Air carrier flight crew reported SPS Tower issued an intermediate level off at the departure end of the runway; when issuing the takeoff clearance. The unpublished low altitude level off assigned by ATC resulted in a nonstandard departure profile and altitude exceedance required overriding aircraft automation in order to comply.
Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported SPS Tower issued an intermediate level off at the departure end of the runway; when issuing the takeoff clearance. The unpublished low altitude level off assigned by ATC resulted in a nonstandard departure profile and altitude exceedance required overriding aircraft automation in order to comply.
Narrative
Flight from SPS to ZZZ. Clearance was lineup and wait Runway 33L. We were on Runway 33L. We then received a takeoff clearance. The clearance was climb maintain 13;000; fly runway heading; not exceed 2000 feet on departure end of airport; 33L cleared for takeoff.We departed 33L. We did not set 2000 in the altitude window. The pilot flying (PF) slowed the climb by pulling back on the thrust levers. This was overriding the autothrottles (AT). Thrust lever angle (TLA) NOT TOGA alerted. We cleaned up the aircraft without an overspeed alert. Shortly ATC advised us to make a left turn to heading 180. I verified with ATC that this was a left turn. ATC stated left turn for traffic.Field elevation is 1019 ft. ATC cleared us not to exceed 2000 ft at the departure end. Looking back; we did exactly what ATC cleared us for. I do not think we flew through 2000 ft at the departure end of the runway. Reflecting back; maybe put 2000 ft in the altitude window. Hopefully this will alert other crews who receive this clearance at SPS.Cause: Not understanding just how far the departure end of runway extends for traffic. Suggestions: Put 2000 ft in the altitude window after clearance is received so as not to exceed the 2000 ft altitude at the departure end of runway; just prior to starting the takeoff roll.
Second reporter narrative
Flight from SPS-ZZZ. First Officer (FO) is pilot flying (PF) and Captain is pilot monitoring (PM). Instructions were to lineup and wait on Runway 33L. Once in position we were cleared for takeoff runway heading up to 13k but to cross the departure end of the runway at 2000ft. Field elevation is 1019 ft and runway length is 13;100 ft. There are no company pages; ODP's; or airport briefing notes for this type of takeoff. We believe we met the 2000 ft at the departure end of the runway when departing 33L. Difficult to verify through side window and front window due to pitch attitude. We set the performance initial page as the default 290/.74 and 210 kts til 4000 ft/5 nm; the altitude set in the window was 13000 ft; and the auto-throttles were engaged while hand flying the aircraft. During the departure in an effort to avoid over-speeding the flaps the auto-throttles were overridden (Increasing airspeed due to level pitch attitude and throttles commanded for takeoff). The initial reduction in thrust was by the PF; and the second by the PM while the PF was attempting to trim the aircraft for level flight to avoid fighting the control's pitch up trim setting. This resulted in an ENG TLA NOT TOGA EICAS message and audible chime of the EICAS. In addition to simultaneously overriding the throttle; the PM reduced the flaps to setting 1 then 0 to alleviate in avoiding a flap over-speed. The flight continued to ZZZ with no further issues after the departure. In conclusion; we complied with the takeoff clearance and did not overspeed the aircraft; but intend this as a way to warn other crews and the company of potential non-normal departure procedures out of SPS. Reflecting on the situation we believed we should have initially set 2000 ft in the altitude window to alleviate in the departure. Cause: Unfamiliar airport; with a clearance I have never received at this experience level. Thus; resulting in a non-standard departure profile without adequate time to plan. Suggestions: Set 2000 ft in the altitude window; possible publication of procedure if it is a standard practice. Potential adjustment of FMS climb speed in the perf init section.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.