Air carrier flight crew reported a Wing Body Overheat warning and returned to departure airport.
Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported a Wing Body Overheat warning and returned to departure airport.
Narrative
Climbing through 11;000' after departing ZZZ I was flying. The master caution alerted and after looking up I noticed the 'wing-body overheat' light illuminated. I said 'my aircraft' and called for the wing-body overheat QRH procedure. Shortly after the light; the departure controller handed us off to center but after a short conversation with the captain; I took over the radio and communicated the captain's decision to return to ZZZ. This malfunction had occurred the day prior on the same jet and the MX corrective action was to fix an actual problem and not just an indication. After completing the QRH procedure the light remained on and continued to remain on for at least the next ten minutes. The captain decided to [request priority handling] and ask to be met by Crash Fire Rescue (CFR). We returned to ZZZ and was met by CFR. They scared the right side of the aircraft and found no anomalies. We taxied to the gate and after opening the main cabin door the CFR personnel entered the cockpit and asked for the captain to sign some paperwork. After the event and debriefing it ourselves we came to the shared conclusion that we were not fit to continue and reported fatigued. There has been a fatigue report filed by me about this event.Causal factors included: Task saturation and a high level of concern for the safety of the flight.
Second reporter narrative
I started out the day with relatively good rest. I felt ready for Day 2.Aircraft X started out fairly normal except for write-up in Aircraft X's logbook about a right WING BODY OVERHEAT light that had occurred the day before. I was concerned because the crew reported the light did not go out after running the QRH and maintenance had reported they found a loose clamp on right Air Cycle Machine (ACM) and it had been secured. I was also curious if the crew had diverted for the issue and reviewed their flights but saw the flight had gone back and forth from ZZZ to ZZZ1.Ground ops were normal and we took off around XA:30 pm. Climbing through 11;000' we got a right WING BODY OVERHEAT. The FO was flying and continued to fly while I got out the QRH and ran through the steps. The jet showed the same indications as the day before- at the end of the checklist the light did not go out. One of the frustrating things about this is that the QRH gives no further guidance. Should we land 'As soon as possible'? 'As soon as conditions permit'?. The lack of guidance caused a further workload because we had no official guidance to go by but our instincts/experience at this point. I would say we were relatively cool and professional during the whole event but I would characterize a bit of nervousness that we were both suppressing during the flight as we were in constant fear/uncertainty if this problem would escalate further and we would lose systems or a fire would start. On one of my former aircraft a bleed air leak was a very serious malfunction that usually resulted in the plane catching on fire; loss of flight controls and eventual ejection from the jet. This was a main contributor to the stress I was feeling.This all led to serious concern in the cockpit and I relayed to the FO that I was no longer comfortable taking the jet to ZZZ2 and that we would return to ZZZ3 because we had a jet that - for the second day in a row - had an unknown situation of very high heat escaping into its right wing area. We [requested priority handling] and the FO flew jet back to ZZZ3 while I ran the necessary checklists of informing ATC/Company/Pax/FA's of our intentions and coordinating Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) to be standing by for our landing.We landed uneventfully and ARFF looked us over; there was no abnormal heat indications so we had them follow us to the gate. After we shut the engines down; advised the passengers that they would need to deplane; ran through the shutdown checklist; did a walk-around and worked with maintenance to get the incident written up; and informed ops and dispatch of the status of the jet; I started to experience different symptoms of fatigue. I was feeling a pit in my stomach - nauseous. I was also feeling a little depressed - wondering if we had done the right things and irritated/frustrated that the QRH wasn't more detailed for our situation. As I started to evaluate my Fitness for Duty to carry on with the rest of the flights of the day; I was concerned I didn't have the mental or physical capacity to go through another event like the one we just had. That led me to believe that the stress we encountered from handling the situation itself; plus the stress of the underlying apprehension from not knowing if the malfunction would turn worse; caused me to be 'worn out' and not feeling like I wanted to fly anymore today; or better yet; should fly anymore today. This realization of my current physiological state caused me to report 'fatigued'.1. Perceived lack of guidance in checklist. Add a step at end of WING BODY OVERHEAT checklist when the light does not go out to advise whether landing is recommended immediately or as soon as conditions permit. This would alleviate stress from not knowing the severity of the malfunction and then worrying about making the correct decision of what to do next. 2. No streamlined way to remove yourself from flying after a high-stress event like this. Due to the stress of this situation; I did not realize what I was experiencing was fatigue. Many phone calls to company/mentors were required to remove ourselves from flying when I no longer felt Fit for Duty. Provide more education in the fatigue program that acute stress that occurs on flights with malfunctions such as this can cause fatigue. 3. Not enough info in previous logbook write up for this condition. Would have been nice to know what phase of flight they were in when it occurred; why they chose to continue to destination. Any other items that occurred during the flight. Increase emphasis to pilots to give a little more detail when writing up a more serious condition that would warrant more facts for perspective.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.