Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC on a visual approach. Flight crew climbed and continued approach.
Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC on a visual approach. Flight crew climbed and continued approach.
Narrative
Because the RWY 36R ILS was OTS (Out Of Service); we planned and briefed a visual approach to RWY 36R; backed up by the RNAV GPS. We consulted the QRH to mitigate the risks associated with non- precision approaches emphasizing the importance of being cleared; established; and protected; with Prof selected prior to setting the DA. While being vectored ATC instructed us to expedite our descent from approximately 4000ft to our clearance altitude of 2000ft due to traffic. To expedite the descent I elected to select LVL CHG and also extend flaps to 15 (approx. 15nm from touchdown). After being vectored to a dogleg; and with RWY 36R in sight; we accepted the visual approach; as we descended to 2000ft. After sequencing HADAN (RNAV 36R IAF); I complied with the stabilized approach criteria; but I failed to select Prof prior to setting the DA; circumventing the altitude protection Prof provides. At approximately 1700ft my FO (PM) began to identify the altitude deviation. Nearly simultaneously ATC instructed us to climb to 2000ft because we were currently below the MVA. I selected LVL CHG and climbed back to 2000ft.Cause: In spite of a thorough discussion and briefing we failed to 1) select Prof prior to setting DA and 2) adequately monitor FMAs (Flight Mode Annunciator). We also should have made the visual environment more prominent in our scan; especially considering we were on a visual approach.Suggestions: I will share my experience with my fellow crew members and focus on how visual approaches using a non-precsion back up creates risk we don't always consider. We should continue to emphasize visual approaches backed up with non-precision approaches in training.
Second reporter narrative
During our return to MEM; the RWY 36R ILS was OTS (Out Of Service); so the Capt and I planned/briefed a visual approach to RWY 36R. This was to be backed up by the RNAV GPS. We consulted the QRH to mitigate the risks associated with non- precision approaches emphasizing the importance of being cleared; established; and protected; with Prof selected prior to setting the DA. We received several airspeed changes and vectors for spacing while approaching the terminal environment; which led to a little bit of task saturation; but I felt the Capt and I did a good job mitigating them; I felt we still had good SA (Situational Awareness). While being vectored by ATC they instructed us to expedite our descent from approximately 4000ft to our clearance altitude of 2000ft due to traffic. To expedite the descent the Capt elected to select LVL CHG and also extend flaps to 15 (approx. 15nm from touchdown). After being vectored to a dogleg; and with RWY 36R in sight; we accepted the visual approach; as we descended to 2000ft. After sequencing HADAN (RNAV 36R IAF); the Capt complied with stabilized approach criteria. The Capt said that he selected Prof prior to setting the DA ; which circumvented the altitude protection Prof provides. At approximately 1700ft I noticed the altitude deviation about the same time that we received an altitude alert from Approach as they instructed us to climb immediately to 2000ft because we were currently below the MVA. The Capt selected LVL CHG and climbed back to 2000ft; we reintercepted the visual glide slope and landed uneventfully.Cause: PROF selection out of sequence; we were still in level change mode with DA set; prior to PROF.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.