Air carrier pilot crew reported a critical ground conflict and other distractions before takeoff resulted in taking off with an incorrect flap setting.
Synopsis
Air carrier pilot crew reported a critical ground conflict and other distractions before takeoff resulted in taking off with an incorrect flap setting.
Narrative
After engine start; I requested taxi with ZZZ Ground. We were given a clearance to 'taxi to runway XX via taxiway 1; cross runway XY at taxiway 1.' Upon reaching the intersection which we had been cleared to cross; and after initially clearing aircraft left and right; I noticed landing traffic from the left on the intersecting runway and assertively told the Captain to stop; which he did. A turboprop was on the high speed rollout after having been cleared to land runway XZ. After stopping; I remember ground told us to hold short and I asked if we had originally been cleared to cross XZ/XY and the ground controller confirmed that we had indeed been cleared to cross the intersecting runway. No additional explanation by ATC was offered to the obvious problem. However; with landing traffic; I believe we should have been given a hold short clearance. The turboprop aircraft did ultimately hold short of the intersection but I am certain an aircraft cannot be given a taxi clearance to taxi across a runway where another aircraft is actively landing at the same moment. This was too close for any level of safety or comfort. Cause: Improper taxi instructions given to the crew from ground controller. Crew trapped the controller error and potential runway incursion. Recommend the ATC not clear aircraft to taxi in front of landing traffic.Bottom line; we accomplished this takeoff with an improper flap setting. We briefed a flaps 2 takeoff; and we inadvertently accomplished the takeoff with flaps 1 out of ZZZ Runway XX. After pushback and engine start from the gate; the Captain called for 'flaps 1.' I moved the flap lever to 1 and did not catch that it should have been flaps 2. This was the first mistake. The after start checklist was completed. We were given a clearance by ZZZ ground to 'taxi to runway XX via taxiway 1; cross runway XY at taxiway 1.' Upon reaching the intersection which we had been cleared to cross; I noticed landing traffic on the intersecting runway and assertively told the Captain to stop; which he did. Ground confirmed that we had indeed been cleared to cross the intersecting runway but I believe we should have been given a hold short clearance with landing traffic. This will be covered in a separate report; however; this is relevant because I think it distracted us as a crew further from trapping our original flap error. Once we had reviewed the load closeout and accomplished the flight control checks; the captain then called for the before takeoff checklist. The first step of the before takeoff checklist is FLAPS. Again; possibly now due in part to an avoided runway incursion; neither of us caught the fact that we had briefed a flaps 2 takeoff and instead verbally confirmed '1 planned; 1 indicated' and continued the checklist. Normally; we would both have confirmed the flap setting against the Performance Data and the PERF page in the MCDU but I think we were still worried about the fact that ground/tower had almost had us taxi in front of a landing aircraft. No excuse for failing to properly configure the aircraft; but I simply think it may have contributed to the errors in the heat of the moment. This was an inadvertent failure on both our parts to trap this error and correctly set the flaps. The T/O Config test also did not catch this error as we had flaps 2 in the takeoff performance page; but the flap lever and flaps were set and indicating 1. I did notice the improper configuration just prior to V1 (121 KIAS) and VR (123 KIAS); something in my brain just picked up on it. I don't think I would have had time to alert the captain meaningfully prior to v1. Since our jet was light with lots of acceleration; extra performance; and plenty of runway remaining- as the pilot flying; I elected to continue the takeoff instead of trying to alert the captain to the problem at a high rate of speed right at V1. I delayed rotation by 5-10 knots and climbed out about 10 knots fast to mitigate the flap setting. I brought this to the attention of the captain after we were clean and climbing out of 10;000'. We determined that the flaps 1 V speeds would only have been a few knots greater than flaps 2; however; I recognize this could have been a much bigger event had we been performance limited on a shorter runway. Cause: Human error/loss of situational awareness likely caused by being somewhat rushed due to late departure from maintenance issue; flow time and further distraction by an incorrect instruction from ATC which could have resulted in a runway incursion (an incursion which we prevented as a crew). Possible recommendations: Add flap setting to TAKEOFF PERF step in the Before Start Checklist. Have FO read the flap setting for 'planned' on the Before Takeoff Checklist Directly from the Performance Data or Dispatch Release; not just 'consistent with.'Takeoff config test programmed to cross check the MCDU flap setting vs. the actual flap setting on the Airbus (which I thought was already a safety function of the test).
Second reporter narrative
Incorrect flap setting; config 1 vs config 2; caused by multiple distractions before takeoff. Upon arrival to aircraft; maintenance was called to fill a low hydraulic system. Our scheduled out time was XA:42; but we did not leave until XC:00. As Captain; I was busy keeping passengers informed of status of the maintenance work. At a few points I had to leave aircraft to observe what appeared to be an extended fix time to add a gallon of hydraulics. The contract maintenance had never done this on an airbus before; and seemed to need a lot of coaching via phone from other maintenance supervision. We were asked to pressurize and depressurize the system; and close the gear doors that had been opened. After finally getting the maintenance complete; we completed checklists and pushed back. Shortly after we pushed back; and got a takeoff time; a regional jet was cleared to push onto the taxiway; blocking our exit. While we were starting; we asked and received permission to have the regional jet hold its position since we were late and had a flow time. We finished the start and checklist; and were cleared to taxi to the runway; with a crossing clearance given to cross the intersecting runway. Arriving at the intersecting runway; I cleared to the left and looked right as the FO cleared to the right; and he looked left. As he looked left; a turboprop was rolling out on the runway; and the FO told me to stop. I had not seen the aircraft; since it was likely already on the ground; but behind a small building which blocked my view. We stopped before the intersecting runway; queried ground if indeed we were cleared across; and they said we were previously cleared. The turboprop cleared the intersecting runway prior to our crossing point. We continued to taxi; and takeoff for what appeared to be a normal takeoff. I did notice that the FO had a slightly slower rotation and climbed out a little faster; but not outside of what appeared normal. Later the FO told me that he realized we should have been config 2 during the takeoff run; but decided we were likely too fast to abort; and that the speeds were so close; and we were below our takeoff weight that he kept going.Cause: Multiple distractions including clearance across an active runway with an aircraft on landing rollout; maintenance confusion about hydraulic servicing; flow time restrictions and being blocked by another aircraft caused me to lose my situational awareness. Since the V speeds for our weights at config 1 vs config 2 are only 5 knots apart; there was no red flag that something was wrong. Fortunately; we were lighter than planned and the V speed difference was probably only 2 or 3 knots. We realized afterward that the takeoff configuration test doesn't actually check that you have the flap setting that you have programmed in the box. I think under the circumstances; given the decision to continue or abort a high speed takeoff; that appeared normal to me; I'm glad we didn't abort. In the future; I plan on adding the flap setting to the card of information I use as a backup to cross check myself
More incidents for this aircraft family →
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.