Tower and Ground Controllers stated that coordination confusion during training resulted in evasive action and a critical ground conflict event. Controllers also state that management failed to create a mandatory occurrence report.
Synopsis
Tower and Ground Controllers stated that coordination confusion during training resulted in evasive action and a critical ground conflict event. Controllers also state that management failed to create a mandatory occurrence report.
Narrative
On the evening of Day 0; ZZZ was in dual Tower operations. There were four people in the Tower. A trainer and trainee on NLC (North Local Control); a certified CPC on SLC (South Local Control); and a Supervisor working GC (Ground Control) and was TOT/CIC (Controller in Charge). At XA:09 the GC taxied Aircraft X 'Runway XXL taxi [Taxiways]1; 2; hold short of 2'. Shortly after that at XA12 and 09 seconds they taxied Aircraft X south on [Taxiway] 2 and hold short XXL. They shortly after tried to get the aircraft to hold short but they had already switched to SLC while taxing south on 2. The SLC controller had Aircraft Y on final for RWY XXR. ([Taxiway] 2 is in the RSA (Runway Safety Area) for XXR) They were in the middle of a transmission turning an aircraft off of RWY XXL when controller shouted across the Tower cab to reach out to Aircraft X and have them stop. before getting the read back from the aircraft turning off of XXL he reached out to Aircraft X and told them to stop. XA12/39 seconds he told Aircraft Y to go around and Aircraft Y overflew Aircraft X on [Taxiway] 2 by less than 100ft and a guess of around 30ft to 50ft above Aircraft X. All of this should have triggered an MOR and been a report to the ATM (Air Traffic Manager) even though a member of management knew and did nothing about it.They were training on NLC at the time as well and apparently all the coordination was up to standard with our LOA's (Letter of Agreement) and SOP's. according to the trainer.I was not in the building at the time of the event I was on my scheduled day off. I was approached by the trainer working the NLC position the next day they came to me as our facilities Safety Rep. they asked what they should do about it and told me that no MOR was filed nor any reports and only the Supervisor who had the error knew and had not told anyone about it; including the ATM. As soon as I learned of this; I had a talk with our ATM (Air Traffic Manager) pulled tapes; falcon replay; and had our FAC (Facility) Rep talk with me about the incident. They were afraid to come out and say something because they were worried of retaliation and a bad atmosphere and bad work environment. This has been a major problem at our facility with our members of management. Some people have not come forward with issues or even report in fear of what management might do.Suggestion: No longer have IFR jets land on RWY XXR while we are split into dual Towers. Unless emergency situation exists. Any aircraft holding short of [Taxiway] 2 must be put on Towers frequency and they must taxi them through the RSA.
Second reporter narrative
This event was brought to my attention by the facility ATM (Air Traffic Manager). I have not had the opportunity to see the Falcon replay to help me recall this event in full. Upon discussing this event with my ATM; the following is my recollection of what happened:Aircraft X called from Location A (in the northwest corner of the airport) for taxi for an IFR departure. He was initially instructed to taxi via [Taxiway] 1; hold short of [Taxiway] 2; which he read back correctly. ZZZ Tower was operating in a dual local control status at this time. As the Ground Controller; I had a couple of others taxiing in and out on the south side of the airport; as well. As Aircraft X approached TWY 2; I looked out on final to see Aircraft Y (Later; I learned this aircraft was Aircraft Y) on approximately 1.5 mile final; so I instructed Aircraft X to continue south on [Taxiway] 2; hold short of RWY XXL. Aircraft X read this back correctly; but as he entered the Runway Safety Area for RWY XXR (on TWY 2); I realized Aircraft Y might be aligned with XXR. I asked the individual working SLC (South Local Control) where that aircraft was landing; and they confirmed they were landing XXR. Due to the Dual Local operation; and because traffic complexity and congestion was light; overall; I found it a bit a normal to be clearing an IFR Jet on the north runway. I immediately reached out to Aircraft X to expedite his taxi to get them clear of the RSA prior to Aircraft Ys landing; but received no response. Right after that transmission; the individual on SLC advised me Aircraft X was on their frequency. They issued the same expedite instructions. When Aircraft Y was approximately 1/2 mile final; I told the SLC Controller to send them around. They sent them around; kept them in right traffic; and they landed on RWY XXR without further incident.Suggestion: Our current SOP states something about to the maximum extent; IFR jet departures should be taken to RWY XXL/XR. This is the largest RWY at ZZZ. I believe this practice should be used for both arrivals and departures.To the maximum extent possible; all IFR Jet arrivals and departures should utilize RWY XXL/XR for landing and takeoff.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.