Air carrier pilot crew reported a hard landing; resulting in passenger injury and Maintenance to inspect the aircraft.
Synopsis
Air carrier pilot crew reported a hard landing; resulting in passenger injury and Maintenance to inspect the aircraft.
Narrative
FO Initial IOE trip; second leg in aircraft; first landing. FO disconnected autopilot just below 500' and continued the approach; making corrections to deviations in glide path and Runway centerline. At 40'; rather than begin a normal round out and flare; a correction was made to lower the nose; with no resultant flare or back pressure at 20' to arrest the aircraft sink rate. Check Pilot in the CA's seat intervened after calling out FLARE" with pitch correction and increase in power to avoid nosewheel landing. Aircraft had a minor bounce before power was retarded slowly and speed brakes were deployed on rollout to avoid pitch up after touchdown and possible tail strike. On taxi in; FA let CA know that a passenger was hurt; complaining of pain; and asked paramedics meet the aircraft. Operations was told to have the paramedics meet the aircraft at the gate and subsequent Logbook entry was made. Cause: Check Pilot immediately intervened; but aircraft attitude and altitude did not afford time for a go around. Unfortunately; the only recommendation that comes to mind is increasing training time prior to "live aircraft" landings for IOE; like a "landing sim." Live aircraft landings without passengers would be best before beginning IOE. This hadn't presented itself as a trend in this FO's training; so I was not aware this might occur. I believe it was an error in his judgment on this particular approach. Upon arrival at the gate; after this event; I had a passenger enter the flight deck and introduce himself as a member of an organization. He presented his badge and told me the FA had made a PA after landing that he felt was unprofessional. I explained that I was not aware; nor did I have control over what was said. He asked what we were going to do about the landing since "it was really bad and someone was hurt back there." I explained our procedure was to make an Logbook entry and maintenance would download data and perform tests if they were warranted. The gentleman then left with his baggage without giving me his contact information. I thought his questions had been answered; but would have gladly contacted him. I hadn't even stowed my professional gear when he entered the flight deck."
Second reporter narrative
I disengaged AP (Autopilot) at about 500' so I could get a feel for the aircraft prior to landing. I was chasing the cross hairs for the next 400' vertically a little slow to correct the situation; but nothing out of stable or really close to even questioning that. Then; just before the landing flare on the ILS 17C (about 100' AGL); I was above the glide slope. I made a nose down correction and transitioned outside. I then heard the numbers from call out go quickly from 50; 30; 20; and I started a flare (way too late with not enough pitch up for the decent I was in). The CA immediately applied thrust in an attempt to salvage the landing. We then bounced and landed on the left of centerline. It was a rough landing. We requested maintenance perform a landing inspection. It was my first landing in the type aircraft as well as the largest aircraft I've flown. After the event; we were notified that a passenger may have been injured or at least frightened. Shortly after this was brought to our attention; a passenger came into the cabin while the check airman was trying to work with Ops; maintenance; and ensure the medical emergency was being handled. I didn't understand his purpose as it was clear we had our hands full and it was obvious it wasn't a good landing and needed to be inspected by maintenance. He seemed to be challenging the CA and seeing how much of the maintenance process the CA knew; which I didnt like as he could have offered assistance in his position with that experience. I was later informed that the initial landing was just above the threshold for maintenance to inspect it and that there was no damage to the aircraft; which ultimately relieved a lot of my personal stress after the event.Cause: My nose down pitch was too far into the maneuver; but my experience is too little to know that. Furthermore; it was too much and only gave the check pilot a fraction of a second to salvage the landing. Given the variables; I think the check airman prevented a tail strike; especially after the bounce as the aircraft would have had no energy. I believe my pitch down correction and personal lack of experience of the position I put the aircraft in took us both by surprise.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.