Air carrier flight crew reported after push back they started the #1 engine. The aircraft started to drift to the right and the captain applied the brakes after they felt a jolt. The aircraft had struck a tug at the #1 engine.

Date: 2024-08 · Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR · Phase: taxi

Anomalies: ground-event-encounter-loss-of-aircraft-control|ground-event-encounter-vehicle

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported after push back they started the #1 engine. The aircraft started to drift to the right and the captain applied the brakes after they felt a jolt. The aircraft had struck a tug at the #1 engine.

Narrative

During pushback from Gate X; the tug became disconnected and ended up hitting engine #1. Initially the pushback seemed normal with the tug driver indicating he was ready for the brakes. We called ramp control for push instructions which we received. We passed the clearance on to the push crew. Once the push started; ramp control revised their clearance to push to the top of the alley; which we passed on to the ground crew. After the direction reversal from going backwards to being pulled forwards; the tug driver stated that we were cleared to start an engine. I had the F/O start engine #1. Soon after we felt a slight bumping motion but didn't think anything of it as it seemed like some usual bumps we sometimes get during some pushbacks. Then there was a bigger jolt and I noticed the airplane drifting to the right. Initially I thought the tug was over-steered and just needed to straighten out. Then there was a bigger jolt; and I thought maybe the shear pin broke. I hesitantly started applying the brakes to get the airplane stopped; but didn't want to hit the brakes hard as to not cause any tow bar damage in case it was just a rough push. I queried the ground crew but did not get a response. I brought the airplane to a stop; set the parking brake; and attempted to get a hold of the ground crew. At no time did we visually see the tug. Then we noticed some ground personnel coming from the right; and walking to the airplane. Nobody was waving or trying to get our attention; and I thought once again that the shear pin probably broke. Then someone appeared from under the nose of the plane and gave use the 'engine cutout' signal; with which we promptly complied. At no time during the engine start and run time did we receive any abnormal engine indications. I still was not able to get communication with the ground crew. Then various ground personnel approached the airplane from the left. I turned around and looked as far back as I could and noticed the tug had struck the number 1 engine. The B/FA called up to ask what the jolts and bumps were about. I informed him that the tug had hit the airplane. After I made sure that everything else was ok; I made a PA announcement informing the passengers of the general situation and asked them to remain seated with their seatbelts fastened. We attempted to inform ramp control that we had a problem with the push. They interpreted our call as a request for taxi; informed us that we are disconnected and to contact ground control. We once again informed them that we actually had a problem and wouldn't be moving. We informed dispatch via ACARS. We contacted maintenance control as well. Additionally; we made various customer service announcements to ensure passengers were OK; to keep them apprised of the situation; as well as allowing use of mobile devices and lavatories once it became apparent that the situation would take longer than just simply pushing us back to a gate. Maintenance and ground personnel were unable to dislodge the tug; and operations made the decision to have passengers deplane via air stairs. The OPS manager wasn't sure whether they would fit at the main cabin door as various ground equipment was still in the way. I suggested we use the L2 door. I communicated the plan to the flight attendants and the passengers. I kept the crew informed about normal post-incident procedures.Suggestions:I believe we did everything we could with the perceptions we had at the time. Obviously in hindsight; it would have been better to use the brakes firmer and stop the airplane sooner.

Second reporter narrative

During pushback we were originally given a standard pushback clearance. Then the captain instructed them on the pushback and they complied with the instructions. However; shortly after we were instructed to be pushed to the top of the ally; which was relaid to the ground crew. Moments later we were cleared to start #1 Engine. The captain stated to start engine #1 and I complied. We had a good start and everything seemed normal to that point. Then we felt some vibrations that started increasing and I stated something to the effect of 'what's that?' or some similar wording. As I stated that I leaned forward over the nose to see what was in front of us. Then a harder hit happened and the captain brought the aircraft to a stop. I continued looking around started by looking to the left as that was were the impact was felt. However; I continued to scan my whole viewing area and a ramp person on the right side gave us the shutdown engine sign which we complied with immediately and shutdown the engine. The captain made attempts during this to talk to the ground crew with no avail. I then contacted ramp and they said something back along the lines that we were disconnected but not much more. Then safety personnel arrived and we had some discussions with our flight attendants to make sure they and everyone was OK in back as well as with ramp and operations. Also; we started the tarmac delay program paperwork. The ramp and maintenance teams discussed and planned a number of ideas to get us moved. However; the decision was made to deplane the aircraft via air stairs via the L2 door and that was conducted. We then secured the aircraft and passed it to maintenance personnel.Also; to note even though we took just a very brief look at engine indicators as I was reaching to shutdown the engine I did not see any anything abnormal nor did any EICAS messages appear.Suggestions:Having a better program to inspect and ensure the tow bar and tow bar pin are secured to the tow truck as well as that the tow bar is securely attached to the aircraft. Have another person who is not on the tug have a way to communicate to the cockpit to better relay any issues to the cockpit that may arise. Wait to start any engine until the aircraft is stopped; disconnected and waive off is received from the ground crew.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.