Two pilots of a Piper PA32 reported landing safely after the engine lost power. Post flight inspection revealed fuel starvation due to improper tank selection.
Synopsis
Two pilots of a Piper PA32 reported landing safely after the engine lost power. Post flight inspection revealed fuel starvation due to improper tank selection.
Narrative
We were taking a post engine OH (overhaul) 2 hr. flight. I was sitting left seat; and my plane partner was sitting right seat. Our route of flight was from ZZZ-ZZZ1-ZZZ; and we were on flight following in VMC conditions. The flight was following the engine break-in procedures of 75% power and full rich settings. Due to headwinds for the return flight; we turned around prior to reaching ZZZ1 and everything had been running great and uneventful. Just north of ZZZ2 we terminated flight following; started our descent and picked up the weather in ZZZ prior to contacting ZZZ tower. Just after getting the weather; we experienced what we assumed was engine roughness possibly related to OH (Overhaul). At this point we were about 6 miles from ZZZ2 and could see right down RWYXX so a turn towards the airport was made. We continued having engine roughness and chose to [advise ATC]. I had the checklist out and turned on the fuel pump but did not make any other configuration changes as we still had some engine power; we were lined up with the runway and we did not want to introduce anything that may make the situation worse. We landed smoothly on the runway; and prior to exiting on the taxiway the engine stopped and we were able to clear the active runway and came to a stop on the taxiway. In our post debrief two things were apparent 1) expectation bias played a factor due to the engine OH (Overhaul); first thoughts were focused on engine issues related to the OH (Overhaul). 2) fuel management was a factor due to the increased fuel usage from running in a full rich configuration. We were running 24 GPH; and under normal non-break-in cruise configuration the fuel use is 13-15 GPH. I last looked at the left tip tank with 6 gallons remaining and my thought was to cancel flight following; get the weather and switch tanks while in the vicinity of ZZZ2. 6 gallons should be roughly 15 minutes at 24 GPH. Distraction from increased monitoring of engine parameters of CHT/EGT/pressures delayed my thinking for switching tanks. After we had [advised ATC] and had the runway in front of us; the next thing on the checklist was to switch tanks. This likely would have resolved the issue; but the first thoughts were to make no changes. Had we been in an environment where there wasn't a runway I would have switched tanks. I have a contract with myself for maintaining safety awareness and I took many classes/seminars and I will make sure those are recorded in my WINGS account. I also will be taking a class I have found on the FAASafety website - Engine Failure Emergency - Prevention and survival techniques. For all remaining high horsepower/full rich flights; fuel management parameters will be better adapted to be more often; and reminders set more prominently.
Second reporter narrative
My co-owner and I had just had our engine overhauled. I went flying with him to start the engine break-in per the engine manufacturer. I was in the right seat as a passenger on this flight while my co-owner was flying as PIC. He took off from ZZZ in the afternoon and flew up to ZZZ1. He turned around prior to ZZZ1 and started the return to ZZZ. The engine had been running well with no noticeable issues. We were just west of ZZZ2 enroute to ZZZ and he had started the descent to ZZZ. We both felt the engine surge and run rough. He immediately turned toward ZZZ2. The engine felt like it was still developing some power. While he diverted to ZZZ2 and descending he quickly handed control over to me. I'm assuming since he felt I was more experienced. At some point the engine did quit. We were descending and I was busy flying the airplane trying to maintain best glide. I was also busy looking for traffic in the area. We [advised ATC]. We had the airport made and landed successfully and were able to exit the runway onto the taxiway. I called TRACON on the phone to let them know we were safely on the ground and clear of runway. After we had landed; I noticed that my co-owner had forgot to switch fuel tanks and we had run out of fuel in that tank. The other three tanks had sufficient fuel. In retrospect; I think we both had expectation bias that the engine had failed due to mechanical reasons since it was a newly overhauled engine. When the controls were handed to me I was so busy flying the airplane; being relatively low and close to the airport; that I failed to run an emergency checklist. Also; I should have utilized CRM and told my co-owner to run the checklist. Had we done that he would have noticed he forgot to switch tanks and most likely the engine would have restarted by selecting a tank with fuel. No one was injured and no damage; I learned a very valuable lesson as there are many takeaways in this experience. One was to utilize proper CRM and also utilize a flow check and then follow-up with the procedures in the checklist.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.