Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a TCAS RA resulting in a descent with flight towards terrain and ATC issuing a low altitude alert. The flight crew rejoined the glide path and landed safely.

Date: 2024-08 · Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR · Phase: approach

Anomalies: atc-issue-all-types|conflict-airborne-conflict|deviation-speed-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|inflight-event-encounter-cftt-cfit

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a TCAS RA resulting in a descent with flight towards terrain and ATC issuing a low altitude alert. The flight crew rejoined the glide path and landed safely.

Narrative

On base we were given a heading of 020 to join; short time later a speed of 150 knots; then asked if we had the airport; and instructed to clear for the visual and shortly after that an altitude of 3000 feet. This caused task saturation to the pilot flying; as well as to myself monitoring. Due to task saturation activating of vectors was overlooked further compounding the task saturation; and automation selections; though not incorrect; were causing further increase in task saturation to both myself; pilot monitoring; and pilot flying. Approach I believe did not give us direction on how long to maintain the assigned airspeed. The assigned airspeed was not manually selected and during the final addition of flaps five caused the aircraft to slow to approach speed. Approach then informed us that an company 737 was on parallel for XXR and had visual on us; behind us; so we could not see them; and to switch to tower. The lack of not manually selecting speeds; allowed us slowing prematurely caused the parallel aircraft to get closer than ATC anticipated and resulting in an RA. I asked the pilot flying if he could see the aircraft; he responded 'NO' and I said we must follow the RA. Knowing our altitude; I asked several more times if he could see the aircraft. I was looking in his direction and it was apparent the pilot flying was task saturated and clearly getting stressed. I got visual of the aircraft and instructed the pilot flying to stop following the RA and continue the approach. I knew of the pilot flying's situation because it was taking multiple commands to get results and compliance indicating to me he was becoming more stressed; if not overwhelmed. Tower then informed us of a low altitude and to check altitude. This occurred just after the FAF. The visual approach was continued without further event. Cause: Improper guidance panel selections and inappropriate vertical guidance selections on the FMA (Flight Mode Annunciator). Failure to understand instructions; and not selecting manual speeds and activating vectors. ATC alignment of an aircraft so closely on parallel without staggering the parallel aircraft. Improper selections of descent and speed modes caused inefficiency and task saturation to both myself and the pilot flying. Suggestions: Increase qualifications of First Officers' recency of experience in order to make them eligible to land at ZZZ according to the FOM. Proper selection of the guidance panel; activating vectors at the proper time. ATC not aligning parallel aircraft so closely. I also use a technique of turning to manual speeds when given an assigned airspeed; this tells me that it is manual and an assigned speed; prevents inadvertently slowing down of the aircraft and helps increase situational awareness. The FO is a great pilot; very smart; great attitude; and will become a better pilot than me someday; but his experience level made this a very challenging approach to landing. Earlier in the day I flew into ZZZ with this exact same event; parallel aircraft; speed assigned; visual approach and we had no issues what-so-ever; so I think better understanding of the guidance panel; modes selected and situational awareness would have helped. I take responsibility in allowing the first officer to fly this leg; and I felt due to the fact he saw the exact same event earlier he would have no issue with this approach. Unfortunately; he was trying to do too much; and not utilizing the full potential of the automation; which will come in time. I feel that I will have to fly more of the ZZZ landing legs in the future to avoid this and other events from happening. I have had too many issues with FO pilot flying legs in to ZZZ in the past and will raise the standard on my flight deck above what is outlined in the FOM.

Second reporter narrative

On a vector for the final approach visual runway XXL; ATC instructed an intercept heading 020 degrees and a descent to 3000'. I selected FPA (Flight Path Angle) and 3000 on the guidance panel and preselect to comply with the instruction. The PM noticed this altitude conflicted with the ILS published altitude of 3100 ZZZZZ; so I selected 3100 and selected pink VNAV. I then selected 1800 for the FAF altitude when we had two pinks". We were then instructed to slow to 150kts; but was unclear of until when this instruction would cancel. At ZZZZZ; we lost SA (Situational Awareness) of what position we were relative to the approach and a call out of "set missed approach altitude?" was made by the PM. I reflexively called out to "set missed approach altitude." and this cause the aircraft to get high on glide path so I initiated correction maneuvers. Also because I thought we were at the FAF of ZZZZZ1 I called out flaps five while in FMS speeds. Subsequently; we got slow and this began an overtake from a parallel runway aircraft. We had no SA of the other aircraft and we received an RA. Because I did not have the aircraft in sight; we had to comply with the descend RA which caused a low altitude alert from ATC. We were unsure of a go around because of the descend command. Cause: Loss of situational awareness due to task saturation. Narrow ATC traffic separation. Suggestions: Communicate to PM when task saturation is happening. When given ATC instructions to fly a speed on an approach; remain in MAN speeds until sure of when to slow. Maintain high levels of traffic awareness. Be ready for an approach discontinue or go around when appropriate."

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.