B737 MAX 9 flight crew reported hydraulic system malfunction and oil filter bypass issue during cruise. Flight crew diverted and landed safely.

Narrative

OIL FILTER BYPASS/IMPENDIMG ENGINE SHUTDOWN and COMPLETE LOSS OF HYDRAULIC SYSTEM BWe were assigned to operate flight ABCD ZZZ-ZZZ1 on Day 0. We were in a MAX 9 aircraft that had a history of a low pressure on the hydraulic system B engine driven pump. I conferenced with Dispatch and Maintenance Control prior to the flight to make sure I understood that nothing was required of us on the verification flight other than the Electronic Logbook (ELB) report if everything passed. They concurred. The First Officer (FO) and I departed as planned and everything went normally up until the climb out . Upon climbing out around 15;000 ft.-20;000 ft.; we received a master caution. The right engine (SYS B) Hydraulic EDP had a low pressure light. The FO was flying; so I ran the QRH keeping in mind that there was a history of this. The QRH directed us to turn off the right side hydraulic engine driven pump. I pulled up the synoptic page while I was doing this step to ensure we retained pressure and fluid quantity. Pressure remained constant and the quantity rose to the max of 106% on the right hand side. I opted to conference Dispatch and Maintenance Control due to the history of it and bring them in the loop. We all agreed that continuing to ZZZ1 was appropriate due to the electric pump picking up the slack. Around 10 minutes later; we step climbed to FL340 as planned. After leveling off at FL340; I allowed the passengers to get up. A few minutes later; we received a flashing right (#2) engine 'oil filter bypass' light. Knowing the possible outcome of this checklist; I gave the radios to the FO and warned that this may lead to a descent/inflight shutdown. I began running the QRH for oil filter bypass; and we realized we were going to need to descend due to the need to reduce the power to the #2 engine. I turned on the seatbelt sign and had the flight attendants take their jumpseats. We were on ZZZ Center; I tried to get their attention for a descent. He was busy with another call so I [advised ATC]. He responded immediately and I asked for a descent. He gave us a descent to FL240 and advised to let him know if we needed anything else. Complying with the QRH; we reduced power to the engine and the oil filter bypass light extinguished. According to the QRH; as long as it remained extinguished and didn't re-appear; we didn't need to run the INFLIGHT ENGINE SHUTDOWN QRH. We knew we were going to be diverting at this point. Around the time I announced that the oil filter bypass QRH was complete; we received more master cautions; this time; the once working system B electric pump. I checked the HYD synoptic and noticed that hydraulic system B had dropped to 0 for quantity and pressure. The FEEL DIFF PRESS; FLT CONTROL SYS B; and associated pump light were illuminated. I ran the QRH for all lights; which included putting the FLT CNTRL SYS B into STBY RUDDER; turning off the associated pump (ELEC 1 on SYS B) and preparing to run the LOSS OF SYS B (MAX) QRH. We [requested priority handling]; and the FO started pulling weather for ZZZ2 and ZZZ3. I conferenced Dispatch and Maintenance Control once again. I advised what had happened and that we were a [priority] aircraft at this point. Looking at alternates; we kept in mind that we were not a 'land at nearest airport'; although we recognized the severity of the situation. Maintenance Control advised that ZZZ3 was best for them; however; the FO and I saw lower ceilings; icing conditions; and wet runways at ZZZ3 and similar at ZZZ2. We had 35000lbs of gas and still needed time to run checklists and brief the flight attendants (FAs). Keeping in mind that we were going to have to alternately extend to flaps 15; loss of certain flight controls/primary braking system; wet runways; and land VREF 15 ICE speeds into ZZZ3. We ultimately agreed that the safest course would be to go to ZZZ4 where there was longer; dry runways; no ice; and more services. It also gave us more time to setup and brief. We finished thedeferred checklists from the LOSS OF SYS B checklist. Slowed below 230 kts. and configured using the alternate extension system early; and eventually swapped controls for the landing. Upon landing; we exited the runway and awaited Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) inspection. I informed ARFF what had happened asked them to inspect the aircraft for any leaking fluid and/or abnormal conditions. After a moment; the ARFF Operator came on and said he didn't notice any fluid but saw a larger amount of smoke coming from the #2 engine. I advised that it may be due to the hydraulic fluid being dumped into that engine; and it may the source of the smoke. He advised that with the amount of smoke coming from the #2 engine; that he wanted to be safe and advised us that they would be spraying the engine to ensure that the risk of fire was mitigated. Not being able to see it for ourselves; we opted for the safest course of action which was to shut down the #2 engine and follow his recommendations; especially given that he has a much better picture of what's happening down there than we do without being able to see it at the time. They sprayed the engine and confirmed the source of smoke was eliminated. We started the APU and shut down engine #1; ran the supplemental tow-in checklist; and got towed back to the gate. Upon arrival I debriefed with the Chief Pilot; Maintenance Control; Dispatch; and local Maintenance.