A-319 air carrier crew reported electrical and hydraulic malfunctions on a ferry flight after previous maintenance was performed. The crew returned to the departure airport and landed safely.

Date: 2024-07 · Aircraft: A319 · Phase: approach

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|deviation-speed-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-maintenance

Synopsis

A-319 air carrier crew reported electrical and hydraulic malfunctions on a ferry flight after previous maintenance was performed. The crew returned to the departure airport and landed safely.

Narrative

Today we were assigned to a ferry flight of a 319 that had diverted to ZZZ the day before for an electrical problem where maintenance replaced Transformer Rectifier 1; and had returned the aircraft to service. During the ferry flight after being cleared for the approach in ZZZ1 we experienced a power disruption where all displays went blank at the same time and all automation kicked off. When the displays started to come back and the CA established manual control of the aircraft as the PF; I immediately started the APU. With the airport in sight and electrical seemingly back online with the APU starting we initially continued the approach with the presumption the ECAM actions would be completed in time. As I worked through all of the associated ECAMs; it became apparent that the blue hydraulics and associated items were inop that needed further review. The CA executed the hand flown TOGA go around of an empty airplane which caused rapid speed increase and an overspeed of flaps 3. After getting all automation back online and all inop items reviewed I calculated a landing distance for what appeared to be the controlling remaining ECAM of AC BUS 1 FAULT. We made the decision to return to ZZZ for the longer runways due to inop hydraulic items but did not [request priority handling] due to having more than double the calculated distance available on Runway XXR. After a normal touchdown and landing we exited the runway and were inspected by [priority handling] vehicles which ATC had arranged despite not [requesting assistance] . Once cleared; we continued under own power to parking at remote parking XX.Cause: The assumption during the initial power disruption was that it was just a generator problem or related to the TR1 replacement since we knew of the maintenance history. We did not initially consider different electrical failures than before or the number of items that needed to be reset with ECAM procedures due to the power disruptions; and certainly not a hydraulic problem that did not present it's own ECAM action items. If we had just cancelled the approach right away and taken delay vectors following the failure rather than try and complete it while still continuing inbound we would have not gotten to a point where a go around would be required; and thus no flap overspeed would have occurred.

Second reporter narrative

Lost elect on final approach into ZZZ1Cause: On final outside the final approach fix; we lost the left electric system which initial lost all scopes in the cockpit and auto pilot and throttles. I took over manual; the copilot right way started the APU. It appeared that we got back the left system with the APU starting. I was hand flying in visual contact with the runway and thought the safest action was to continue. But copilot further analysis found we had lost multi systems including some hydls. At that point we went around and requested clearance to ZZZ with the long runways. We were a fair flight with no pax onboard so we were super light. Unfortunately I the go around I got behind the aircraft and overspd the flaps 3 by 10 kts. We had an Integrated Drive Generator (IDG) over heat and disconnect as per the ECAM actions. We made a safe landing in ZZZ. Even thought we did not [request priority handling] ; the [priority handling] ground crew met us and look over the aircraft. We then taxi to hard stand as per operations

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.