PC-24 First Officer reported an electrical failure in cruise. Flight crew diverted to a safe landing.
Synopsis
PC-24 First Officer reported an electrical failure in cruise. Flight crew diverted to a safe landing.
Narrative
While in cruise at FL400 in VMC conditions; we encountered a momentary LIFT DUMP FAIL Msg. Which self cleared after a few seconds then it re occurred 2 more times. Shortly after the third message appeared and while running the appropriate checklist for this failure we encountered complete loss of Electronics on the CO-pilots side or (Display Unit (DU) 3 & 4 in this case). We also incurred several CAS messages cascading along with multiple aural chime warnings at this moment. The pilots side Primary Flight Display (PFD) and upper Multi-function Flight Display (MFD) (DU 1 & 2) stayed operational but we lost the Autopilot along with the pilots side Electronic Standby Instrument System (ESIS). At this moment the second in command (SIC) said he felt the cabin pressure changing in his vestibular system. O2 Masks were donned immediately upon which [priority handling was requested] along with an EMER Descent initiated. We [requested priority handling] with the Center Controller and explained a possible cabin pressure issue along with partial loss of electronics.The controller asked if we would like to divert to nearest airport which was ZZZ upon which we answered yes. As we descended from FL 400 we immediately entered IMC conditions where we encountered icing; turbulence and then precipitation at lower altitudes. Manual flight control became very challenging as we ran checklists in the conditions being encountered. The Autopilot was inoperative and weather conditions were deteriorating as we descended into night IMC. As we were being vectored by ZZZ Approach in our descent and around for the ILS XX we continued running the checklist for GEN 1 & 2 Fail messages being displayed. We also had noticed the overhead BUSS TIE was illuminated OPEN along with both GEN's being INNOP. We were able to close the BUSS TIE and reset GEN 2 successfully. Systems began to recover slowly by the time we were being vectored onto the approach. We elected not to reset GEN 1 at this moment being we had already been configured for landing and were in visual conditions and not sure if the reset of GEN 1 would trip and Fail GEN 2 wiping out the electronics all over again. As we broke out below the base of the cloud's and had the Runway insight and were configured for landing we asked ZZZ Tower to change our status from [priority handling] (which the Tower Controller appreciated). Based on the checklist; we briefed that normal brakes maybe unavailable and that we would use remaining accumulator pressure along with EMER Brake if necessary to come to a complete stop on the 9;000 ft runway for the Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) inspection. After we came to a complete stop on the Runway with remaining brake pressure and without incidence with both engines still running we elected to try and reset GEN 1 without success. ARFF inspected our aircraft for any visible signs of damage. No damage was reported by ARFF; so we elected to clear the Runway to the nearest Taxiway following the Fire Rescue vehicle. At this stage our normal brake pressure accumulator started depleting on our Synoptic page so we elected to set the parking brake and shut down both engines and asked to be towed to the FBO. A thorough post flight inspection was completed by both crew members upon which no obvious damage was noticed except for a very small piece of what appeared to be fairing protective tape on the lower side of fuselage that began to peel back slightly.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.