PA-44 commercial pilot applicant and check pilot reported an aircraft loss of control while performing a single engine approach circle to land in visual conditions. The check pilot took control from the applicant; maneuvered to another runway; and landed without a landing clearance from the tower.
Synopsis
PA-44 commercial pilot applicant and check pilot reported an aircraft loss of control while performing a single engine approach circle to land in visual conditions. The check pilot took control from the applicant; maneuvered to another runway; and landed without a landing clearance from the tower.
Narrative
Completing a checkride practical test for the Cpl multi-engine add-on rating. I had completed the RNAV XXR approach with left engine simulated inoperative. I received clearance to circle to land on runway YYR. During the circling approach; I banked left into the simulated inoperative engine and added power causing the airplane's nose to rise and begin to yaw to the left. At this point I was on a southbound heading to join the downwind for YYR and approximately abeam runway XXL. I began to reduce power and bank and attempt to apply more rudder to put the airplane in the correct attitude; but the examiner asked me loudly 'what are you doing!' in a slightly panicked tone. He believed that I was meant to land on runway XXL instead of fly past it. I think he was also surprised by the sudden change of airplane attitude. He took controls and steeply veered to the right with a bank of 50 degrees. He flew back to runway XXL and proceeded to attempt a landing. Prior to touchdown I informed him that I had communicated with tower and was pretty sure the clearance I received was for YYR. He also heard this during the approach to XXR. He ignored me and continued to make the landing on XXL and then vacate the runway. Starting to believe that he was right. And I was wrong about which runway we were cleared to; I remained silent during the final parts of the landing. We both were looking for traffic as soon as he had aligned the aircraft with XXL; despite the confusion. There were no aircraft nearby during the landing and the runway was empty. The landing took approximately two thirds of the length of the runway. Upon vacating the runway; the tower informed us to contact ground. Ground then told us it was a possible pilot deviation and to call the tower after we park the aircraft. Although I was PIC of the flight from a training/examination perspective; it was discussed and confirmed in the pre-flight that if the examiner were to take controls; he is the PIC and I must give him the controls. Positive exchange of controls did occur in this flight when the examiner initially took control of the airplane. In regards to the airplane attitude prior to the examiner taking control - I do accept that I had added too much power but I was unable to correct this as the examiner took controls far too fast. It was definitely not an [priority handling] situation and I am fully confident that I would have fixed airspeed; bank; altitude and whatever else was necessary has the examiner not taken controls. The reason he took the controls is because he thought we were landing on XXL. The examiner did not request an [priority handling] or even attempt to contact the tower or do a go-around procedure. The examiner did not restore power to the simulated inoperative engine until very close to touchdown. If there was any type of dangerous airplane attitude; the examiner should take controls and recover; then proceed to turn base for runway YYR and land on the appropriate runway. I had completed all maneuvers; landings and takeoffs; [priority handling] scenarios etc.; in this aircraft prior to this final approach. There were no issues; meaning that I am confident to say I would have fixed any low altitude or over-banking that may have occurred in the seconds before the examiner grabbed controls. I do not believe it is my fault that the aircraft landed on the incorrect runway. The examiner had total control of he aircraft and I had informed him that the clearance was for YYR.
Second reporter narrative
I was conducting a FAA practical test with a Commercial Pilot (Add-On) AMEL applicant. The last task(s) to be completed on the practical test was the IAP with a simulated engine failure and a OEI approach and landing. The winds were out of the north/northwest and the applicant was receiving radar vectors to final from ATC (ZZZ Approach) for the RNAV/GPS XXR IAP with a circle to land RW YYR. At the FAF; I simulated a engine failure by retarding the left engine's throttle. The applicant responded to the simulation appropriately. The applicant correctly identified and verified and touched the prop lever of the inoperative engine to be feathered at which time I simulated a 'feathered' propellor by increasing the MP to approximately 12 inches on the left engine. Task saturated; the applicant was slightly south of the final approach course but was correcting appropriately and then lowered the gear; completing the landing checklist; save the flaps. The applicant was instructed by ATC to contact tower; which he did; and was cleared to continue the IAP to RWXXR and circle to land RW YYR. Shortly thereafter; the applicant was cleared to land on RW YYR; which he also acknowledged. Once at the MDA; I had the applicant 'look up'. The applicant looked up and began circle to the left (into the inoperative engine); as instructed; but failed to anticipate the need to add additional power on the operative (right) engine due the additional drag created by the extended landing gear. The applicant then began to descend below the MDA and responded by adding 'full' power on the right engine which pitched the nose up and initiated an additional roll and yaw to the left. I immediately assumed the aircraft flight controls and lowered the nose and simultaneously pulled back the right throttle. I then leveled the wings while still descending and elected to emergently land on RW XXL and not YYR to reduce the amount of low level maneuvering.As is often the case; when things go badly; they go badly very quickly and I did not have time to communicate my [priority handling] situation and/or intentions to the tower. Fortunately; we were already cleared to land on RW YYR which intersects RW XXL and there was no observed traffic on RW YYR when I elected to land RW XXL. In hind sight; there were several contributing risk factors that if mitigated; the risk associated with this event would have been greatly reduced.First; applicant proficiency. The applicant had not flown in airplane in almost 2 weeks. When queried about a probable lack of proficiency; the applicant stated that he was 'comfortable' taking the practical test. While the applicant was issued a Notice of Disapproval; the other inflight tasks that were considered satisfactorily demonstrated were within minimum standards only. The applicant stated that due to DPE availability; it was expensive trying to maintain proficiency not having a date certain for a practical test.Second; The ACS does not require the applicant to conduct a OEI circle to land maneuver. Due to the winds; and the ATC workload; a straight in IAP and landing was not readily available. Again; due to DPE availability; the applicant decided to continue rather than discontinue the practical test and wait for better wind conditions.Third; The applicant initially requested from ZZZ the RNAV/GPS ZZR IAP circle RW YYL IAP (VFR); but they were unable since the RNAV/GPS XXR was active at ZZZ. The applicant then contacted ZZZ Tower and requested the RNAV/GPS ZZR IAP; circle RW YYL IAP (VFR) which they initially approval; but soon cancelled shortly thereafter due to traffic concerns. The applicant then contacted ZZZ and they provided him with a squawk code and VTF. However; the circling maneuver was more extensive for the IAP XXR; circle YYR; then it would have been for the RNAV/GPS ZZR IAP; circle RW YYL IAP. Regardless; a circle to land with OEI requires a turn in into the 'inoperative' engine increasing the risk of the applicantmismanaging the approach and increasing the risk of a 'Vmca Roll' event. With that in mind; I simulated failing the left engine knowing that only the initial left turn would be into the inoperative engine and the downwind to base and the base to final turns would be into the operative engine. However the applicant's mismanagement occurred during the first turn... Forth; Modifying the IAP. The ACS requires the applicant to demonstrate the IAP as published. The circling minimums for both IAPs is 480 feet MSL; 320 feet below traffic pattern altitude. The applicant has to maintain +100 until in a position to land. Modifying the MDA TPA would have allowed more of a 'cushion' to address an applicant's mistakes... Fifth; Taking the controls sooner. Knowing the above; I should not have allowed the situation to get to the point that it did. Often times on a practical test when the applicant is informed that a task 'was not demonstrated within ACS standards;' the applicant's defense mechanism(s) kick in. Example responses include; but not limited too 'I was just going to correct for that'; 'you took the controls too soon'; etc. To preempt that; sometimes I will allow the applicant to get to a place where he/she knows that they are deficient. This time I waited too long to take the controls from the applicant at a very busy airport operating two runways creating unnecessary safety concerns for all concerned.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.