ERJ-175 flight crew reported loss of performance shortly after takeoff that may have been due to wake turbulence and/or wind shear.
Synopsis
ERJ-175 flight crew reported loss of performance shortly after takeoff that may have been due to wake turbulence and/or wind shear.
Narrative
While setting up for and briefing this flight; we missed the presence of wind shear advisories in the ORD departure ATIS. We called for and input takeoff numbers for normal conditions instead of wind shear ones. On the taxi out; numerous distracting events took our attention off of normal operations. Our taxi was changed from the planned 28R/N5 to 22L; we were only initially going out single engine; and the CRJ ahead of us in the ramp alley applied excessive thrust upon receiving their taxi instructions. This caused our IAS to jump in excess of 80 kt.; causing the FMA (Flight Mode Annunciator) to cycle into takeoff mode as it believed we were on the takeoff roll. On the short; but complex; taxi out; both the Captain and I encountered a fixated state while we had to start the #2 engine; reload the FMS for the new departure runway; and troubleshoot the FMA. When we finally did take off; we experienced a sudden loss of lift - climb rate arrested; no loss of altitude noted - within the first 50 ft. of the climb; approximately abeam the approach end of Runway 28R. This may have been a slight amount of wind shear but I believe it to be more likely that it was the wake of a heavy aircraft that landed 28R immediately prior to our arrival. Either way; the event caused us to reflect on the complexity of our ground operations that flight and we realized our mistake with the wind shear numbers.Ultimately; the cause of this event was an initial failure to recognize the wind shear advisories on the ATIS; followed by my failure to brief the status of the advisory on the predeparture briefing. Suggestions: I have flown with several captains that underline and make notes of any points of interest on an ATIS to avoid lapses like this one. I believe following suit will make it harder to miss important information that gets buried within a rash of NOTAMs and lengthy runway descriptions. In addition; our rushed taxi could have easily been avoided if we either cancelled taxi clearance or asked to pull aside until we were confident in being prepared for departure. I believe either of these things could have easily prevented this mistake from happening.
Second reporter narrative
During our departure brief we neglected to notice wind shear advisories were in effect for O'Hare. We did not send for or input windshear takeoff data. We may have caught this on taxi if it weren't for a number of distractions and an unanticipated short taxi. Prior to taxi; the CRJ in front of us spooled up their engine(s) to taxi out which caused our airspeed indication to spike above 80 kt.; which triggered takeoff mode. We then got a quick taxi to 22L when we had briefed a longer taxi to 28R/N5. While I taxied; the FO reprogrammed the MCDU (Multipurpose Control Display Unit) for the new runway and started the second engine; and I attempted to repopulate the FMA (Flight Mode Annunciator); which took longer than I anticipated. I then made a wrong turn on a taxiway; which may have been avoided if I had the FO heads up with me; and if I was not trying to repopulate the FMA. On takeoff; the FO noticed a loss of lift immediately after rotation; to which we suspected windshear. This is when we realized our original mistake.Cause: Lack of attention to detail; improper crosscheck and verification; numerous distractions from the point of the departure brief until takeoff.Suggestions: We should have looked at the ATIS more closely; I am going to start a habit of underlining the important parts of the ATIS to catch these things. After getting the airspeed spike and subsequent loss of standard FMA programming; I should have asked to cancel taxi clearance; not rushed and got everything squared away before calling again.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.