B737 MAX 8 flight crew reported they received an engine overheat and engine fire warning on initial climb. Flight crew returned to departure airport.
Synopsis
B737 MAX 8 flight crew reported they received an engine overheat and engine fire warning on initial climb. Flight crew returned to departure airport.
Narrative
It was a normal engine start at Gate XX with a takeoff from ZZZ Runway XXL. It was the Captain's leg and he briefed that there was roughly 1;000 lbs of fuel in the center tank which may trigger a master caution light on takeoff. He requested that I remind him to turn the center pumps off prior to taking the runway. N1 target was 83.6% per the performance data; the engine instruments were displayed on the right navigation display (it was a Max); and the secondary engine indications were de-cluttered post-engine start. On takeoff; the master caution illuminated at 130 kts. and I called out that it was the center fuel tanks. As we were retracting the gear I smelled something burning and thought that it was one of the ovens in the forward galley. At roughly 400 feet the flight attendants initiated a triple chime and notified us that they smelled something burning. I looked down at the engine fire panel and saw the overheat light was illuminated and then saw that the #1 engine EGT gauge was very high however the digital read-out of the EGT did not have a red box around it indicating an EGT limit exceedance. I notified the Captain that there was an engine overheat and we were simultaneously switched to ZZZ Departure. Passing 4;000 ft. the master warning light; engine fire light; and the engine fire bell indications occurred. We [requested priority handling] and requested a level off at 5;000 ft. with vectors to Runway XXR. ATC amended the vectors for a visual approach to Runway XX. Both engines were providing full thrust; so the engine out (EO) SID did not arm. The Captain continued to fly the aircraft while I executed the QRC and QRH. While running the QRH the Captain directed me to take the aircraft and radios while he continued to run the checklists. We received a descent to 4;000 ft. then a follow-on descent to 3;000 ft. I called for flaps 1 and flaps 5 and loaded ILS XX into the CDU (Control Display Panel) to back up the visual approach. We reported the field in sight and were cleared for the visual Runway XX. I called for gear down; flaps 15; we configured; and the Captain took the landing. The non-normal and normal checklists were complete and we landed below max landing weight without further event. We stopped on the runway; I set flaps 40 and the Captain retracted the speed brakes; and the fire department inspected the #1 engine and brakes while the Captain made a PA to the passengers. The fire department reported no abnormalities and notified us that we were safe to taxi to the gate. We coordinated with operations and ATC to taxi back to Gate XX with the fire department following us. Once shut down the passengers disembarked without event. There was no apparent damage to the #1 engine and there was no red box around the digital EGT display. I believe the causal factor was some type of mechanical failure in the #1 engine. I do not know the nature of the engine malfunction and cannot make meaningful recommendations to mitigate future risk.On debriefing the event we saw that there was an EGT split once TOGA was selected; with the left side reading 999 and the right side reading 827. I was focused on the N1 gauges to ensure that the proper thrust setting was achieved and then shifted my focus to the Primary Flight Display (PFD) to monitor the takeoff and make the appropriate pilot monitoring (PM) callouts. The digital EGT gauge did not illuminate red indicating an over-temperature condition so I did not realize the #1 engine was running hot. I believe I misdiagnosed the master caution at 130 kts. due to a combination of expectation bias and difficulty seeing the overheat light from the right seat (it is partially masked by the #1 engine fire handle) during a critical phase of flight. Had I noticed the over-temperature while still on the runway I do not believe we would have initiated a rejected takeoff as we were in the high-speed rejection regime with little time remaining. Having an EICAS would have likely prevented themisdiagnosis however I do not believe it is not likely to be changed on the 737. From now on I will include EGT in my scan as pilot monitoring (PM) when takeoff thrust is set. I do not believe this was a causal factor but it is my main lesson learned from the event.
Second reporter narrative
Pushed back from Gate XX in ZZZ and started engines as normal. Taxied to the departure Runway XXL. On taxi out I informed the First Officer (FO) that we may get a master caution with 1000lbs in the center tanks and that we would assess that as we approached the runway as to weather we would go with center fuel pumps closed for takeoff. On takeoff roll we got a master caution light at about 130 kts.; as we briefed continuing in that event; as we did. Initially it was called out as a fuel issue until airborne; after takeoff got a triple chime from the flight attendants (FAs) about smelling burning smell and further assessment and inspection that the caution light was an engine overheat on eng#1 shortly there after we got the left engine fire warning. We then [requested priority handling] with ATC; performed the engine fire QRC and corresponding QRH; notified the Dispatcher/FAs/PAX (Passengers) that we would return for landing back in ZZZ. A normal" landing was made. After stopping on Runway XX; Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) inspected our aircraft and deemed it safe to taxi to the terminal. Max landing weight was not exceeded as we took-off below max landing weight.Cautioning about the potential caution light about fuel may have set us up for "seeing what we wanted to see" instead of what it actually was. However that wouldn't have changed our decision to continue in this case. Intersting to note that the engine "red" digits did not illuminate. Also as I was the flying pilot the engine instruments were set to the FOs side for monitoring; however I don't know that I would've noticed a difference because the temps were high but not "red" at anytime. Normally if the engine temps have been exceeded after shut down the Interstage Turbine Temperature (ITT) indicator would show A red box where the digits would be; there was none. Don't know if that is disabled as a function of pulling the fire handle or maybe inhibited in the MAX-8I did feel slightly task saturated and felt slightly rushed by ATC. In hindsight; I should have requested a longer final approach. We did however complete all the tasks needed for a successful outcome."
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.