B737-800 flight crew reported unreliable airspeed indications on First Officer's and standby indicator during initial climb. Flight crew returned to departure airport and landed.
Synopsis
B737-800 flight crew reported unreliable airspeed indications on First Officer's and standby indicator during initial climb. Flight crew returned to departure airport and landed.
Narrative
On takeoff roll at approximately 110 kts; Auto throttle disconnected. I stated continue. Shortly after rotation; FO Noticed and stated airspeed wasn't right. I saw his airspeed was indicating approximately 120kts and rolling back. I did a crosscheck against both my airspeed and the standby instruments. Noticed the standby speed tape was also at approximately 120kts and rolling back. My airspeed indications were increasing and matching ground speed. I took control of the aircraft and pitched 10* and n1 80%. Airspeed unreliable memory items were actioned. The FO then sourced the QRC FOR AIRSPEED UNRELIABLE. At approximately 1500 ft. we [requested priority handling] with Tower and requested vectors for the ILS XXL. We then went to the FM (Flight Manual) Airspeed unreliable check list. Climbed to 5000 ft. per ATC. Upon level off noticed FOs airspeed around 110kts and altimeter reading 300-400 high. Standby speed indicating 60kts. Verified my airspeed with a crosscheck of both ground speed and ATC. Sent a diversion report to dispatch and briefed the Flight Attendants. We then re-recruised the aircraft and performed the descent checklist; followed by landing checklist. On final approach noticed standby airspeed at 0kts and FOs IAS at 60kts. Landed ZZZ [airport] ILS XXL.Upon arrival at the gate we did a parking checklist. We were then meet by a mechanic and discussed our situation. He mentioned that there were a lot of bugs flying around; today. I then tried to enter the manual code for AIRSPEED UNRELIABLE; however; I kept receiving a fault message. I then followed up with dispatch and the Chief Pilot. After consultation with the Chief Pilot; we were informed that there would be a crew swap. We remained on the aircraft for approximately 30-45 minutes. During; this time we kept the passengers apprised of the situation; and that a new crew was inbound to take the flight to ZZZZ [airport] in approximately 1-1 1/2 hours. Upon leaving the aircraft I went outside to talk with the mechanics and inform them I was unable to enter a manual code. I used one of the mechanic's tablet and wrote up; airspeed unreliable; FOs and standby indicator.
Second reporter narrative
I did the walk around prior to this flight. I did not see anything on or around pitot tubes. I was PM on this segment. On the take off roll above 100 knots the auto throttle tripped off. The Captain reached up and tried to reengaged it at that point; but it did not reengage. He called continue; so we continued take off roll. Shortly after taking off; I noticed my airspeed was not reading right. it was right above berber poll. I cross checked with my Captain's instruments and his instrument was reading reasonable airspeed; so I handed him the control. At some point of this process of accessing whats going on; the shaker started vibrating. We quickly executed memory items for unreliable airspeed; and communicated to ATC that we were [requesting priority handling] and needed to come back to ZZZ [airport]. We requested vectored for ILS XXL at ZZZ. We requested to maintain 5000 feet; and as the airplane leveled off; we noticed that my side of altimeter was reading about 300 feet higher than the Captain side. While we were being vectored around; we accomplished QRC and QRH. Captain also communicated with FAs and passengers around that time. Then we set it up for ILS XXL and did a quick briefing on that; and accomplished descent checklist. On the final; my side of airspeed went into the berber poll and the shaker was reactivated until we touched down. The landing checklist was accomplished in timely manner as well. Because we contacted ops before initiating the approach and told them that we were coming back; the ground crew were all ready to have us into the gate. After we parked; we did the parking checklist and started communicating with FAs; passengers; Gate Agents; Mechanics and the Dispatcher.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.