B737 crew reported Hydraulic 'A' system Quantity Low Pressure Lights and partial quantity loss after takeoff. Crew returned to field for normal landing.
Synopsis
B737 crew reported Hydraulic 'A' system Quantity Low Pressure Lights and partial quantity loss after takeoff. Crew returned to field for normal landing.
Narrative
Note: Flight originally operated using another aircraft but swapped to another after our Air Return to ZZZ.Just after rotation on ZZZ RWY XXL we observed a Master Caution Light and observed that both the Engine and Electric HYD A Low Pressure lights illuminated when we selected gear handle up. These lights quickly extinguished and we continued our climb out. We selected the Hyd page and observed Hyd A quantity to be 72%. After selecting the A autopilot on; we established roles and troubleshot. We didn't observe any other abnormal indications but noted that two days prior; significant HYD work had been performed on the A Hyd system. We climbed to our final cruise altitude and sent dispatch a call me Maintenance request. Dispatch gave us a freq and we held a conference call with Maintenance Control.In that call; we decided to continue to ZZZZ but were told there were limited maintenance resources there. My very sharp and highly experienced FO advocated that it would be bad to get stuck in ZZZZ and I concurred with that assessment. Based on no other indications of a degrading situation we decided to press on. My FO was tracking the Hyd Quantities closely and shortly thereafter we noted that the Hyd A quantity was decreasing 1% every 12 min. That prompted me to reinitiate the conference call with Maintenance Control and Dispatch. Maintenance Control said they were not allowed to make recommendations on diversions or precautionary landings and that any decision to do so would have to be be my call. They also stated that I should be concerned if the A Hyd quantity got down in the 50's". Based on our remaining flight time and our consistent loss rate; I made the decision to Air Return to ZZZ where we knew there would be the capability to get the jet either fixed or replaced in support of the rest of the days schedule. Contributing factors in this decision was the fact that ZZZZ is a high altitude airport and that the highest level of safety should the situation further degrade would be attained by landing in ZZZ versus ZZZZ. We coordinated with dispatch and ATC and we were cleared to fly to ZZZ. We coordinated with the flight attendants and made a passenger announcement that we were going to return to ZZZ and make a precautionary landing there due to a minor system issue that would be far easier to fix there verses ZZZZ. The rest of the flight was uneventful. On downwind; A Hyd quantity was 61%; down 11% from 72%. After the gear was extended; Hyd A quantity jumped to 80% which was down 12% from the 92% I noted on preflight. We landed uneventfully and debriefed maintenance at the gate.After our debrief; we noted that we had been given a new aircraft so we proceeded to the new gate and started getting the aircraft ready for departure. The flight attendants took a long time before they arrived; and when they finally did arrive; they said that they had been dealing with an elderly passenger who asked them to call EMTs after we had left the aircraft. This passenger started complaining of feeling ill. They stayed on the aircraft as EMT's evaluated her. Even though the EMT's apparently cleared her for further travel; my Flight Attendants expressed concerns about the passenger continuing on with us. Per FOM guidance; I initiated a conference call with dispatch and Medlink and we held a gate screening. Using one of the CSRs as a speaker; we had MedLink discuss the passenger's symptoms with the passenger and their travel companion; and ultimately; med Link did not clear the passenger to travel. Medlinks exact recommendation was that "passenger should go to an emergency room" before flying. Of note; the the passenger suffers from an brain disorder and was in a wheelchair so she may fall in the category of handicapped; but the passenger was not denied boarding because of any handicap; rather due to her not being cleared to fly by Medlink after a comprehensive gate screening.After all of that; we boarded up the flight on our replacementaircraft and flew uneventfully down to ZZZZ and then back to ZZZ. Both myself and the FO extended our duty time to support operating the return leg.Now for the part that concerns me most. I have been coughing for a month due to chronic post nasal drip following a severe head cold from weeks prior. Just an intermittent dry; non productive cough. Nothing that makes me unfit for duty. But on my drive home last night I sneezed and it made me concerned. So I tested for Covid and came up positive. I bring it up because the recent reinstatement of company policy Is a profound threat to flight safety and extremely counterproductive to keeping the pilot group at the company healthy and flying. I will admit that the generic email I received from company expressing "concern" over the number of times I've called in sick this year was a factor in my decision to operate this trip. In retrospect; being less than 100% healthy; obviously depressed my immune system enough that I caught Covid on this trip. Not only caught it; but have been spreading it to my flying partners. I'm certain that I did not have Covid before I started this trip because I tested negative before I left home. But my willingness to share my private medical information is made intentionally and deserves high level attention. My decision to fly with a cough was unduly influenced by the company's reinstated policy and what I perceived as pressure from the company to minimize any further sick calls. My decision to continue flying with a cough likely masked the fact that I caught Covid at some point in this trip. Given the recent" resurgence of Covid; is it not time to once again suspend company's rather draconian absent manage policy so other company pilots don't find them self unduly influenced by a policy that was implemented in pre cyclical Covid surge environment? I have been told by numerous sources that the worst manifestation of this particular policy can be found at the company's partners. There First Officers with companys pathway agreements are being cautioned to never call in sick for simulator upgrade training lest they be found to be in noncompliance with company's absence manage policy and be removed from consideration for hiring at company. I can't hardly believe it; but that is what I am being told. Even if that is not the way the policy is actually enforced; the perception of it is out there and it is having an undesired and counterproductive effect on the safe and efficient operation of the company and it's affiliates."
Second reporter narrative
On gear retraction we got both HYD system A low pressure lights and a master caution when raising the gear. The indications went away almost immediately. Upon reaching a safe altitude we referenced the Flight Manual and monitored the HYD quantity (pressure was fine). We noticed that the system A was dropping by 1% every 10-12 minutes. It was not fluctuating; as it did not go up; rather it was a steady decrease. Referenced logbook entry for previous work done. The jet had a severe hydraulic failure the day prior. The captain got a patch and was able to talk to Maintenance and the best course of action was determined to be to return to ZZZ.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.