed to pattern altitude without any indication of issues. We turned the crosswind leg at 700 feet; and used the G500 avionics to maintain a 0.75nm distance from the runway in the downwind in preparation for the power off 180 maneuver. Tower cleared us to land Runway XXR and approved the short approach. At the abeam point; Person B pulled power to idle; brought the propeller full increase; and brought the gear down; waiting for 3 green indication lights before turning a short base; maintaining best glide; 79 kts. all the way until intercepting the extended centerline. Person B added flaps as needed to maintain a safe speed and altitude on approach; and slowed to 72 kts. as we crossed over the threshold of Runway XXR. The aircraft touched down on the 1000 foot markers on centerline; without sideload. Person B maintained crosswind corrections and the proper rudder inputs all the way to the ground; and there was no indication of rudder issues; similar to the first landing. Again; we used toe braking to slow the aircraft and exited Runway XXR on Taxiway 1 holding short of Taxiway 2. We were instructed from the Tower to switch to Ground frequency; which we did; requesting taxi clearance to the company ramp. We were instructed by Ground to taxi to the ramp via [Taxiway] 2; and we complied. The
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.