B737-800 flight crew reported receiving an engine overheat caution light during climb. Flight crew returned to departure airport and after thermal inspection taxied to the gate.
Synopsis
B737-800 flight crew reported receiving an engine overheat caution light during climb. Flight crew returned to departure airport and after thermal inspection taxied to the gate.
Narrative
We were departing ZZZ [airport] XXR. Captain was the pilot monitoring and the first officer was the pilot flying. These duties remained for the entire flight. Climbing through 10;000' MSL Master Caution light illuminated with ENG and associated ENG 2 OVERHEAT. QRC procedure was executed and the light extinguished at roughly 50% n1. We [advised ATC] an immediate turn back to the airfield. The QRH was then completed with the #2 engine planned to remain at 40%. The aircraft remained at 11;000' receiving radar vectors while the remaining checklist were completed. During this time the Non-Routine Landing Considerations Checklist was accomplished. ACARS code was used to notify dispatch of the situation and the airfield returning to. ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) was requested with ATC. The flight attendants received their brief of a Precautionary Landing; and the passengers were given a brief PA of the situation and that safety vehicles would be present for an inspection upon landing. The aircraft was then prepared for the RNAV (RNP) X Rwy XXR from ZZZZZ [waypoint]. Due to the high airfield temperatures and elevation; a flaps 15 landing was planned for incase of a go around with reduced thrust from the #2 engine. ATC gave a descent to 8;000' and clearance was given for the approach. Shortly after the aircraft slowed below commanded flap speed and the increased thrust was not sufficient in level flight. The aircraft descended to regain airspeed; and ATC gave a new clearance to maintain 7;000' until ZZZZZ still cleared for the approach. Airspeed was quickly regained and not a factor for the remainder of the flight. During short final the crew received several 'glide slope' aural warnings. This was due to having an ILS frequency tuned to a runway not in use. This was acknowledged; disregarded; and the aircraft never left stable criteria. An uneventful landing was made with the aircraft stopping next to the '3' board where ARFF was positioned. A PA was made to reassure the passengers of a brief inspection and to remain seated. There was a brief delay in being able to reach the fire commander; but eventually the aircrew and fire command were able to establish communication on a dedicated frequency. Fire command used thermal cameras to verify there was no fire threat and the aircraft was able to safely taxi back to the gate with 2 engines. The aircraft executed a 180* turn on the runway per ATC's instruction and fire command followed the aircraft back to the gate uneventfully. This was a repeat write-up with the exact scenario occurring just two flights before. This was the first time we were operating this aircraft and upon preflight inspection we found loop B on the ENG 2 OVERHEAT inoperative. Contract maintenance was brought out and MEL'd loop B with loop A still functional. We had the discussion in our departure briefing to be prepared for this overheat condition; since no actual bleed air leak was found or fixed in the logbook; only the engine core fire detection system was replaced. After the flight; we were able to go outside with the mechanic and see the engine cowl. The QRC/QRH procedure was adequate for the most part. Had the OVERHEAT light remained illuminated the QRH directed to 'Go to the ENGINE FIRE or Engine Severe Damage or Separation Checklist.' It is unclear if that meant to execute that checklist; or to just go there and wait for a condition of that checklist and if such a condition was met; only then do you execute it.
Second reporter narrative
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.