B737 Captain reported veering from the runway centerline during a crosswind landing when a newer First Officer did not apply the correct flight controls during a crosswind landing. The Captain took control and returned the aircraft to the centerline with no damage.

Narrative

Thank you to all departments reviewing the following safety report. The pilot group sincerely appreciates all you do to keep our airline; and our industry; at the highest safety standards. Prior to reviewing the present safety report; it is important to know that the author; who was the Captain and the pilot monitoring on this event flight; has had significant safety concerns about factors directly related to the event for quite some time. If all parties could please attentively study Report-XXXXXX before continuing the review of the present safety report; this would immensely help to provide context and perspective on the Captain's point of view on the narrative presented below. Narrative of the event flight:The event flight transpired uneventfully from push back and engine start; up to the landing flare. During the entire leg; the Captain acted as pilot monitoring and the First Officer acted as pilot flying. In compliance with standard operating procedures; prior to the top of descent; an arrival briefing was conducted utilizing the threat-forward briefing cards. During the briefing; the Captain did notice the light crosswind observed in the ATIS; with reported winds of 020/12; an 11.8 knots crosswind component for the runway in use. Additionally; the ATIS also indicated FICON (Field Conditions) NOTAMs of 5/5/5 for the runway in use.Some of the threats identified by the First Officer were a possible arrival change and possible approach change. Since the First Officer; despite not being high minimums"; was still quite new to our company and; in fact; very new to Part 121 operations; the Captain kindly assisted the First Officer in understanding that; provided the direction from which they were approaching the airport; an arrival or approach change was very unlikely. It appeared to the Captain that the First Officer was confused; and was mentally ready for an arrival or approach change; as he had heard; from other pilots; about the complexity of this given airport; and how it was common to receive changes in different instructions from air traffic control. However; in this particular scenario; it was obvious that changes to the existing air traffic control instructions were very unlikely. Adding to the context; it is important to know that this was the last leg of a multi-leg four-day rotation. The Captain had the opportunity to observe the performance and abilities of this First Officer for several legs before the event flight. The opinion of the Captain about the First Officer was that his attitude was above-average; being willing to learn and improve; and his abilities at the flight controls; interacting with the different modes of automation; and handling the aircraft; in general; were average. Continuing the threat-forward briefing; the Captain added to the threats the critical nature of the aircraft that they were flying; regarding tail-strikes. The Captain added this note to the briefing after considering the light crosswind component; combined to the average nature of his First Officer's abilities at the flight controls. Provided that; according to our company; his First Officer was fully qualified; (as he had satisfactorily passed the the companies training curriculum for this type of aircraft); provided that he had obtained more than 100 hours of experience as a company First Officer; (hence; he had no restrictions for crosswind landings; according to the current standard operating procedures); and provided that he had demonstrated average abilities in the past four days; the Captain did not see a reason why he should take the flight controls and act as the pilot flying for this particular landing. Considering the current standard operating procedures provided by the company; the present pilot culture; and the present expectation from the First Officer group; the Captain thought it would have been impractical; and even detrimental to safety; to take the flight controls from this First Officer; in advance of this landing scenario; with such a light crosswind component.As explained at the beginning of this report; in order to contextualize the information on the paragraph immediately above; a thorough review of Report-XXXXX is necessary. After discussing the possible threats; the First Officer continued the arrival briefing. During said briefing; the First Officer did include the current weather at the destination; taking the reported winds into consideration. The descent and approach phases of the flight continued very uneventfully. Upon check-in with the tower; the wind check provided to the Captain was 030/14; a 13.6 knots crosswind component for the runway in use. This crosswind component was still quite light (according to the current standard operating procedures; even a "high minimums" First Officer would had been allowed to land on it). Because of this reason; and the reasons explained two paragraphs above; the Captain allowed the First Officer to continue the approach. During the flare; the Captain noticed the First Officer was about to touchdown on a crab which; even though the Captain believes this standard operating procedure is certainly unreasonable; touching-down in a crab is clearly allowed by the company standard operating procedures. Even though the Captain was starting to feel uncomfortable by this point; in order to not interfere with his First Officer's technique (which was in absolute compliance of all standard operating procedures); the Captain remained silent and decided to let his First Officer "do his job". Essentially; the Captain wanted to avoid micro-managing a First Officer which; as previously mentioned; was operating the airplane in universal compliance with the companies standard operating procedures.Immediately after touchdown; as it often happens when pilots touchdown utilizing the crosswind landing technique this First Officer utilized; the aircraft departed the runway center line. However; in this case; the pilot flying failed to apply immediate correction.After the moment of touchdown; everything happened very rapidly; quite literally; "in the blink of an eye". After touchdown; the next thing the Captain knew was that the airplane under his command and responsibility was remarkably away from the runway center line. It is believed by the Captain that passengers observing through the right side windows would had been; perhaps; able to see the runway center line. Possibly; the aircraft deviated so much from the center line that; at the point of maximum deviation; it is believed the aircraft reached the mid-point between the center line and the left runway edge. In compliance with company guidance; the Captain verbalized "center line"; in observance of the step "Identify" in the model.Before the situation became truly critical; and irreversible; there was; simply; no time to observe the step "Command"; so the Captain proceeded directly to the step "Intervene". The Captain joined the First Officer in the flight controls. The First Officer was already correcting towards the center line. At that point; the Captain also actuated the reversers; which had been forgotten by the First Officer; due to task saturation and; simultaneously; verbalized "my controls".The Captain assumed control of the aircraft and returned it to the center line safely. A few seconds later; the Captain proceeded to exit the runway at the next taxiway high speed; normally. After the event; in compliance with standard operating procedures; a thorough flight debrief was conducted; with emphasis on the landing that had just occurred.The author of this narrative hopes it is decidedly clear that this report is; in no way; aimed to criticize the performance of this First Officer (or Captain); or to evaluate their actions (or inactions) during the event flight's landing. Instead; in conjunction with Report-XXXXXX; the objective of these safety reports is to illustrate to our company; the Federal Aviation Administration; and the union; that the very ambivalent; abstract; and ultimately; unclear guidance (or lack of guidance) currently provided by the companies standard operating procedures; in regards to First Officers limitations; can compromise the safety of the flight. In the experience of the author of this report; most First Officers may handle crosswind landings rather poorly. This may be especially factual for First Officers new to Part 121 operations; with limited experience in larger airliners. In the opinion of the author of this report; despite having more than 100 hours as a First Officer; most Second in Command pilots; even after this milestone; may continue to severely lack the experience and; mostly; the perspective; required to handle a large airliner in challenging situations. In any case; the problem is not; necessarily; the possible lack of experience; or perspective; in Second in Command pilots. Instead; the safety concern of the author resides on the lack of tools or company provides to Captains to take the controls; in advance; when challenging situations are anticipated. (Please refer to Report-XXXXXX).Had the company given more tools to the Captain; in the standard operating procedures; to take control of the airplane; in advance of this landing; given the conditions; perhaps the Captain would had decided to take controls during the descent; in preparation for landing; considering the crosswind component and the FICON NOTAMs of 5/5/5. Moreover; and as a conclusion; the parties reviewing this report are invited to consider what could had happened had the crosswind component been stronger; had the runway been narrower; or had the runway been cluttered.Under the current standard operating procedures; this First Officer was not limited by FOM XX.XX.X. Hence; apart from FOM XX.XX.Y; this First Officer observed no restrictions; whatsoever; for any crosswind condition or runway cluttering condition. Yet; perhaps; he still very much mishandled this crosswind landing. Please refer to Report-XXXXXX for an explanation on the practical invalidity of FOM XX.XX.Y; from the perspective of a Captain; in day-to-day line operations. The author of this report wonders: Under the current standard operating procedures; regarding First Officers limitations; would the Captain had been able to effectively take the controls from his First Officer; in advance of this landing; without hurting the First Officer's professional pride and; hence; eroding their professional relationship; and therefore; compromising crew resource management? Asa company; the Federal Aviation Administration; and the union know; an eroded professional relationship in the flight deck directly compromises safety. On the other hand; under the current standard operating procedures; regarding First Officers limitations; had the crosswind component been stronger; or had the runway been cluttered; and had the Captain decided to allow the First Officer to continue the approach; due to the practical invalidity of FOM XX.XX.Y; would the crew had been able to recover from such a center line deviation; probably caused by a poorly managed crosswind landing?FOM XX.XX.Y does acknowledges that there are; certainly; operational factors that suggest that the Captain should serve as pilot flying on a particular segment. If the company is aware that these operational factors do exist; why are they not clearly outlined for both; Captains and First Officers; providing clear instructions; boundaries; and expectations for both pilots in the flight deck?Where is the limit?"