CARGO WDB FLC MISSES THE XING RESTRICTION. CREATES LTSS.

Date: 1992-06 · Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 4 Turbojet Eng

Anomalies: atc-issue-all-types|conflict-airborne-conflict|deviation-altitude-crossing-restriction-not-met|deviation-altitude-undershoot|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance

Synopsis

CARGO WDB FLC MISSES THE XING RESTRICTION. CREATES LTSS.

Narrative

THE FLT WAS PROCEEDING EBOUND TO EWR ON A FLT PLAN VIA THE PENNS 1 ARR. CLRNC WAS RECEIVED TO DSND FROM CRUISE FL370 TO FL240 AND DSCNT WAS BEGUN. FURTHER CLRNC WAS GIVEN TO CROSS IPT VOR BELOW FL270. I NOTED WE WERE CLOSE ENOUGH TO THE IPT VOR TO THINK A RAPID DSCNT WAS GOING TO BE REQUIRED AND HAD MOVED THE THRUST LEVERS TO IDLE AND PITCHED THE ACFT NOSE DOWN CONCENTRATING ON RATE OF DSCNT AND AIRSPD. THERE WAS NORMAL BUST ATC COM AND SOME COCKPIT TALK. I REMEMBER THE FO (PNF) SAID SOMETHING LIKE 'WE CAN TELL THEM RESTRICTIONS DON'T APPLY TO MGMNT PLTS' AND I WONDERED WHAT HE MEANT BY A COMMENT LIKE THAT. THE RELATIONSHIP HAD BEEN VERY AMIABLE THIS FLT. DID HE JOKINGLY MEAN MGMNT PLTS DIDN'T HAVE TO FOLLOW RULES OR WAS HIS COMMENT MORE OF A CHIDE THAT I WASN'T DOING THE DSCNT PROPERLY. I THINK I REPLIED 'YEAH; MGMNT PLTS DON'T HAVE TO MAKE RESTRICTIONS.' BUT THINKING TO MYSELF 'WHAT'S HE TALKING ABOUT; WE'RE GOING TO CROSS IPT VOR BELOW FL290 IN TIME.' I DON'T KNOW WHY I HAD THE NUMBER 290 INSTEAD OF 270 IN MY MIND AND LATER COULD NOT RECALL WHAT HAD MADE ME MAKE SUCH AN ELEMENTARY AND DANGEROUS MIX-UP; BUT FL290 WAS MY MENTAL TARGET TO MEET THE XING CLRNC. REALIZATION; AND EVENTS CAME TOGETHER RAPIDLY WHEN WE WERE ALMOST ON TOP OF THE IPT VOR; AND DSNDING AT MORE THAN 4000 FPM WITH AIRSPD NEXT TO THE BARBER POLE. THROUGH FL290 WHEN ATC QUERIED 'ARE YOU GOING TO MAKE BELOW 270?' AS THE FO WAS RESPONDING 'NO; WE'RE PASSING 290;' I REALIZED; 'DAMN; WE WERE SUPPOSED TO CROSS AT 270; NOT 290!' ATC RESPONDED 'LEVEL OFF 290' TO WHICH THE FO PROMPTLY RESPONDED 'WE'RE DSNDING 4000 FPM.' I HAD BEGUN TO REVERSE THE DSCNT UPON HEARING THE CLRNC TO LEVEL. WHEN THE CTLR RESPONDED 'CONTINUE DSCNT BELOW 270; TFC 280; 12 O'CLOCK.' I INCREASED RATE OF DSCNT AGAIN AS WE SPOTTED THE TFC OFF THE NOSE XING R TO L. WE ADVISED ATC WE HAD THE TFC AND WOULD PASS WELL CLR. WE RPTED PASSING FL270 BELOW AND CLR. THERE IS UNEASY IRONY ABOUT THIS EVENT BECAUSE MY PRIMARY MGMNT RESPONSIBILITY AT MY COMPANY IS FLT SAFETY! I HAVE SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME AND EFFORT OVER THE PAST COUPLE OF YEARS PROMOTING ALT AWARENESS IN PUBLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROC AND PRACTICES. WHEN I HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO FLY; I TAKE CARE IN FOLLOWING THE PROCS AND PRACTICES I KNOW ARE APPROPRIATE TO AWARENESS; SUCH AS BEING SURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE PNF'S SETTING OF THE ALT ALERTER IN RESPONSE TO ATC ALT CHANGES. I HAVE MENTALLY REVIEWED THIS EVENT OVER AND OVER AGAIN BUT CANNOT REMEMBER ANYTHING THAT WOULD HAVE CAUSED ME TO THINK '290' VS '270.' AS FAR AS CORRECTIVE ACTIONS; I PLAN TO USE THIS EVENT TO EXAMINE TECHNIQUES OF AWARENESS SPECIFICALLY FOR XING LIMITATIONS AND INTERMEDIATE ALT RESTRICTIONS DURING CLB AND DSCNT. IN RETROSPECT; I SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED A DSCNT CLRNC THAT WAS SO CLOSE TO PERFORMANCE LIMITS. IN PARTICULAR; WITH A 100 KT TAILWIND.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.