EMB-170 flight crew reported that while being vectored for a night visual approach ATC had the aircraft high and fast resulting in the flight crew trying to configure the aircraft that had them overshoot the final approach course and flight towards terrain. The flight crew was able to make a stable approach to the airport.
Synopsis
EMB-170 flight crew reported that while being vectored for a night visual approach ATC had the aircraft high and fast resulting in the flight crew trying to configure the aircraft that had them overshoot the final approach course and flight towards terrain. The flight crew was able to make a stable approach to the airport.
Narrative
Being vectored to do Visual approach RWY XXR backed up with RNAV X XXR. Approach left us high and fast as they were about to turn us base just outside the final approach fix. At which point I was trying to slow down and descend from 250 down to appropriate speeds for flaps. Approach cleared us for the visual but my attention was a little too focused on trying slow down that I did not press NAV early enough for the course to capture properly; instead we overshot the course by some. Once this happened I turned off the autopilot to hand fly since we had the runway in sight and our speed was back under control but still had to configure some more. We were lined up with centerline prior to FAF; I asked for the flight director off since I was no longer following it. I lost situational awareness of my altitude and began to drift down to the point of 1000 FT above TDZE 5 nm out. My first officer challenged me and I halted my descent to level there. Upon getting closer to the runway I began my descent again and the flight continued with no other issues.Suggestions: In hindsight I was definitely complacent and just lost situational awareness of my altitude in relation to my distance. My FO did a good job of monitoring the situation and informing me of deviations to make the proper corrections. What would have helped me avoid this situation in the first place would have been to slow down a bit sooner than I did. This would have helped with staying ahead of the airplane and not fall behind. A go-around should have been initiated by myself or the first officer.
Second reporter narrative
I was the pilot monitoring and the captain was the pilot flying. We were being vectored for the visual approach to XXR. We had the RNAV XXR loaded as the backup since it was at night. As we were being vectored we were given the descent from 6000 feet to 4000 feet on a 45* between base and downwind leg. Then we were given the turn to base and descent to 3000 feet and called the airport in sight. At this point I said to the captain that we were high. We were also still slowing from 250 knots. We got the altitude and speed under control however the captain was late to push the nav button after we were cleared for the approach so the autopilot did not capture the course. We ended up being left of course and the captain turned the autopilot off and was correcting; he also asked me to turn off his flight director. As he got us back on the correct lateral course I noticed that we had been descending while he corrected. The final approach fix altitude was 3000 feet and I warned him that we were at 2500 feet. However it was visual and he said correcting and slowed the descent so I did not call the go-around. Then as we passed the final approach fix I reminded him that we were still low and he said he was leveling off. There was no PAPI to reference so I continued to watch the vertical path. He had us leveled off just above 1000 feet AGL; fully configured. He held this until he was back on the vertical path and was then making a stable descent by the 500 foot callout. We landed after with no issues.Suggestions: When we were originally off course I should have just told tower that we needed to get re-vectored for the approach. As we continued the approach I felt uncomfortable and was trying to express it by reminding the captain that we were low. However I should have just called the go-around and left it at that. I think I let the fact that it was visual sway me that we could fix the approach since we had the runway in sight. However looking back I should have called for a soft go-around before we even crossed the final approach fix and then definitely after as we leveled off to get back on the path. I also think we should have made the TDZE a bigger part of our brief because it was higher than what we are used to.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.